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Abstract  
 
The present study is an inquiry into power transition and how it relates to international 
social structure comprised of state practice, norms, international law and international 
organisations. It examines how the behaviour of rising powers and international political 
change in the context of power transition are governed and guided by international social 
structure through exploring the interface between three themes in International Relations 
scholarship: power transition, the interwar debate on peaceful change and reform of the 
UN Security Council. Via integration of elements of English School theory and hitherto 
neglected, but nevertheless valuable insights from the interwar debate on peaceful change, 
the study sets out the socio-structural conception of power transition—or, to be more 
accurate, of international political change in the context of power transition—as an 
institutionally governed process, presents a distinctive way of theorising power transition 
that radically departs from the materialistic, mechanistic and state-centric conception of 
power transition prevalent in the existing literature on power transition, and develops a 
framework for analysing actual cases of power transition from the socio-structural 
perspective, taking Security Council reform as a case study. The study emphasises the 
diversity of institutions governing change in international society, highlighting the role of 
international law and international organisations designed for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, such as the League of Nations and the UN, in managing 
international political change in the context of power transition, and showing the role that 
the Security Council as an agent of international political change plays in entrenching the 
institution of peaceful change in contemporary international society via exercise of its 
powers under Chapter VI and potentially Chapter VII of the UN Charter. From this 
standpoint, the study questions and reframes the existing debate on Security Council 
reform, specifying key issues to be addressed in future debate thereon.  
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Introduction  
 
 
 
Power transition has featured prominently in contemporary debates on world politics, 
both within academia and beyond. In the present study, power transition is defined as 
shifts in the distribution of material capacities of sovereign states which may well have 
the effect of significantly altering the existing polarity of the international system. Power 
is understood here in terms of material capacity rather than in terms of authority. During 
the last decade or two, the rise of the BRICS, and especially China’s ‘peaceful rise’, has 
generated a growing literature on how power shifts among states impact on the 
international system. There is an increasing awareness that it is vitally important to 
comprehend the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political 
change if we are to better analyse and understand new trends in contemporary world 
politics.  
The present study is an inquiry into power transition and how it relates to state 
practice, norms, international law and international organisations (the term ‘international 
social structure’ will hereafter be used as a generic term for these factors). The study 
explores how the behaviour of rising powers and international political change in the 
context of power transition are governed and guided by international social structure, 
presents a framework for analysing actual cases of power transition from such a socio-
structural perspective, and discusses how the existing international social structure can be 
reformed so as to better manage international political change in this age of global power 
transition. I shall address these tasks by exploring the interface between three themes in 
10 
 
International Relations (hereafter IR)1 scholarship: power transition, the interwar debate 
on peaceful change, and reform of the UN Security Council. Although these themes have 
tended to be studied separately in IR scholarship, being able to explain how they are 
interconnected is a major step forward in the understanding of the behaviour of rising 
powers in the context of power transition. It is my intention to demonstrate how they are 
related to each other.  
In this introduction, I shall sketch out the direction of the present study by pointing 
out the problems of the existing literature on power transition and by explaining how this 
study intends to address them and why it is necessary to do so. The primary and secondary 
research questions that are to be addressed in this study will be formulated and set out in 
chapter 1.  
The present study follows much of the existing literature on power transition in 
seeing the central goal of power transition studies as lying in the better understanding of 
the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political change. 2 
However, the study departs from much of the literature in taking a socio-structural 
approach in seeking to deepen our understanding of these political phenomena. I am 
sceptical of the approach taken by much of the existing literature for the reason that it 
pays insufficient attention to whether, how and to what extent international social 
structure affects the behaviour of rising powers and international political change in the 
context of power transition. Underlying the prevalent approach in the extant literature is 
the conception of the norms, rules and institutions in the international system as being 
                                                   
1  I will use the term ‘International Relations’ with uppercase letters to refer to the 
academic discipline whose purpose lies in studying international relations, that is, 
relations among nations.  
2  See, for example, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981; A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd edn, New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1968[1958]; Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan 
C. Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efird and A.F.K. Organski, 
Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, New York: Chatham House, 2000.  
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merely reflective of power relations within that system.3 Under this conception, the 
behaviour of rising powers is treated as a variable explaining the character of norms, rules 
and institutions in the international system. States, including rising powers, are treated as 
if they were rational actors who make decisions and act solely on the basis of cost-benefit 
calculations, responding to changes in the configuration of material power in the 
international system. This prevalent approach has led to the neglect of the significance 
and role of international social structure in international political change, distracting 
attention from how the behaviour of rising powers is governed and guided by the social 
structure of a given international system.  
This is not to say that the existing literature on power transition has been completely 
blind to questions concerning the modalities of international political change. On the 
contrary, one of the central claims made in the existing literature is that international 
political changes are often brought about by war.4 The problem with this claim is that it 
tends to reduce the modalities of international political change to, or understand them in 
terms of, the war/non-war dichotomy, thereby downplaying the diversity of ways in which 
international political changes in the context of power transition are brought about in the 
international system in practice.  
The diversity of the modalities of international political change can be analysed 
only by theorising power transition from the socio-structural perspective that emphasises 
the significance and role of international social structure in the process of international 
political change. This study seeks to address this theoretical problem by developing an 
English School (hereafter ES) conception of power transition. As will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 1, ES theory provides a suite of conceptual tools for capturing the 
                                                   
3 Gilpin, War and Change, p. xi; Organski, World Politics, p. 364; Tammen et al., Power 
Transitions, p. 9.  
4 Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 15, 197; Robert Gilpin, ‘The Theory of Hegemonic War’, 
The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18/4, 1988, pp. 591–613; Organski, World 
Politics, p. 371; Tammen et al., Power Transitions, pp. 21–33.  
12 
 
institutional features of international societies and potentially for analysing the behaviour 
of rising powers with reference to them, and it is this quality that makes it the most 
appropriate theoretical underpinning of this study. On the basis of theoretical insights 
offered by ES theory, I will develop an ES conception of power transition and, on this 
basis, present a framework for the socio-structural analysis of power transition. The 
primary benefit of taking this approach is that it enables production of historically and 
sociologically thick accounts of power transition.5  
As part of these endeavours, the present study will shed light on peaceful change 
and the interwar debate thereon. The term ‘peaceful change’ has been used in many 
different ways, but, in the present study, I shall use the term to refer to the social practice 
aimed at peacefully bringing about changes in the international status quo the continuance 
of which may give rise to international grievances, thereby leading to the destabilisation 
of the international order and potentially to war. In other words, peaceful change is to be 
understood in the present context not in terms of individual and specific changes 
peacefully made in the international status quo, but in terms of customary manners or 
habitual ways of effecting such changes in a given international system.  
The international status quo with which peaceful change is concerned is not any 
international status quo, but that against which states have grievances. Therefore, changes 
that the practice of peaceful change seeks to bring about are changes that would help 
                                                   
5 Stephen Krasner has described ES theory as follows: ‘For students of international 
relations the English school is the best-known sociological perspective’. Stephen Krasner, 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 46. 
See also Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and 
the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 
1; Andrew Hurrell, ‘Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy Firmly within the 
English School’, Review of International Studies, 27/3, 2001, pp. 489–494; Andrew 
Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 16–17; Laust Schouenborg, ‘A New 
Institutionalism?: The English School as International Sociological Theory’, 
International Relations, 25/1, 2011, pp. 26–44; John Williams, Ethics, Diversity, and 
World Politics: Saving Pluralism from Itself?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 
2.  
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assuage and eliminate grievances of states against the international status quo. Such 
changes can be of various types depending on the state or states that are dissatisfied with 
the international status quo (e.g. territorial readjustment, the establishment of fair trade 
rules, structural reform of multilateral organisations, and hegemonic transition, i.e. 
change of the hegemon in a given international system).  
Peaceful change is not a mere recurring pattern of state behaviour, but is best 
understood as a purposeful, structured and institutionalised practice underpinned by the 
moral and sometimes even legal conviction that the political changes in the international 
status quo ought to be effected in a peaceful and orderly manner, i.e. without recourse to 
the threat or use of force. In this sense, it can be regarded as a fundamental or, in ES 
terminology, primary institution of international society (more on this concept in chapter 
1).6 As will be discussed later in this study, peaceful change can be practised in a number 
of ways, such as by means of negotiation, third-party judgement, etc. Given this 
conception of peaceful change, the problem of peaceful change can be defined as one that 
concerns how to establish a social practice or institution aimed at peacefully bringing 
about changes in aspects of the international status quo causing international grievances.  
The problem of peaceful change takes on particular importance in the context of 
power transition. For rising powers can be tempted to exercise their growing power vis-
à-vis other states and to have recourse to the threat and even use of force in order to obtain 
changes in the international status quo which they deem as unsatisfactory, unfair or unjust. 
This poses challenges as to how and to what extent a given international social structure 
can accommodate rising powers’ attempts to revise aspects of the international political 
status quo, and as to how that structure can be reformed so as to increase its ability to 
guide and govern their behaviour. It is with these challenges that the present study is 
primarily concerned.  
The present study will turn to the interwar debate on peaceful change for a threefold 
                                                   
6 See Buzan, From International to World Society?, p. 167.  
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purpose. Firstly, this will enable us to retrieve hitherto neglected and/or misunderstood 
insights that are nonetheless still relevant to power transition studies. Although IR 
scholarship during the interwar period has often been depicted as the First Great Debate,7 
it was in fact characterised by a substantial and sophisticated debate over how 
international society should respond to power shifts among states that engaged some of 
the most prominent and influential scholars and practitioners of the day. Among other 
things, the debate offers valuable insights into the relationship between power transition 
and international social structure. Indeed, the debate represents the most systematic and 
rigorous attempt in the history of IR scholarship to theorise this relationship. As 
mentioned above, the present study seeks to establish that the process of political change 
in the context of power transition is guided and governed by international social structure, 
and the insights gained from the analysis of the interwar debate on peaceful change help 
us to develop a distinctive way of thinking about and theorising the diversity of modalities 
of international political change in the context of power transition, which is ascribable to 
the presence of international social structure. In particular, the debate offers valuable 
insights for thinking about how international law, especially that governing peaceful 
settlement of disputes, and international organisations designed for the maintenance of 
international peace and order, such as the League of Nations and the UN, add to the 
diversity of modalities of international political change, including changes in the context 
of power transition.  
Secondly, the focus on the interwar debate on peaceful change enables us to shed 
light on the problem of peaceful change in contemporary international society. The 
establishment of a social practice or institution aimed at peacefully bringing about 
                                                   
7 See, for example, Brian C. Schmidt (ed.), International Relations and the First Great 
Debate, London: Routledge, 2012. This depiction has been challenged by ‘revisionists’ 
in IR historiography. See, for example, Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Did the Realist-Idealist 
Great Debate Really Happen?: A Revisionist History of International Relations’, 
International Relations, 16/1, 2002, pp. 33–51; Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the “First 
Great Debate”’, Review of International Studies, 24/5, 1998, pp. 1–15.  
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international political changes is one of the most pressing problems that have yet to be 
fully resolved under contemporary international law and the UN system, as will be 
discussed later in the present study. And the importance of this unresolved problem is of 
growing importance as contemporary international society faces mounting challenges 
posed by rising powers intent upon revising aspects of the international status quo. The 
insights the interwar debate provides help us not only to better understand how and to 
what extent international social structure guides and governs the behaviour of rising 
powers in contemporary international society, but also to consider how it is that the 
existing international social structure can be reformed so as to further entrench the 
practice of peaceful change in contemporary international society facing global power 
transition.  
Thirdly, the insights retrieved from the debate will provide the basis on which to 
rework ES theory. Although ES theory provides conceptual tools for analysing the 
behaviour of states in connection with international social structure,8 the ES has yet to 
develop its own distinctive analytical framework for power transition analysis that 
matches its ambition to provide a grand-theoretical perspective on world politics.9 By 
incorporating the insights offered by the debate in ES theory, this study seeks to develop 
an ES framework for analysing actual cases of power transition in the past, present and 
future.  
The framework will bring in the distinction between issue-specific and general 
institutions, which enables the analysis of the institutions governing the behaviour of 
rising powers and international political change not only in general but also in connection 
                                                   
8 See, for example, Buzan, From International to World Society?; Kilian Spandler, ‘The 
Political International Society: Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions’, Review of 
International Studies, 41/3, 2015, pp. 601–622.  
9 See, for example, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International 
Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International 
Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000; Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A 
Comparative Historical Analysis, London: Routledge, 1992.  
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with specific issue-areas. 10  Taking advantage of this analytical virtue, this study 
examines the issue of reform of the UN Security Council with a view to understanding 
how institutions of contemporary international society shape the behaviour of the rising 
powers pursuing this political goal. What characterises the existing literature on power 
transition is the scarcity of theoretical analyses of Council reform. The linkage between 
power transition and the issue of Council reform is evident and requires no explanation. 
Indeed, many works on power transition touch on this issue, showing an understanding 
of its significance for, or relevance to, power transition in contemporary world politics.11 
However, efforts to establish their connection have not been accompanied by 
commensurate efforts to put theories of power transition to the test by applying them to 
this issue.  
While it is difficult to explain why certain things have not happened, I venture to 
say that the lack of theoretical analyses of Council reform is primarily due to the simple 
fact that the existing theories of power transition are ill-suited for such an analysis; they 
are not fit for purpose in the first place. The primary purpose of much of the existing 
theoretical literature on power transition has been to identify the correlation between 
power shifts and the occurrence of wars. In order to improve the explanatory power of 
their theories, scholars have focused on key variables such as the (dis)satisfaction of 
states. 12  However, such a theory of power transition is not enough to capture the 
                                                   
10 The concept of issue-area has been widely used in comparative foreign policy analysis, 
and the publication of Power and Interdependence written by Robert O. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye has helped it to take root in IR. See William C. Potter, ‘Issue Area and 
Foreign Policy Analysis’, International Organization, 34/3, 1980, pp. 405–427; Robert 
O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.  
11 See, for example, Miles Kahler, ‘Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating 
Change in a Resilient Status Quo’, International Affairs, 89/3, 2013, pp. 711–729; Stefan 
A. Schirm, ‘Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance’, 
European Journal of International Relations, 16/2, 2010, pp. 197–221.  
12  See, for example, Woosang Kim, ‘Alliance Transitions and Great Power War’, 
American Journal of Political Science, 35/4, 1991, pp. 833–850; Woosang Kim and Scott 
Gates, ‘Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China’, International Area Studies 
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complexity of the process of Council reform and, for that matter, any process of 
international political change. In view of this, this study aims at deepening our 
understanding of the process of Council reform by analysing it through the above-
mentioned analytical framework that focuses attention on both general and issue-specific 
institutions governing international political change. This leads to a better understanding 
of the behaviour of the rising powers active in this particular issue-area, especially the 
four countries comprising the Group of 4 (hereafter G4): Brazil, Germany, India and 
Japan. Analysis of Council reform through the analytical framework will help us consider 
the impact of institutions upon the behaviour of rising powers in contemporary 
international society.  
The present study takes up the issue of Council reform not only because the Council 
is of importance as an object of international political change in the context of power 
transition, but also because it is itself an agent of international political change, including 
changes in the context of power transition. Security Council reform is important from the 
point of view of power transition since it is one of the central agendas that some of the 
rising powers in contemporary international society have called for, but it is also 
important from the viewpoint of peaceful change since the Council is part of 
contemporary international social structure governing international political change, 
including changes in the context of power transition. This means that the question of 
Council reform cannot be discussed apart from the problem of peaceful change, which, 
as discussed above, concerns the establishment of a practice aimed at peacefully bringing 
about changes in the international status quo. As already mentioned, one thing that the 
interwar debate on peaceful change demonstrates, and that this study seeks to theorise, is 
the role of international organisations in managing change in international society.13 The 
                                                   
Review, 18/3, 2015, pp. 219–226; Organski, World Politics; Tammen et al., Power 
Transitions.  
13 See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Legal Aspect’, in C.A.W. Manning (ed.), Peaceful Change: 
An International Problem, London: Macmillan, 1937, pp. 135–165; Arthur Salter, 
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behaviour of rising powers is affected by the presence of international organisations, 
especially those designed for the maintenance of international peace and security such as 
the League of Nations and the UN. In contemporary international society, this task is 
being carried out by international and regional organisations of various kinds, but there is 
no doubt about the centrality of the UN and, more specifically, the Security Council in 
that regard. Illustrating the need to view the Council as both object and agent of 
international political change, this study shows that it is vitally important to recognise this 
duality of the Council when examining issues concerning power transition in 
contemporary international society.  
The recognition of this duality gives additional importance to the issue of Council 
reform since the outcomes of Council reform would have significant repercussions for its 
capacity to manage international political change, including changes in the context of 
power transition. If this be the case, it follows that Council reform should be brought 
about in such a way as to enhance its effectiveness in managing international political 
change. Despite this, however, the current debate on Council reform is fixated on the issue 
of its size and composition, as will be shown in chapter 7. While recognising its 
significance, it will be argued that any Council reform which tackles nothing but the issue 
of size and composition would almost certainly fail to improve the Council’s effectiveness 
in managing international political change, including in the context of power transition, 
thereby failing to enhance its practical ability to maintain international peace and security. 
With that in mind, this study seeks to reframe the debate on Council reform by shifting 
focus of attention from the issue of size and composition to the issue of the Council’s 
capacity to promote the practice or institution of peaceful change in international society. 
It is only by addressing the latter issue that the prime goal of Council reform—the 
enhancement of its ability to maintain international peace and security—can be achieved. 
While this reframing of the Council reform debate is not necessary for answering the 
                                                   
‘Reform of the League’, The Political Quarterly, 7/4, 1936, pp. 465–480.  
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primary research question of the present study, which will be set out in chapter 1, the 
issues at stake here are too important to be dismissed and are best understood in the 
context of the subject matter discussed in the present study.  
If change is inevitable, it is important that efforts be made to bring about change 
for the better and in a peaceful manner, and such efforts must be underpinned by, above 
all else, an accurate understanding of the nature of change in a given society. This study 
provides an innovative way of understanding change in international society by exploring 
the relationship between power transition and international social structure. While one 
may, at this point, still have doubts about the interconnectedness of power transition, 
peaceful change and Security Council reform, it is my hope that this study will clearly 
demonstrate that it is not only helpful but even necessary to address the interface between 
them if we are to get a fully integrated understanding of the relationship between power 
transition and international social structure. As will be discussed in the conclusion, this 
will not only allow us to correct the defects in the existing literature on power transition, 
but will also enable us to identify future research agendas on power transition.  
 
Chapter structure  
The chapter structure is as follows. Chapter 1 begins by providing an overview of the 
major theories of power transition, revealing the ontological assumptions underlying 
them, and explaining why those assumptions are problematic for power transition analysis. 
It goes on to introduce ES theory as an alternative approach for theorising power 
transition, setting out the conceptual frameworks that are extensively used in the 
discussions and analyses in the present study, and setting forth the primary research 
question of the present study. The chapter then discusses in greater detail than is done 
here why it is necessary to explore the interface between the three themes identified above 
in order to understand the relationship between power transition and international social 
structure, and formulates the secondary research questions to be addressed in the chapters 
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that follow.  
Chapter 2 addresses the methodology and methods underpinning the present study. 
The first part of the chapter considers different ways of theorising power transition in 
connection with their methodological principles, and argues for the adoption of 
methodological pluralism from the standpoint of keeping both the analytical and the 
normative within power transition studies. The second part of the chapter addresses the 
methodological and hermeneutical issues concerning the interpretation of the interwar 
debate on peaceful change and the significance of historical insights.  
Chapters 3 and 4 turn to the interwar debate on peaceful change. The historical 
backgrounds and focus of the debate are explained in chapter 3. The chapter shows the 
symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change, emphasising its 
significance for the management of international political change, including changes in 
the international status quo in the context of power transition. Moreover, it demonstrates 
that there exists a mutually constitutive relationship between these state practices and 
international organisations designed for the maintenance of international peace and 
security such as the League of Nations. Deepening the understanding of these institutional 
connections is not only necessary for understanding the interwar debate on peaceful 
change, but also for understanding the basic character of contemporary international 
social structure governing international political change, including in the context of power 
transition. Chapter 4 addresses the normative aspects of the debate by exploring three 
different normative positions on the problem of peaceful change. As discussed in chapter 
2, the analytical issue of understanding how international social structure affects the 
process of international political change in the context of power transition is inseparably 
linked to the normative issue of how international social structure should be (re-)arranged 
so as to better manage the process of international political change in the context of power 
transition. The chapter advances the conception of power transition—or, to be more 
accurate, of international political change in the context of power transition—as an 
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institutionally governed process, and shows the inescapable normativity of power 
transition studies.  
Chapter 5 sets out and discusses the socio-structural conception of power transition 
that underpinned the interwar debate on peaceful change, comparing it with the 
mechanistic conception of power transition prevalent in much of the existing literature on 
power transition, and deriving theoretical insights from the former. It then goes on to 
establish the enduring relevance and significance of this socio-structural conception and 
these insights for power transition studies today by examining the character of 
contemporary international social structure governing change with a focus on the role of 
the Security Council in promoting peaceful change. It will be argued that the 
institutionalisation of peaceful change and other developments in contemporary 
international society have rendered the socio-structural conception of power transition 
even more valuable for power transition studies today.  
On the basis of the socio-structural conception of power transition and other 
findings of the preceding chapters, chapter 6 sets forth an analytical framework for 
examining actual cases of power transition in connection with international social 
structure. The framework will be set out in the form of a set of key questions to be 
addressed in power transition analysis. It helps facilitate analysis by drawing attention to 
regulative and constitutive effects of institutions of international society on rising powers, 
by bringing in the distinction between issue-specific and general institutions, and by 
shedding light on issues concerning the effectiveness and reform of international social 
structure.  
Chapter 7 explores how reform of the Security Council relates to power transition 
and peaceful change, focusing on the duality of the Council as both object and agent of 
international political change. First, it gives an overview of the history and current status 
of Council reform, and then demonstrates how the behaviour of the rising powers active 
in this issue-area has been governed and guided by the institutions governing the Council 
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reform process. Moreover, it considers how the Council reform process can be moved 
forward given the existing institutional constellation. The chapter then questions and 
reframes the debate on Council reform, which has been fixated on the issue of size and 
composition, from the standpoint of the role the Council as an agent of international 
political change plays in entrenching peaceful change in contemporary international 
society, including in the context of power transition, and specifies a couple of key issues 
that need to be addressed in future debate on Council reform.  
In the conclusion, I shall first summarise the discussions and analyses of the present 
study, providing answers to the primary and secondary research questions, and then 
discuss the significance of the present study. This is followed by a discussion about how 
this study can contribute to further research on power transition.  
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Chapter 1  
Literature Review  
 
 
 
Introduction  
Power transition has long been the subject of debates in IR. Power transition has been 
viewed by many IR theorists as the occasion of wars, and on that account a great deal of 
research on the theme has been produced.1 However, the existing literature on power 
transition is not without problems, and it is necessary to bring the problems to the fore 
and to put them under critical examination. The goal of this chapter is fourfold: (1) to 
identify gaps in the existing literature on power transition; (2) to elaborate upon 
alternative ways of theorising power transition that would fill the gaps; (3) to narrow 
down the focus of the present study by associating power transition with peaceful change 
and reform of the UN Security Council; and (4) to set forth the research questions that 
will be addressed in the following chapters.  
The plan for this chapter is as follows. The first section examines theories of power 
transition and reveals the ontological assumptions underlying them. It starts out with an 
exposition of classical theories of power transition that provide the basic ideas on which 
contemporary works and debates on power transition build. Among others, I shall focus 
                                                   
1 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981; Robert Gilpin, ‘The Theory of Hegemonic War’, The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, 18/4, 1988, pp. 591–613; A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd 
edn, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968[1958]; Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas 
Lemke, Allan C. Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efird and A.F.K. 
Organski, Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, New York: Chatham House, 
2000.  
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on three classical theories of power transition: A.F.K. Organski’s power transition theory, 
George Modelski’s long cycle theory and Robert Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory. 
These theories have had a tremendous influence upon the way contemporary IR theorists 
look at power transition, shaping their basic conception of what it is to theorise power 
transition. The section then offers a brief overview of contemporary debates on power 
transition. This is followed by an examination of the ontological assumptions upon which 
theories and debates on power transition are based. Identifying their ontological 
assumptions enables us to pinpoint an area where further research can be conducted. It 
will also be discussed why it is necessary to explore this uncharted territory. Outlining 
how the social structure of international society has been theorised in IR scholarship, the 
second section introduces the concepts and theoretical frameworks that will be utilised in 
this study. In particular, I shall focus upon the Wendtian version of constructivism and the 
Buzanian reformulation of ES theory.2 The third section starts by setting out the primary 
research question of the present study and then narrows down the focus of the study by 
establishing the connection between power transition, peaceful change and Security 
Council reform, setting forth three secondary research questions that will be addressed in 
the following chapters, which is followed by the conclusion.  
 
Theories of and debates on power transition  
This section provides an overview of classical theories of power transition, reviews 
ongoing debates on power transition, and critically examines the ontological assumptions 
on which the theories and debates rest.  
 
  
                                                   
2 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the 
Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999.  
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Organski’s power transition theory  
Organski formulated power transition theory (hereafter PTT) in his World Politics, the 
first edition of which was published in 1958.3 This influential theory has been credited 
with having paved an alternative way of theorising international relations that is distinct 
from one based upon the traditional realist idea of the balance of power. Organski severely 
criticised the balance-of-power theory as ‘fuzzy … logically unsound and contradict[ing] 
itself’.4 Instead, PTT emphasises the hierarchical order of the international system as 
against the horizontal order wherein sovereign states of comparable strength act and 
compete with one another. It posits that it is the distribution of power within this hierarchy 
that shapes the course of events in the international system.5  
This hierarchy consists of five layers as shown in figure 1. At the summit of the 
hierarchal structure stands the dominant nation, which holds a preponderance of power 
and shapes the international order through the exercise of its power and influence over 
other states, developing rules and institutions favourable to itself.6 The great powers lie 
beneath the dominant nation. Although they gain some advantage from the existing 
                                                   
3 Organski, World Politics.  
4 Ibid., p. 299.  
5  Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, ‘The End of Hegemony?’, International 
Interactions, 15/2, 1989, p. 116.  
6 Organski, World Politics, p. 364.  
 
 
Figure 1 [Source: Organski, World Politics, p. 365.]  
← Dominant Nation  
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international order, they benefit less as compared with the dominant nation.7 Further 
down the hierarchical ladder are the middle powers, small powers and dependencies. This 
power-based international hierarchical order is considered to be most stable when there 
exists a significant power gap between the dominant nation and the others in favour of 
the former.8 Organski further distinguishes states into those who are satisfied with the 
international order and those dissatisfied with it.9 On the basis of these distinctions, he 
argues that states can be classified into the following four groups or categories:  
 
1. The powerful and satisfied  
2. The powerful and dissatisfied  
3. The weak and satisfied  
4. The weak and dissatisfied10  
 
It is the dynamics among these groups of states that determine the stability of the 
international order.  
By definition, the dominant nation falls into the first category because it is, 
according to this theory, the very dominant nation that creates the international order in 
the first place.11 As is the case with any social order, there are always those (in this case, 
states) who are dissatisfied with the existing arrangements of things, and states lower in 
the international hierarchy are more likely to be frustrated and disgruntled about the status 
quo.12 However, Organski holds that the number of the discontented does not in itself 
constitute a real threat to the status quo since the majority of them, even when combined 
together, lack the power and influence necessary to challenge the dominant nation and the 
international order it maintains. As he argues, it is ‘[o]nly in the rare instance when a 
                                                   
7 Ibid., p. 365.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid., pp. 364–369.  
10 Quoted from ibid., p. 364.  
11 Ibid., p. 366.  
12 Ibid., p. 369.  
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dissatisfied nation is also a great power and manages to overtake the dominant power’ 
that ‘the status quo [is] threatened’.13  
According to Organski, discontented great powers, which fall into the second 
category, tend to go about challenging the ways in which things are organised on the 
international plane with their growing power and influence.14 While the dominant nation 
can always choose to accommodate changes in power balances and meet the rising powers’ 
demands, it tends to cling to the status quo.15 This often leads to increased tensions 
between states in support of the status quo and dissatisfied rising powers, increasing the 
likelihood of armed conflict. As Organski succinctly states, ‘[d]esiring change and unable 
to bring it about peacefully, the challenger all too often turns to war’.16  
In Organski’s view, the main dynamic causing power transition is ‘industrialization 
and political modernization’.17 In particular, he emphasises the role of the former.18 
Industrial Revolution, which originated in Britain in the late eighteenth century, ushered 
in the era of dynamic shifts in the international distribution of power, increasing the 
wealth and power of states going through that process. He singles out such factors as 
‘population size, political efficiency, and economic development’ as constituting the 
sources of national power.19 As the process of industrialisation proceeds, these resources 
                                                   
13 Kugler and Organski, ‘The End of Hegemony?’, p. 117.  
14 Organski, World Politics, pp. 366–367.  
15 Ibid., p. 371. This point may be partly explained from the point of view of prospect 
theory. See Jack S. Levy, ‘Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical 
Applications and Analytical Problems’, Political Psychology, 13/2, 1992, pp. 283–310; 
Jack S. Levy, ‘Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 41/1, 1997, pp. 87–112.  
16 Organski, World Politics, p. 371.  
17 Ibid., p. 339.  
18 While he emphasises the role of industrialisation, he also points out that, in some 
countries, political modernisation takes place in advance of industrialisation. See ibid., p. 
342.  
19 Ibid., p. 338. According to his definition, power is ‘the capacity of an individual, group, 
or nation to control the behavior of others in accordance with its own ends’. A.F.K. 
Organski and Jacek Kugler, ‘The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor’, The 
American Political Science Review, 71/4, 1977, p. 1347.  
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of power grow hand in hand in a synergetic manner.20  
According to Organski, there are three stages of industrialisation which each state 
proceeds through.21 The first is what he calls ‘the stage of potential power’ in which a 
state has yet to experience industrialisation and the accompanying growth of its national 
power. Secondly, ‘the stage of transitional growth in power’ refers to the phase in which 
a state starts to industrialise and increase its power. Finally, there comes a time when a 
state ceases to develop as robustly as before, which he calls ‘the stage of power maturity’.  
Since some states experience industrialisation earlier than others, there emerge 
power gaps between them; what Organski calls ‘the differential spread of industrialization’ 
is the occasion of the formation of the international hierarchy described above.22 The first 
nation that emerged as the dominant nation in history was Britain, for it was in this 
country that the first ever industrial revolution took place. Subsequently, the United States 
superseded it as a new dominant nation, reconstructing the international order in its own 
image.23  
However, as states reach the final stage of industrialisation, the rates of their 
development start to diminish.24 The dominant nation is no exception in this regard. 
Meanwhile other states start to industrialise and get onto the path of robust growth, 
narrowing the power gaps between rising powers and states which began to industrialise 
before them, including the dominant nation.25 When a rising power or powers catching 
up with the dominant nation happen to be dissatisfied with the status quo, the likelihood 
of war increases.26 Organski boldly states as follows: ‘[i]t is the powerful and dissatisfied 
                                                   
20 Organski, World Politics, pp. 340–342.  
21 Ibid., pp. 340–344.  
22  Ibid., pp. 344–345. The quoted phrase is from p. 375. The rankings within the 
hierarchy are affected not only by the difference in the timings of industrialisation, but 
also by the differing growth potential of states. See ibid., pp. 339–340.  
23 Ibid., pp. 339, 355–356, 361.  
24 Ibid., p. 343.  
25 Ibid., pp. 344–345.  
26 Ibid., pp. 361, 364.  
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nations that start world wars’.27  
To sum up, Organski’s PTT offers an alternative way of theorising international 
relations to the one based on the idea of the balance of power, marking a first step towards 
the theorisation of power transition, and setting agendas for further research in this field 
of study.  
 
Modelski’s long cycle theory  
Modelski’s long cycle theory (hereafter LCT) has had as much influence as Organski’s 
PTT. Compared to PTT, LCT views power transition from a broader historical perspective. 
The central focus of LCT is upon what he calls the ‘global political system’ which is 
defined as ‘the institutions and arrangements for the management of global problems or 
relations, or alternatively as the structure for the management of global 
interdependence’.28 The global political system is here understood literally as a political 
system as against other types of system such as the world economic system examined by 
Immanuel Wallerstein.29 It is also distinguished from what he calls ‘regional political 
systems’ such as the European political system. LCT concerns patterns, regularities and 
cycles that can be observed globally.30  
As is the case with PTT, LCT postulates the existence of ‘world powers’ which he 
defines as ‘[e]ntities uniquely dominant in the global [political] system’.31 In this regard, 
the global political system contrasts with the European political system which had been 
characterised by the balance of power.32 According to Modelski, a world power is a state 
with five properties or abilities: 1) insularity; 2) open, pluralistic and coalition-oriented 
                                                   
27 Ibid., p. 367.  
28  George Modelski, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20/2, 1978, p. 214.  
29 Ibid., pp. 215–216.  
30 Ibid., pp. 214–215.  
31 Ibid., p. 216.  
32 George Modelski and Patrick M. Morgan, ‘Understanding Global War’, The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 29/3, 1985, p. 395.  
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society; 3) capacities and resources for ‘global reach’; 4) world’s leading economy; and 
5) innovativeness.33 In particular, he singles out naval power as one of the most important 
attributes of a world state. As he remarks:  
 
In the modern world system a useful indicator of capacity for global reach, and 
therefore also of global power status, has been the distribution of naval forces. 
… No state could overthrow the prevailing world order without first establishing 
a command over the oceans. To chart trends in the distribution of sea power is 
therefore to map the progress of competition for global status.34  
 
In addition, he also stresses the significance of nation-states in the creation and 
maintenance of the global political system. Nation-states have succeeded in constructing 
efficient and effective political systems which provide themselves with the capacity 
required to become and act as a world power of the global political system.35  
The world power is, by definition, a country with the capacity to operate and engage 
in military, economic and other activities globally. 36  The world power establishes, 
governs and leads the global political system, acting as the leader of the global order.37 
The global political system is therefore characterised by a hierarchical structure and by 
‘specialisation’ or ‘functional differentiation’ stemming from the power gaps between the 
leader and the others.38 There have been four world powers in history: Portugal, the 
United Provinces of the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States. These countries 
                                                   
33 George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1987, p. 16.  
34  Ibid., pp. 9–10. For more on sea power, see George Modelski and William R. 
Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993, London: Macmillan, 1988.  
35 Modelski, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics’, pp. 230–232.  
36 Modelski and Morgan, ‘Understanding Global War’, p. 395.  
37 Ibid., p. 397; Modelski, Long Cycles, pp. 12–18. The key functions of the leadership 
of the global political system involve: ‘(i) agenda formation, (ii) mobilisation, (iii) 
decision-making, (iv) administration, and (v) innovation’. Ibid., p. 14.  
38 Ibid., p. 13.  
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have taken turns leading and presiding over the global political system.39  
As discussed above, the world power leads the global political system, supplying 
order and stability to it. However, there comes a time, on a cyclical basis, when the 
capacity of the world power to maintain the global political system declines. Modelski 
argues that ‘[w]e may also take it as given that all order deteriorates. In every known 
system order is continually lost’.40 In time, the world power faces challenges from other 
states who attempt to take over the leadership from it, and a new leader eventually 
emerges with the capacity necessary to undertake leadership role as a result of what he 
euphemistically calls a ‘selection mechanism’, that is, a ‘global war’.41 The assumption 
of the leadership by a new world power marks the beginning of another long cycle of the 
global political system.  
Modelski argues that each long cycle can be divided into four phases, as shown in 
table 1. In the first phase, although the demand for order is high, the declined power of 
the previous leader and severe competition among states make order and stability less 
available. In the next phase, a new world power, which emerges out of the struggles, 
responds to the demand for order by exercising its power and influence. In the third phase, 
the demand for order falls as states devalue it and start to pursue other goals. Finally, the 
world power reduces efforts to provide order in response to the diminished demand.42 
                                                   
39 Modelski, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics’, pp. 217, 225.  
40 Ibid., p. 225.  
41 Modelski and Morgan, ‘Understanding Global War’, pp. 400–401.  
42  Modelski and Thompson explain these processes by using the cobweb models 
developed in economics. See George Modelski and William R. Thompson, ‘Testing 
Cobweb Models of the Long Cycle’, in George Modelski (ed.), Exploring Long Cycles, 
Boulder: Rienner, 1987, pp. 85–111.  
Cycle phase Preference for order Availability of order 
(1) Global war High Low 
(2) World power High High 
(3) Delegitimation Low High 
(4) Deconcentration Low Low 
Table 1 [Source: modified from Modelski, Long Cycles, pp. 30–31.]  
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Modelski points to what he calls ‘monopoly erosion model’ as an important factor 
accelerating this cycle.43 According to him:  
 
The monopoly erosion model posits some such general proposition as “over time, 
monopoly tends to transform into a condition of freer competition.”44  
 
The last phase, which he calls ‘deconcentration’, is followed by the outbreak of a global 
war, in the aftermath of which a new world power leading the global political system 
emerges.  
LCT regards the behaviour of the world power as responding to the demand from 
other states for the provision of order and as contributing to the development of the global 
political system. However, it should be noted that its behaviour is not solely motivated by 
altruism since it is the world power that is the chief beneficiary of the global political 
system.45 Indeed, Modelski himself points out that the world power is propelled by ‘the 
urge to make a global order’ which he defines as ‘an expression of a will to power, the 
urge to control and to dominate, to imprint a pattern on events’.46 Therefore, there is 
ambiguity in his explanation as to the reason why the world power acts as it does.  
At any rate, Modelski maintains that the world power serves to maintain the global 
political system by providing an element of order to it. Moreover, he argues that the world 
power brings innovation to the system.47 This argument, reflective of his evolutionary 
conception of world politics, gives a progressivist twist to his cyclical account of the 
global political system. His conception of world politics can be readily detected in the 
following passage:  
 
                                                   
43 George Modelski, ‘Long Cycles of World Leadership’, in William R. Thompson (ed.), 
Contending Approaches to World System Analysis, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983, p. 127.  
44 Ibid., p. 138.  
45 Modelski and Thompson, ‘Testing Cobweb Models’, p. 110, n. 5.  
46 Modelski, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics’, p. 224.  
47 See Modelski, Long Cycles, pp. 14–15.  
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[W]orld politics [can be] seen as groping its way toward greater coherence and 
higher (more differentiated) forms of social order, with mankind lifting itself by 
its own bootstraps, so to speak, toward new ways of living.48  
 
This ‘Whig interpretation’49 of the history of world politics is further accentuated by his 
depiction of the challengers who had failed to attain global leadership (such as Philip II’s 
Spain, Louis XIV’s France, and Hitler’s Germany) as reactionaries who attempted in vain 
to impede progress by imposing anachronistic political arrangements upon the course of 
world history.50  
Whether or not we accept this progressivist view, there is no denying that 
Modelski’s LCT has had a significant influence upon the way in which power transition 
is analysed today. It claims the existence of recurrent patterns and cycles in world politics 
and tries to explain them by utilising such economic models as cobweb models and 
Talcott Parsons’ sociological theory.51 Moreover, as with Organski’s PTT, it views war 
as the central mechanism by which change is brought about in world politics. However, 
LCT does not offer a detailed explanation as to why states emerge and decline; he 
uncritically assumes the validity of the monopoly erosion model mentioned earlier. It was 
this question that Robert Gilpin undertook to address in his works on power transition.  
 
Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory  
In his War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin utilises some of the basic ideas of 
rational-choice theory in his attempt to construct what is commonly called hegemonic 
stability theory (hereafter HST).52 His argument rests upon the rationalist assumption 
                                                   
48 Ibid., p. 135.  
49 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, London: G. Bell and Sons, 
1931.  
50 George Modelski, ‘A System Model of the Long Cycle’, in George Modelski (ed.), 
Exploring Long Cycles, Boulder: Rienner, 1987, p. 124.  
51 See ibid.; Modelski, Long Cycles, chap. 5; Modelski and Thompson, ‘Testing Cobweb 
Models’.  
52 Gilpin, War and Change.  
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that ‘rationality’ governs how individuals conduct themselves; he assumes that it is cost-
benefit considerations that constitute the most important determinant of human 
behaviour.53 He applies this homo economicus assumption about human behaviour to the 
study of state behaviour. This application is made possible not because he postulates the 
presence of the raison d'État, but because he regards the state as consisting of individual 
human beings whom he assumes to be rational agents conducting themselves with a view 
to maximising benefits and minimising costs.54  
This assumption enables him to defend the universal applicability of his theory of 
political change. As he remarks:  
 
In this book we shall assume that rationality is not historically or culturally bound 
but that individuals in all societies past and present attempt to achieve their 
interests and goals by the most efficient means possible.55  
 
Starting from this assumption, Gilpin maintains that the basic character of 
international relations has remained the same since the days of Thucydides.56 In his view, 
even the much-vaunted economic interdependency among states and the presence of 
nuclear weapons do not effectively change the ways states go about their business.57 His 
theory of power transition is meant to be applicable across times and places, and therefore 
purports to provide the broadest view of power transition. In this regard, HST contrasts 
with Organski’s PTT which confines its own applicability to the post-industrialisation 
period in world history and with Modelski’s LCT which only applies after the emergence 
                                                   
53 Ibid., p. x.  
54 Ibid., pp. 15–18. To be more accurate, he views coalitions of individuals as constituting 
the state. See ibid., pp. 18–19.  
55 Ibid., p. xii.  
56 Ibid., pp. 7, 211. He also states as follows: ‘But, in honesty, one must inquire whether 
or not twentieth-century students of international relations know anything that 
Thucydides and his fifth-century compatriots did not know about the behavior of states.’ 
Ibid., p. 227.  
57 Ibid., chap. 6.  
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of world economy and nation-states.  
On the basis of rational-choice theory, Gilpin assumes that the actors of the system, 
including sovereign states in the modern international system, set out to mould and 
remould its rules and institutions to their own advantage. As a result, they tend to be 
reflective of power relations in the system. 58  On the flip side of this, shifts in the 
distribution of power create demands for restructuring rules and institutions which no 
longer reflect the new power relations in the system.59  When there is a disjuncture 
between the power balances among states and the arrangements of the international 
system, the international system becomes less stable. In contrast, the international system 
is most stable when there are no gaps between these factors, i.e. when rules and 
institutions are completely reflective of the existing power relations in the system.60  
It is well to note that the international system may remain stable even when many 
states are not satisfied with it. Since they are assumed to be rational, they do not seek to 
challenge it if the expected costs are so high that they would offset the expected benefits. 
It is only when there are realistic possibilities for successfully gaining net benefits that 
states set out to challenge the status quo.61  
Gilpin holds that the incentives for states and their cost-benefit considerations are 
substantially affected by the material structure of the international system, i.e. by ‘the 
distribution of capabilities and the ways in which this distribution of capabilities changes 
over time’.62 Moreover, he argues that changes and innovations in technological, military 
and economic environments alter the costs and benefits accompanying an attempt to 
challenge the status quo.63 Furthermore, he points out that the character of domestic 
                                                   
58 Ibid., p. xi.  
59 Ibid., pp. 9–10.  
60 Ibid., pp. 9–15.  
61 Ibid., pp. 11, 50–51.  
62 Ibid., p. 86.  
63 Ibid., pp. 55–84.  
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political configuration affects how states act in a given situation.64 Among other things, 
however, he emphasises the impacts of the distribution of material power on state 
behaviour. To quote his words:  
 
In summary, the structure of the international system and shifts in that structure 
are critically important determinants of state behavior. The structure of the 
system constrains behavior and imposes a cost on any behavior that seeks to 
change the international status quo. Similarly, the redistribution of interstate 
capabilities may decrease or increase the cost of changing the international 
system.65  
 
In order to explain such structural changes, Gilpin focuses upon what he calls ‘the 
differential or uneven growth of power among states’.66 The dominant state rationally 
extends its hold over the international system until the point when the benefits of further 
expansions would be offset by the costs of doing so, i.e. up to the point of there being no 
net benefits. However, the dominant state cannot maintain this state of equilibrium 
because the costs of holding onto its control of the system increase over time while the 
benefits it gains from maintaining its imperial or hegemonic rule decrease. Meanwhile, 
assisted by the ‘diffusion of military and economic technology’, 67  other states 
experiencing robust growth catch up with the hegemon, thereby further increasing the 
costs for the maintenance of the status quo, and decreasing the costs of challenging it.  
These secular processes go hand in hand to create a disequilibrium in the 
international system, increasing pressure for change. Historically, such a discrepancy in 
the system has been resolved through what Gilpin calls hegemonic war, which he defines 
as ‘a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the 
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system’.68 His conception of hegemonic war is concisely summarised in the following 
passage.  
 
Hegemonic war historically has been the basic mechanism of systemic change 
in world politics. Hegemonic conflict, arising from an increasing disequilibrium 
between the burden of maintaining an empire or hegemonic position and the 
resources available to the dominant power to carry out this task, leads to the 
creation of a new international system.69  
 
To sum up, by incorporating rational-choice theory and other theories and 
propositions developed in modern economics, Gilpin’s HST purports to offer a 
universalistic understanding of power transition and continues to shape how IR theorists 
think about and theorise power transition.  
 
Developments in power transition studies  
Using different sets of data and adopting refined methods, subsequent researchers have 
put the key propositions of these classical theories of power transition to the test in order 
to confirm them and, if necessary, to modify them.70  
Jonathan DiCicco and Jack Levy classify subsequent works in power transition 
studies into two categories, drawing upon Lakatos’ concept of research programme.71 
Following Lakatos, they label as ‘progressive’ the contributions that provide researchers 
with new sets of empirically testable hypotheses and propositions built upon (and, in some 
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cases, modifying) the ‘set of hard-core (HC) assumptions in power transition theory’.72 
For example, they argue that Douglas Lemke’s multiple hierarchy model, which applies 
and extends the findings of power transition theory to regional international systems 
should be seen as an example of progressive research in power transition studies.73 In 
addition, the research connecting power transition theory with democratic peace theory 
can also be regarded as progressive.74 Henk Houweling and Jan Siccama argue that 
power transition leads to war only when one or more states involved in the process of 
change have undemocratic political systems.75 Similarly, Douglas Lemke and William 
Reed argue that power shifts among democracies are less likely to result in a war because 
they are more likely to be satisfied with the international order. This is so, they argue, 
since all the dominant nations in history have been democratic in nature.76  
DiCicco and Levy also point out that some works in power transition studies have 
been ‘degenerating’ in that, in their attempt to patch gaps between theory and history, they 
have inadvertently distracted researchers from focusing on the central concerns of power 
transition studies.77  
While some scholars have sought to refine existing theories of power transition, 
others have applied those theories to a wider range of policy issues. For instance, Tammen 
et al. have applied Organski’s PTT to issue areas such as regional international relations, 
security and deterrence, economic policy and trade, and alliance politics.78  
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Some scholars, however, claim that power transition theory offers no significant 
insights into the actuality of world politics. Richard Lebow and Benjamin Valentino claim 
that the key propositions of power transition theories are lacking any empirical evidence, 
warning that they can result in a self-fulfiling prophecy by provoking unwanted hostility 
and unnecessary tensions. 79  Putting aside the validity of their claim, their warning 
contains a grain of truth, for many contemporary debates over the future of the world 
order are being informed by existing theories of power transition.  
 
Contemporary debates on power transition  
There is little doubt that the central concern driving today’s discussions about power 
transition is the rise of China. There have been countless attempts to apply the findings 
and insights of power transition theories to this case.80 Meanwhile, some scholars have 
examined the idea that the West has been declining in terms of power relative to other 
parts of the world.81 The idea of the declining West has sparked extensive debates on the 
prospects of the liberal international order that has been constructed since the end of the 
Second World War. Since it is impossible to cover and track everything said about power 
transition today, here I shall focus upon two prominent figures, John J. Mearsheimer and 
G. John Ikenberry, whose views represent two dominant perspectives on power transition.  
Drawing upon neorealism, Mearsheimer makes a pessimistic assessment of the 
prospects of the American-led international order. He claims that the political and 
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strategic confrontation between the United States and China is highly likely because of 
the latter’s rise and the resulting change in the power configuration of the international 
system.82 He starts from the assumption that every great power pursues the same and 
simple objective in a situation of anarchy. As he remarks:  
 
The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power 
and eventually dominate the system. … Their ultimate aim is to be the 
hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system.83  
 
However, as it is unrealistic for any great power to dominate the entire globe, a 
more realistic goal would be to establish itself as ‘the only regional hegemon in the 
world’.84 He goes on to argue that, once having established its dominance in its own 
region, the regional hegemon will seek to prevent other powers from achieving 
preponderance in their respective regions.85 In his view, the United States has historically 
conducted its foreign policy along these lines.  
According to Mearsheimer, China—the new emerging power—will also act in 
accordance with these principles; he predicts that the country will act to establish a 
regional hegemony of its own. This move will increase diplomatic tensions and a security 
dilemma will set in since such a move is clearly at odds with the United States’ goal of 
preventing other powers from gaining preponderance in their respective regions.86 He 
adds that the increasing economic interdependence between the two giants does not 
substantially affect the course of events.87 This is so because, in his view, ‘there are 
factors that sometimes override economic considerations and cause great powers to start 
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wars’.88  
In contrast to Mearsheimer, Ikenberry is of the opinion that the hegemonic 
confrontation between the two nations is avoidable and China can rise peacefully, the 
main reason being that the nature of the existing international order is such that it is 
beneficial for China to accommodate itself to it rather than to try to challenge it.89 He 
holds that the American-led international order which has been constructed since the end 
of the Second World War is intrinsically liberal.90 Based upon the principles of liberal 
democracy and capitalism, the existing international order is ‘open, integrated, and rule-
based’.91 Furthermore, it is an equitable, ‘neo-Rawlsian’ order in which nations and 
countries of all ranks, including China, can thrive and prosper.92  
In addition, the deepening economic interdependence, he argues, increases China’s 
incentives to accept the rules and institutions of the liberal international order, and the 
advent of nuclear weapons have made the occurrence of hegemonic wars less likely.93 In 
such a world, ‘the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative 
ties go up’.94 In particular, he emphasises that China’s rapidly growing economy owes 
much to the international economic arrangements provided by the liberal international 
order, arguing that China cannot do without those arrangements if it hopes to continue to 
grow.95  
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In short, Ikenberry maintains that peaceful rise is possible because there are strong 
incentives for China to uphold the institutional frameworks provided by the liberal 
international order.96 Seen from this point of view, not only can China be a part of the 
liberal international order, but it can also act as an active defender of that order.  
It is beyond the task of this study to address all aspects of contemporary debates 
surrounding power transition. However, it can be safely said that the focus of those 
debates converges on the question: will the liberal international order be unstable or even 
unsustainable in the future as the relative power of the West, especially that of the United 
States, declines and as the relative power of rising powers, especially that of China, 
continues to grow? Realists tend towards the view that conflict over hegemony is likely 
and the liberal international order will be unstable because of the relatively declined 
power of the hegemon, whereas liberals tend towards the view that it is possible to 
cooperate within the existing institutional frameworks and, therefore, the liberal 
international order can be maintained even after the hegemonic power of the dominant 
nation has waned. In this regard, contemporary debates on power transition are 
reminiscent of, and can be regarded as an extended version of, the neorealist-neoliberal 
debate over whether or not international regimes would remain stable ‘after hegemony’.97  
 
The ontological assumptions underlying theories and debates on power transition  
Having outlined the major theories and debates on power transition, the next task is to 
examine the ontological assumptions underlying them. In doing so, I will draw upon 
Alexander Wendt’s map of ‘four sociologies’ (see figure 2 on the next page).98 This move 
not only allows us to locate the existing approaches to power transition within a wider 
picture, but also enables us to identify an under-explored territory for power transition 
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studies.  
Wendt classifies structural theories in IR scholarship on the basis of their 
underlying ontological assumptions. The first distinction he introduces is between 
materialism and idealism which concerns ‘the extent to which structures are material or 
social’. 99  Materialism identifies material factors as the primary determinants of the 
structure of the international system and state behaviour within that system. While 
materialism recognises the role of non-material factors, it gives secondary importance to 
them in its understanding of world politics. In contrast, idealism holds that the structure 
of the international system and state behaviour are, to a large extent, dictated by ideational 
factors such as social norms, rules and institutions. This position recognises the presence 
of material factors, but maintains that the ways in which they bear upon the relations 
among states hinge on how states understand them and on the meaning states attach to 
them. In short, the idealist argues that, to quote Wendt’s words, ‘the deep structure of 
society is constituted by ideas rather than material forces’.100  
The second distinction is between individualism and holism.101 It is about how 
actors in the international system relate to, and are affected by, structures. Individualists 
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in IR scholarship are primarily concerned with how structures externally constrain and 
regulate state behaviour, and take states’ identities and interests as given, independent of 
structures. In other words, they focus upon what Wendt calls ‘behavioral effects’.102 In 
contrast, holists argue that structures not only constrain states’ behaviour, but also 
internally constitute and construct their identities and interests. In other words, they focus 
upon ‘property effects’ as well.103  
Figure 2 is based upon these two distinctions. Although Wendt drew this map in 
order to analyse structural theories in IR scholarship, this can also be used for identifying 
the ontological assumptions on which theories and debates on power transition rest.  
To start with, theories and debates based on the materialist-individualist ontology 
fit into the left lower quadrant. In fact, most of the major theories and debates on power 
transition can be regarded as belonging to this group. Organski’s PTT is clearly rooted in 
this ontological assumption. It is materialist because it identifies the distribution of power 
and the economic growth as the most significant factors shaping the process of 
international political change, and it can be labeled as individualist because of its 
rationalist conception of state behaviour, which constitutes one of PTT’s core 
assumptions.104  
Grounded in rational-choice theory, Gilpin’s HST also lies within this quadrant. As 
with Organski, Gilpin mainly focuses on material structures and takes states’ identities 
and interests as given independent of structures. Although he recognises the importance 
of sociological perspectives in studying power transition, his reliance on the Waltzian 
conception of structure confines his focus to the role of material factors and their 
behavioural effects. 105  Moreover, he argues that the state’s interests are primarily 
determined by the way in which coalitions are formed domestically. In other words, he 
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maintains that national interests are a function of domestic political processes.106  
Most of the contemporary debates about power transition can also be seen as based 
upon the materialist-individualist ontology. Indeed, as discussed above, they greatly 
resemble the debate between neorealists and neoliberals, whose theoretical arguments 
were rooted in the materialist-individualist ontology. Mearsheimer’s neorealist argument 
is evidently materialist and individualist. Although Ikenberry stresses the importance of 
the nature of the international order in his analysis of power transition, his argument can 
be seen as an extension of neoliberal institutionalism, which is revealed by his frequent 
usage of such words as ‘benefit’ and ‘incentive’.107  
Modelski’s LCT falls into the left upper quadrant. Like PTT and HST, LCT is 
materialist in that it mainly focuses upon the material structure of the global political 
system and the distribution of power within that system. Unlike PTT and HST, however, 
it is holist because the power gaps between the world power and the other states in the 
system leads to the former forging a distinct identity as the leader of the system, resulting 
in ‘functional differentiation’.108  
The above-mentioned research focusing on the role of democratic form of 
government in shaping the course of power transition can be put into the idealist-
individualist group. It is idealist since it focuses upon the relationship between such 
ideational factors as the principles and values on which domestic political systems are 
based, on the one hand, and the process of international political change induced by power 
transition, on the other. It is individualist since those principles and values are assumed 
to stem from domestic factors.  
Compared with research in other quadrants, relatively little research has been 
conducted within the right upper, idealist-holist quadrant. This is problematic since it 
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leads to the neglect of the role of international social structure in international political 
change. The process of international political change in the context of power transition 
cannot be analysed deeply enough without reference to such factors as state practice, 
norms, international law and international organisations, and it is only by adopting the 
idealist-holist ontology that the relationship between power transition and such 
international social structures can be fully theorised.  
As Wendt points out, ES theory is one of the most well-known IR theories that are 
rooted in the idealist-holist ontology. 109  Some ES theorists have discussed power 
transition from this ontological standpoint. Robert Ayson, for example, shows that Hedley 
Bull emphasised the importance of accommodating rising powers’ demands for 
international political change from the point of view of the maintenance of international 
order and viewed the investigation into the relationship between power transition and 
institutions of international society as a scholarly responsibility.110 To quote Ayson:  
 
… if there was to be a semblance of international order, Bull’s continual 
reference point for evaluating the health of the international system, there would 
need to be evidence that the prevailing powers were coming to terms with these 
changes [in the distribution of power in the international system]. Without this 
adjustment, the society of states simply would cease to function properly. … 
Power needed to be accommodated consciously and carefully. Moreover, it was 
the responsibility of scholars in Bull’s view to be part of the debate over how this 
management and adjustment ought to take place: to investigate the institutions 
through which order could be found and maintained [in the context of power 
transition].111  
 
For another example, Ian Clark offers an analysis of power, legitimacy and 
responsibility from the ES perspective, discussing how ‘the power of norms and the 
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norms of power’ interact.112 He has formulated and posed a question of great significance 
as follows.  
 
[D]o international norms effectively constrain the material power of emerging 
states, or do shifts in material power create the necessary condition for the 
reconstruction of those norms?113  
 
This question redirects our attention from material structure to social structure, 
foregrounding issues concerning the latter’s regulative and constitutive effects.114  
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the relationship between power transition and 
international social structure has yet to be fully explored, and there still remains a number 
of unanswered questions in this regard. This is partly due to the fact that much of the 
contemporary literature on power transition based on the idealist-holist ontology has 
confined its attention to the specific case of the rise of China.115 Although this case of 
power transition is of paramount importance for contemporary world politics, power 
transition needs to be looked at from a broader perspective if we are to theorise its 
relationship with international social structure.  
 
International social structure and English School theory  
Although the existing literature on power transition is inadequate in this regard, IR theory 
does offer a set of frameworks that can be utilised for analysing power transition in terms 
of the social structure of the international system. This section gives an overview of the 
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literature on international social structure, identifying the theoretical frameworks upon 
which the discussions in the following chapters draw.  
 
Wendtian constructivism and its applicability to power transition analysis  
Wendt is credited with shedding light upon the ontological assumptions of IR theories, as 
discussed above, and with setting out a clear direction for the development of 
constructivism, which is based on the idealist-holist ontology. His main argument is that 
the identities and interests of states, as well as their behaviour, are to a great extent 
constructed and constituted by the social structure of the international system.116 Wendt 
follows neorealists in focusing on structure.117 However, his conception of structure is 
radically different from that of neorealists; he holds that the structure of the international 
system consists primarily of such ideational factors as shared ideas, understandings and 
knowledge.118 As he puts it, international structure can be seen as a ‘distribution of 
knowledge’.119  
More specifically, he focuses on ‘socially shared knowledge’ or ‘culture’ defined 
as ‘knowledge that is both common and connected between individuals’.120 He describes 
three different cultures defining the nature of the international system. Hobbesian culture 
exits when states represent each other as enemies; Lockean culture exists when they view 
each other as rivals; and Kantian culture exists when they regard each other as friends.121 
States’ identities and interests hinge upon which of these three cultures is widely shared 
by states in a given international system. And this in turn affects the ways in which they 
interact with one another. As he remarks:  
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[T]he character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations 
that states have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social rather 
than material structures. This does not mean that material power and interests 
are unimportant, but rather that their meaning and effects depend on the social 
structure of the system, and specifically on which of three “cultures” of anarchy 
is dominant—Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian.122  
 
Wendt goes on to discuss the ways in which these cultures are maintained by 
introducing the concept of ‘internalization’. 123  According to him, a culture can be 
maintained either by force, by calculation or by legitimacy, and only when it is upheld 
because states regard it as legitimate can it exert constitutive effects on states. When a 
culture is maintained by legitimacy, it is said to be most stable. When it is maintained by 
calculation or by force, it only has behavioural effects and tends to be less stable. And 
here it must be noted that there is no necessary connection between the extent to which a 
culture is internalised and the type of culture prevalent in a given international system.  
Drawing on the Wendtian version of constructivism, Barry Buzan challenges the 
materialist conception of polarity most typically found in neorealism.124 He argues that 
the impacts of polarity on the behaviour of states cannot be understood unless polarity is 
viewed in the context of the social structure of the international system, understood here, 
à la Wendt, in terms of the identities of states and whether they see one another as enemies, 
rivals or friends.125 For example, he examines how the ideologies held by major powers 
shape their relations with one another.126 Since polarity is one of the most basic concepts 
used in power transition analysis, Buzan’s attempt to reform the understanding of it on 
the basis of the Wendtian version of constructivism is highly informative.  
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Kupchan et al. attempt to analyse power transition through a similar, constructivist 
theoretical framework which they call ideational contestation.127 According to them, the 
peaceful management of power transition is more likely when (1) the hegemon and the 
challenger hold a benign image of one another; (2) both parties agree on the fundamental 
principles and rules that would govern the international order; and (3) they are successful 
in legitimising the agreed international order.128  
Although their concept of ideational contestation opens up a critical way of 
analysing power transition from a constructivist perspective, the problem with this 
framework is that it is likely to divert attention away from how the social structure of the 
international system affects the ways in which the major powers interact in their relations 
with one another. Indeed, it gives the reader a false impression that the major powers are 
free from, or immune from, the behavioural and constitutive effects of social structure as 
if they were in a position to freely negotiate and legitimise their preferred international 
order as they like. For example, it is argued that:  
 
Legitimacy emerges when hegemon and contender agree not just on hierarchy 
and a set of core rules on the conduct of foreign policy, but also on a set of deeper 
normative principles.129  
 
However, the fact is that there already exists ‘a set of deeper normative principles’130 that 
is deemed legitimate in a given international system before the hegemon and the 
challenger commence negotiations on the future shape of the international order, and such 
normative principles delimit the socially accepted and appropriate ways of settling 
disputes. To argue otherwise is to acknowledge the verity of the realist argument that the 
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norms and principles of international society are merely reflective of the underlying power 
relations in the international system.  
That said, some of the contributors to the book do touch upon this important point. 
Jean-Marc Coicaud argues that it is important to factor in the social contexts provided by 
the UN system, although he does not elaborate on this point.131 Moreover, Emanuel Adler 
focuses upon the impacts that security communities and social learning have on the course 
of power transition.132 They both suggest a direction for further research into power 
transition, albeit in a brief and sketchy manner. What is needed is a more robust 
framework that would enable such analysis.  
 
English School frameworks for analysing international social structure  
In this study, I will fully utilise the merits of ES theory since it provides a set of refined 
conceptual frameworks that can be used for explaining the behaviour of rising powers 
and the process of international political change in connection with international social 
structure. In particular, I shall make extensive use of Barry Buzan’s socio-structural 
reformulation of ES theory.133  
ES theory assumes the existence of international society comprised of sovereign 
states. As Buzan briefly explains:  
 
The basic idea of international society is quite simple: just as human beings as 
individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also 
states live in an international society which they shape and are shaped by.134  
 
The concept and reality of international society have been the central focus of ES 
                                                   
131 Ibid., pp. 68–100.  
132 Ibid., pp. 138–158.  
133 Buzan, From International to World Society?.  
134 Ibid., p. 8.  
52 
 
theory.135 Hedley Bull, one of the founding fathers of the ES, defines international society 
as follows:  
 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the 
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in 
their relations with one another, and share in the working of common 
institutions.136  
 
One of the foundational elements of international society is international law, and 
many ES theorists have regarded it as, to quote Martin Wight, ‘[t]he most essential 
evidence for the existence of an international society’. 137  Although the members of 
modern international society are called ‘sovereign states’, this only means in practice that 
states are ‘constitutionally insular’, and the membership in international society is 
accompanied by the duty and obligation to abide by the rules of international law.138  
However, international law is only one of the institutions of international society. 
ES theorists have pointed to the existence of a series of institutions governing the 
maintenance of order in international society. By way of example, Bull reflects on the 
functions of what he views as the five fundamental institutions of international society: 
diplomacy, the balance of power, international law, war and great power management.139 
However, it has long remained unclear what exactly the term ‘institution’ refers to, 
                                                   
135  See Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of 
International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 12–13.   
136 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 4th edn, 
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137 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 107. See 
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138 C.A.W. Manning, ‘The Legal Framework in a World of Change’, in Brian Porter (ed.), 
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causing difficulty in mapping the constellation of institutions in a given international 
society.  
Picking up on this, Buzan sets out to engage in a comprehensive reworking of the 
ES frameworks for understanding the institutions of international society. After 
examining the differences demarcating the ES conception of institution from that of 
neoliberal institutionalists, Buzan introduces two categories of institutions, i.e. primary 
institutions and secondary institutions.140 Primary institutions, according to Buzan, are 
‘relatively fundamental and durable practices, that are evolved more than designed’ and 
are ‘constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each 
other’.141 More concretely, the term ‘primary institution’ refers to some such thing as ‘an 
established custom, law, or relationship in a society or community’. 142  Primary 
institutions are not to be understood as norms or principles, but as entrenched practices 
underpinned by norms and principles. Accurately speaking, therefore, when ES theorists 
speak of the primary institution of sovereignty, the thing that is being discussed is not the 
principle of sovereignty, but the entrenched practice of respecting the principle of 
sovereignty. When ES theorists speak of human rights as being a primary institution, what 
they are discussing is not so much the idea of human rights as the established international 
practice of respecting and promoting the idea of human rights. Likewise, in ES theory, 
such primary institutions as self-determination and democracy are to be understood as 
internationally established practices, rather than as ideas and principles.  
Secondary institutions are defined as arrangements ‘consciously designed by states’ 
for specific purposes.143 Examples of secondary institutions include the WHO, the IMF, 
the League of Nations, the UN and other international arrangements, regimes and 
                                                   
140 Buzan, From International to World Society?, pp. 161–167.  
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Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, p. 16.  
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54 
 
organisations.  
According to Buzan, primary institutions ‘shape and constrain the formation, 
evolution, and demise of secondary institutions’.144 In a lately published introductory 
primer of ES theory, he speaks of secondary institutions as follows:  
 
For the English School, secondary institutions are reflective and supportive of 
primary ones, and their possibilities are constrained by the broader framing of 
primary institutions within which they necessarily operate.145  
 
Table 2 is Buzan’s list of the institutions of contemporary international society. As shown 
                                                   
144 Barry Buzan, ‘International Political Economy and Globalization’, in Alex J. Bellamy 
(ed.), International Society and its Critics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 121.  
145 Buzan, Introduction to the English School, p. 30, emphasis added.  
Table 2. Buzan’s list of contemporary international institutions  
Primary Institutions Secondary Institutions  
Master  Derivative  (examples of)  
Sovereignty  Non-intervention 
International law 
UN General Assembly  
Most regimes, ICJ, ICC 
Territoriality  Boundaries  Some PKOs  
Diplomacy  Bilateralism  
Multilateralism  
Embassies  
United Nations  
Conferences  
Most IGOs, regimes 
Great power management  Alliances  
 
War  
Balance of power  
NATO  
 
UN Security Council  
Equality of people  Human rights  
Humanitarian 
intervention  
UNHCR  
Market  Trade liberalisation  
 
Financial liberalisation  
Hegemonic stability  
GATT/WTO, MFN agreements  
 
IBRD, IMF, BIS  
Nationalism  Self-determination  
Popular sovereignty  
Democracy  
Some PKOs  
Environmental stewardship  Species survival  
Climate stability  
CITES, UNFCCC  
Kyoto Protocol, IPCC, Montreal 
Protocol, etc. 
   
Source: adopted from Buzan, From International to World Society?, p. 187. 
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in the table, he subdivides primary institutions into master institutions and derivative 
institutions, which are derived from the former.146  
Buzan argues that international societies can be categorised into different types 
according to their institutional features. 147  Here, I shall briefly explain how Buzan 
classifies international societies, focusing on the role and status of war as an institution 
in each type of society.  
A ‘Power Political interstate society’ is characterised by hostility, animosity and 
war. The relations between states are minimally institutionalised in international societies 
of this type. In such a society, war may be institutionalised as a socially accepted means 
for political and territorial aggrandizement.148  
A ‘Coexistence interstate society’ is characterised by a higher degree of 
institutionalisation. This corresponds with Bull’s conception of Westphalian international 
society based on pluralism.149 War is one of the fundamental primary institutions in 
international societies of this type. Bull argues that, on reflection, war has from time to 
time performed ‘a positive role in the maintenance of international order’.150 According 
to him, war has the following three functions in pluralist international societies. Firstly, it 
serves as an instrument for law enforcement. Secondly, it functions as a means of 
maintaining the balance of power. Thirdly, it is an avenue for bringing about just 
change.151 International societies of this type may be characterised by the development 
of rules regulating the conduct of war, but those rules tend to be confined to jus in bello 
and do not extend to jus ad bellum.152  
                                                   
146 See Buzan, From International to World Society?, pp. 182–184.  
147 Ibid., pp. 190–195.  
148 Ibid., pp. 190–191.  
149 Ibid., pp. 191–192.  
150  Hedley Bull, ‘War and International Order’, in Alan James (ed.), The Bases of 
International Order: Essays in Honour of C.A.W. Manning, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1973, p. 120.  
151 Ibid., pp. 120–121.  
152  See Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Herbert 
Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of 
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A ‘Cooperative interstate society’ is not only marked by an even higher degree of 
institutionalisation, but also by an increase in the number of secondary institutions.153 
International societies of this type are solidarist in nature and may be characterised by the 
development of jus ad bellum.154 Although war may still have a place in a Cooperative 
international society, the legal and/or legitimate use of force is usually restricted to limited 
cases such as self-defence.155  
A ‘Convergence interstate society’ is marked by the breadth of shared values and 
the convergence of forms of government adopted by states, which make for much greater 
institutionalisation.156 With the advance of institutionalisation, war becomes less of an 
institution and becomes more of a social deviance.  
Drawing upon Wendt’s idea of internalisation, Buzan argues that the stability of an 
international society hinges upon how and to what extent the common values 
underpinning that society are internalised by states. According to him, international 
societies are most stable when the values underpinning them are deeply internalised by 
belief. They are less stable when the values are shallowly internalised by calculation, and 
are least stable when the values are imposed by coercion.157  
 
The relationship between primary and secondary institutions  
Generally speaking, the principal focus of ES theory has been on primary institutions. 
This has led to the unwarranted neglect of the role of secondary institutions in 
international societies. The ES’s disposition to focus on primary institutions in disregard 
of secondary institutions is most apparent in Bull’s following statement:  
 
                                                   
International Politics, London: Allen and Unwin, 1966, pp. 51–73.  
153 Buzan, From International to World Society?, pp. 193–194.  
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157 Ibid., pp. 157–160.  
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Even the part that is in fact played by the United Nations and other international 
organisations is best understood not in terms of the official objectives and 
aspirations of these organisations themselves, or of the hopes commonly placed 
in them, but in terms of the contribution they make to the working of more basic 
institutions. It is for this reason that such references as are made to the United 
Nations and such bodies appear in the chapters dealing with the balance of power, 
international law, diplomacy, the role of the great powers, and war. It is these 
latter that are the effective institutions of international society; the League and 
the United Nations, as Martin Wight once argued, are best seen as pseudo-
institutions.158  
 
This is an unwarranted downgrading of the role of secondary institutions. As Peter Wilson 
rightly suggests, ‘[i]t may turn out that secondary institutions loom far larger in the 
psychomilieu of practitioners’ when they are studied empirically.159 Indeed, Emanuel 
Adler points out that international organisations not only regulate state practice, but also 
serve as ‘a site of interest and identity formation’.160 In short, it is theoretically possible 
that secondary institutions have both regulative and constitutive effects on states, and this 
is something that needs empirical verification.  
Picking up on this point, Kilian Spandler argues that there needs to be a sustained 
effort to examine how primary and secondary institutions relate to each other.161 While 
appreciating the primary/secondary distinction made by Buzan, he criticises ES theorists 
for not treating secondary institutions as ‘autonomous objects of analysis’.162 He goes on 
to argue that primary and secondary institutions are ‘linked by distinctive processes of 
constitution and institutionalisation’, pointing out that the mechanism of social change 
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can be better understood in terms of how these two types of institutions interplay.163 In 
some cases, primary and secondary institutions are supportive of one another. In other 
cases, they can be mutually inconsistent. 164  Building on Buzan’s argument that the 
inconsistency and tensions between primary institutions can lead to institutional change 
in international society, Spandler seeks to theorise how secondary institutions come into 
the picture.165 Theorising how primary and secondary institutions interact is crucially 
important for understanding the development of international social structure governing 
international political change, including in the context of power transition, and therefore 
must be an integral part in the development of a socio-structural conception of power 
transition.  
 
Anarchy and hierarchy  
Some readers might wonder if ES theory is an appropriate theoretical choice for the 
present study on the grounds of its emphasis on the anarchical nature of international 
society, which could seem to contradict power transition studies’ focus on the hierarchical 
nature of the international system.166 However, ES theorists are far from being oblivious 
to hierarchical aspects of international society. As discussed above, Bull conceptualised 
great power management as an institution of international society, and Wight wrote of 
suzerainty in historical international societies.167 Moreover, Clark sets out to establish 
hegemony as an institution of international society.168 The existence of ES writings on 
hierarchical aspects of international society shows that ES theory is by no means 
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incompatible with power transition studies, and the present study will discuss the impact 
of institutions reflective of international hierarchy, such as great power management, on 
the process of international political change in the context of power transition.  
 
Peaceful change and UN Security Council reform  
These ES frameworks enable us to understand international social structure in terms of 
primary and secondary institutions and also help us explain state behaviour with reference 
to them. On this basis, the primary research question of the present study is: how do 
primary and secondary institutions of international society affect the behaviour of rising 
powers and hence the process of international political change in the context of power 
transition? In order to address this question, it is necessary to establish an ES conception 
of power transition, develop an analytical framework underpinned by such a conception 
of power transition, and then analyse actual cases of power transition through the lens of 
such a framework. For these purposes, the present study addresses a couple of secondary 
research questions that will help guide the present inquiry into the relationship between 
power transition and institutions of international society.  
 
Peaceful change  
While ES frameworks mentioned above are of potential value to power transition studies, 
they are, as they stand, framed in too general a manner to be used for addressing analytical 
and normative issues concerning power transition, and therefore in need of reworking. 
Bearing this in mind, this study seeks to establish a reformed conception of power 
transition and develop an ES framework designed for power transition analysis, and to 
this end it integrates the above-mentioned elements of ES theory with the insights 
retrieved from the interwar debate on peaceful change. I shall here set out the reasons as 
to why the present study turns to the debate, setting forth the first secondary research 
question to be addressed in the following chapters.  
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The interwar debate on peaceful change engaged a number of prominent scholars 
and practitioners during the interwar period. This study calls for a renewed attention on 
the debate for two main reasons. Firstly, the debate provides important clues as to how 
we can go about theorising the relationship between power transition and institutions of 
international society. Although the debate predates both power transition studies and ES 
theory, it offers hitherto neglected, but nevertheless valuable insights into the relationship 
between power transition and institutions of international society, providing a strong 
support for the socio-structural conception of power transition, which the present study 
seeks to develop.  
Secondly, the debate provides an ideal starting point from which to embark upon a 
historically-informed investigation into institutions governing international political 
change in contemporary international society. The interwar period marks a normative and 
historical turning point in the development of international social structure, and indeed 
the origins of much of contemporary international social structure can be traced back to 
the interwar period. Therefore, understanding the features of the interwar international 
social structure is an essential first step in understanding the institutional contexts within 
which power transition occurs today. This point will be discussed further in the next 
chapter on methodology and methods.  
It is worth stressing at this early stage that the term ‘peaceful change’ cannot be 
understood as simply referring to the avoidance of wars. Such a truncated conception of 
peaceful change would not add much to power transition studies. The significance of the 
debate lies in that it sheds light on the fact that international political change in the context 
of power transition is an institutionally governed process. As such, the term ‘peaceful 
change’ carries an institutional connotation.  
Although the interwar debate on peaceful change has little presence in the ongoing 
debates in power transition studies, there has been a couple of attempts to explore the 
contemporary relevance of peaceful change. In his 1984 article, Esko Antola offered a 
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brief overview of the debate, and, in another article published in the same year, he 
attempted to apply the insights he gleaned from the debate to post-war international 
relations in Europe.169 Another notable work was written by Arie M. Kacowicz. In his 
1994 article, he attempted to apply E.H. Carr’s conception of peaceful change to the 
analysis of local and regional territorial disputes.170  
In spite of these works, however, the interwar debate on peaceful change either 
receives little attention or is totally forgotten in the ongoing debates in power transition 
studies. On that account, it has to be said that the previous works on peaceful change have 
failed to inform and shape contemporary debates on power transition, despite the 
significance of the insights that the debate offers for power transition analysis.  
Moreover, the previous works on peaceful change have failed to pick up on the 
insights the debate offers into the relationship between international political change and 
international social structure. This is primarily due to that they were written against the 
intellectual backgrounds in the 1980s and early 1990s, and therefore were greatly 
informed by the neo-neo paradigm in IR theory. In view of this, the debate needs to be 
revisited from the point of view of ES theory with a view to shedding light on the hitherto 
neglected aspects of the debate.  
In particular, the present study will focus on the legal aspects of the debate. The 
study of international relations during the interwar period was not fully differentiated 
from the study of international law, and therefore it is impossible to understand the 
significance of the debate without understanding the legal issues involved in the problem 
of peaceful change. Moreover, the focus on the legal aspects of the debate will enable us 
to tackle the false dichotomisation of IR and international law. This division of labour 
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should be questioned and challenged rather than be taken as a given.171 Furthermore, the 
legal dimensions of the debate are of particular interest from the standpoint of ES theory. 
As discussed above, ES theorists have viewed international law as an empirical 
confirmation of the presence of an international society, with the implication being that 
the character of international law in a given international society shapes the character of 
that society. If this be the case, it can be argued that the ways in which the process of 
political change is managed in a given international society are to a great extent 
determined by the character of the law governing political change in that society. The 
interwar debate on peaceful change can provide valuable insights with regard to the 
relationship between international law and international political change.  
In this connection, the present study will also focus on what the debate tells us 
about the role of international organisations in international political change, including in 
the context of power transition. The development of international law during the interwar 
period went in hand-in-hand with that of international organisations such as the League 
of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. As a matter of historical fact, 
the interwar debate on peaceful change was inextricably linked to this dual process. A 
focus on this dimension of the debate will enable us to tackle state-centrism in the 
previous works on peaceful change as well as in the existing literature on power transition. 
Moreover, this dimension of the debate is of interest from the standpoint of ES theory 
since it provides the key to understanding how primary and secondary institutions interact 
in the management of international political change.  
Bearing these points in mind, the first secondary research question of the present 
study is: what are the key insights from the interwar debate on ‘peaceful change’ and how 
do they, with the help of ES theory, reform the conception of power transition and the way 
we analyse the behaviour of rising powers?  
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UN Security Council reform  
The present study will develop a framework for analysing actual cases of power transition 
on the basis of the reformed conception of power transition. The framework will enable 
us to analyse the behaviour of rising powers with reference to the type, character and 
effectiveness of institutions of international society. In this study, I will use this 
framework to analyse the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international 
political change in the issue-area of reform of the UN Security Council.  
There is no question that UN reform is one of the most urgent issues facing 
contemporary international society. Since the UN is responsible for tackling a whole 
range of global problems including international security, poverty, climate change and 
human rights, its reform calls for a multifaceted and multidimensional approach. That 
said, there is no doubt about the centrality of Security Council reform, and the sheer 
number of publications devoted to this theme attests to the importance attached to it by 
scholars and practitioners alike.  
Moreover, global power transition of today has given additional importance to 
Council reform. As is often argued, the size and composition of the Council reflect the 
power relations that existed at the end of the Second World War, and there have been calls 
for its reform in order to make it in harmony with the current power balances and in tune 
with other realities of contemporary world politics. In view of this, the Council can be 
viewed as an object of international political change in this age of global power transition. 
The present study seeks to deepen the understanding of this important issue foregrounded 
by power transition by explaining the behaviour of the rising powers actively pursuing 
Council reform in connection with the primary and secondary institutions governing 
change in this issue-area. Hence the second secondary research question to be addressed 
is: how does the reformed conception of power transition enhance the understanding of 
the behaviour of the rising powers pursuing UN Security Council reform?  
However, that the Council is an important object of international political change 
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is not the only reason why this study focuses on the issue of Council reform. One thing 
that the interwar debate reveals is, as mentioned earlier, the role of secondary institutions 
such as the League of Nations in managing change in international society. Extrapolating 
from this, it may well be surmised that the UN—the successor to the League—also plays 
a role in managing change in international society, including international political 
changes in the context of power transition. Indeed, it will be shown in chapter 5 that the 
UN, especially the Security Council, is a central part of contemporary international social 
structure governing international political change, including in the context of power 
transition. Moreover, secondary institutions such as these may have constitutive as well 
as regulative effects on states, thereby serving as ‘a site of interest and identity 
formation’.172 On this account, it can be argued that the Security Council is not just an 
object, but also an agent of international political change. The interwar debate on peaceful 
change provides insights into the agency of secondary institutions designed for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, such as the League, the UN and its 
Security Council, by shedding light on their role in managing change in international 
society, including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition, 
via the promotion of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful 
change.  
Bearing in mind that the Council is both object and agent of international political 
change, the present study examines the following secondary research question: given the 
duality of the Security Council with regard to power transition, how should the Council 
be reformed so as to enhance its capacity to manage change in international society, 
including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition? This 
question may not need to be addressed for the purpose of answering our primary research 
question, but it is too important a question to be ignored and is best addressed in the 
context of the present study. Moreover, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
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analysis of power transition cannot be separated completely from normative issues 
surrounding power transition from the point of view of ES theory.  
 
Conclusion  
The key points made in this chapter can be summarised as follows. The majority of the 
literature, theories and debates on power transition rest on the materialist-individualist 
ontology, while others are based upon the materialist-holist or idealist-individualist 
ontological assumptions. Although some constructivists and ES theorists have attempted 
to analyse power transition from the idealist-holist perspective, the results are far from 
satisfactory due to the lack of efforts to develop a robust framework for power transition 
analysis that emphasises the role of international social structure. ES theory, especially 
Buzan’s reformulation of it, provides a good starting point for developing such an 
analytical framework and for analysing the behaviour of rising powers in connection with 
institutions of international society. Bearing these points in mind, the present study 
addresses the following primary research question: how do primary and secondary 
institutions of international society affect the behaviour of rising powers and hence the 
process of international political change in the context of power transition?  
The present study also addresses three secondary research questions that will help 
us answer the primary research question and deepen our understanding of the relationship 
between power transition and institutions of international society. The secondary research 
questions that will be addressed in the following chapters are as follows:  
1. what are the key insights from the interwar debate on ‘peaceful change’ and how do 
they, with the help of ES theory, reform the conception of power transition and the 
way we analyse the behaviour of rising powers?; 
2. how does the reformed conception of power transition enhance the understanding of 
the behaviour of the rising powers pursuing UN Security Council reform?; and  
3. given the duality of the Security Council with regard to power transition, how should 
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the Council be reformed so as to enhance its capacity to manage change in 
international society, including changes in the international status quo in the context 
of power transition?  
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Chapter 2  
Methodology and Method  
 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter addresses methodological issues involved in this study, setting out the 
methodological principles underlying the discussions and analyses in the following 
chapters. Firstly, drawing upon what ES theorists call methodological pluralism, it 
discusses how power transition can be studied from three different, yet complementary 
methodological perspectives: positivism, interpretivism and critical theory. Secondly, it 
provides, yet again, the rationale for revisiting the interwar debate on peaceful change. 
Thirdly, it deals with some hermeneutical issues concerning text interpretation, focusing 
on the issue of objectivity and the nature of lessons of history or historical insights. Finally, 
I shall discuss how the insights drawn from the interwar debate can be applied in power 
transition analysis.  
 
How can power transition be studied?  
Methodological pluralism  
A number of ES theorists adopt a methodological approach known as methodological 
pluralism. The approach originates in Martin Wight’s three traditions of international 
theory. According to Wight, the discourse of international relations has developed as a 
series of continuous conversations amongst three distinct traditions of thought about 
world politics. Realists view sovereign states as engaging in power struggle in a state of 
anarchy. Rationalists put weight on their sociality and see international relations as more 
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of a social intercourse and less of a power struggle. Revolutionists view individual human 
beings as the principal moral agents in world politics, and seek to bring into existence a 
global moral community based upon the solidarity of humanity. 1  This tripartite 
classificatory scheme was meant to be reflective of the multifaceted nature of world 
politics, providing IR theorists with different perspectives from which to look at the 
complex realities of world politics. However, methodological issues were of minor 
interest to Wight, and he himself did not reflect on the potential of the scheme for the 
development of a distinctive IR methodology.  
It was Andrew Linklater who took the initial steps in exploring its potential. In his 
1990 book Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, 
he proposed associating each of Wight’s three traditions with a different methodological 
approach in sociology: positivism, hermeneutics and critical theory.2 Firstly, he points 
out that there is an affinity between realism and positivist methodology. Positivism in the 
social sciences seeks to conduct natural-scientific research on social phenomena aimed at 
explaining recurrent patterns of social behaviour on the basis of the principles, methods 
and ways of reasoning developed in natural science. According to Linklater, realists in IR 
scholarship, especially those known as structural or neo-realists, are chiefly concerned to 
employ such positivist approaches in their study of the international system.3 Secondly, 
rationalism is based upon hermeneutical methodology since it recognises the importance 
of diplomatic language and culture in understanding international relations. Rationalists 
take particular note of human agency and intentionality and are sceptical about the idea 
that human behaviour can be understood by simply applying the principles and methods 
                                                   
1  He presented this scheme in a lecture delivered in 1960. See Martin Wight, ‘An 
Anatomy of International Thought’, Review of International Studies, 13/3, 1987, pp. 221–
227. His categorisation has become widely known especially after the publication of one 
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developed in natural science.4 Thirdly, revolutionism has a strong affinity for critical 
theory since they both are concerned with, and united in their belief in, human progress 
and emancipation. Revolutionists maintain that human beings are capable not only of 
explaining and understanding social phenomena, but also of changing them for the better. 
Therefore, revolutionists are chiefly concerned to challenge the existing arrangements in 
the international system rather than to explain and understand them. In other words, 
revolutionism is based on a conception of political theory that stresses its inseparability 
from political practice.5  
According to Linklater, these three approaches ‘form a sequence of progressively 
more adequate approaches to world politics’.6 As he remarks:  
 
One of the main developments of this line of argument suggests that positivism, 
hermeneutics and critical sociology form a dialectical sequence of approaches to 
society. … Critical theory surpasses both perspectives because its inquiry is 
oriented towards the realisation of truth and freedom.7  
 
As is clear from this citation, he treats revolutionism and its critical methodology as a 
superior mode of theorising world politics, proffering a dialectical or progressive 
conception of IR methodology.  
Richard Little takes issue with such an interpretation of ES theory, arguing instead 
for the adoption of methodological pluralism as the methodological basis of it. Little 
draws attention to the fact that ES theorists have traditionally explored the multifaceted 
nature of world politics via focus on international system, international society and world 
society and how they interplay in world politics.8 For example, he shows how Hedley 
                                                   
4 Ibid., pp. 3–4, 9, 15–21.  
5 Ibid., pp. 3–4, 9, 21–32.  
6 Ibid., p. 10.  
7 Ibid., p. 9.  
8 See Richard Little, ‘Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological 
and Theoretical Reassessment’, European Journal of International Relations, 1/1, 1995, 
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Bull had warned against focusing on only one of these ontological elements to the 
exclusion of the other two in the study of world politics.9 He goes on to argue that the 
study of each of these ontological elements is closely associated with a specific 
methodological approach, pointing out that international system, international society and 
world society have been typically studied on the basis of positivist, interpretivist and 
critical methodology respectively.10  
It is well to note that Little’s argument accords with Linklater’s argument on this 
point. The main point of difference lies in the former’s rejection of prioritising critical 
methodology over the other methodologies. Instead, he strongly argues for the adoption 
of methodological pluralism which regards each of the three methodologies as equally 
contributing to the advancement in knowledge about world politics. Moreover, Little 
argues that methodological pluralism has potential for overcoming ‘the fragmented nature 
of the contemporary discipline’, 11  providing IR theorists with ‘ways of linking 
apparently disparate bodies of knowledge and understanding’. 12  Indeed, one of the 
strengths of ES theory is its simultaneous focus on the three ontological aspects 
(international system, international society and world society), and therefore it is essential 
that those using ES theory take account of all of the three associated methodologies when 
studying world politics.  
 
  
                                                   
pp. 9–34; Richard Little, ‘The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International 
Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 6/3, 2000, pp. 395–422.  
9  Little, ‘Neorealism and the English School’, p. 15; Little, ‘English School’s 
Contribution’, p. 402. See also Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in 
World Politics, 4th edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 23–26, 39, 49–50.  
10 Little, ‘English School’s Contribution’, pp. 404–414.  
11 Ibid., p. 415.  
12 Ibid., p. 397. Little demonstrates this point by showing how the balance of power can 
be studied and understood from different methodological points of view. See ibid., pp. 
404–411.  
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Systemic and societal approaches to studying power transition  
Methodological pluralism in the sense discussed in ES theory is instructive for the present 
study inasmuch as it allows us to consider how power transition can be studied from 
different methodological perspectives. I shall first discuss how power transition can be 
investigated from the positivist and interpretivist perspectives, and then discuss the 
relationship between power transition and the critical perspective.  
As we have already seen, positivism in the social sciences aims at constructing a 
theory that can explain patterns of human behaviour in society. Carl G. Hempel’s idea of 
scientific historiography epitomises such a methodological perspective. With a view to 
achieving ‘the methodological unity of empirical science’, he attempted to open up a new 
line of scientific historical inquiries based on his idea of the covering-law model.13 He 
claimed that a scientific explanation had to be comprised of two kinds of statements: (1) 
statements identifying ‘the determining conditions for the event to be explained’; and (2) 
statements concerning ‘the general laws on which the explanation is based’.14 In other 
words, he contended that, in order for an explanation to be scientific, it had to include one 
or more statements about general patterns or regularities. He also asserted that this idea 
should be applied to scientific prediction, arguing that predictions should be inferred from 
these two kinds of statements.15 On the basis of this idea, he claimed that the same 
principle should be applied to the study of history. As he remarked:  
 
In history as anywhere else in empirical science, the explanation of a 
phenomenon consists in subsuming it under general empirical laws; and the 
criterion of its soundness is … exclusively whether it rests on empirically well 
confirmed assumptions concerning initial conditions and general laws.16  
                                                   
13 See Carl G. Hempel, ‘The Function of General Laws in History’, The Journal of 
Philosophy, 39/2, 1942, pp. 35–48. The quotation is from ibid., p. 48.  
14 Ibid., p. 36.  
15 Ibid., pp. 38–39.  
16 Ibid., p. 45.  
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Hempel’s idea of scientific historiography is of assistance in considering how 
positivists in IR scholarship would go about studying power transition. They would gather 
empirical data on diachronic changes in the distribution of material power in the 
international system and then see if there exist any historical correlations between power 
shifts and the occurrence of wars. Using such data, they would then set out to construct a 
theory that would not only help spot correlations, but also help explain the causality 
behind them. They would then use the theory to scientifically predict the behaviour of 
rising powers in the future. They might, for example, predict that a war between countries 
A and B is likely in the near future since there exist such and such conditions at present. 
At the risk of oversimplification, this is, in fact, what much of the existing literature on 
power transition has done up until today, as represented by Gilpin’s HST, Organski’s PTT 
and most of the works inspired by these classical theories of power transition.  
From the rationalist perspective, the analyses of this kind are far from satisfactory 
since they take insufficient account of the role of human agency and intentionality. 
Rationalists consider that the important factors to be looked at in power transition studies 
are quite unlike the objects studied in natural science. What rationalists are chiefly 
concerned with are social facts underpinned by human agency and intentionality. More 
specifically, rationalists focus upon what the philosopher John R. Searle calls institutional 
facts. According to Searle, institutional facts are created when people in society 
collectively attribute to something, whether it be a physical entity or a pattern of 
behaviour, a status, meaning or function that are not inherent in its physical nature, and a 
social fact exists as long as people make decisions and act on the basis of it, whether 
consciously or not. 17  On this view, the study of society should be focused on 
understanding the meanings of institutions for actors and on clarifying the socially created 
semiotic contexts behind those meanings.  
In the eyes of rationalists, most of the building blocks of a plausible analysis of 
                                                   
17 See John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, London: Penguin, 1996.  
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power transition seem to be institutional facts in Searle’s sense of the word. At the most 
fundamental level, sovereign states and their role in the international system exist by 
virtue of a series of intertwined institutional facts based upon human agency and 
intentionality. Moreover, wars, the occurrence of which positivists treat as dependent 
variables in their study of power transition, can hardly be viewed as physical phenomena 
occurring naturally. As Bull argues, war needs be considered as a purposive institutional 
activity with certain social functions.18 From this point of view, any attempt at theorising 
power transition that downplays the institutional aspects of power transition are bound to 
fail because of its inability to capture the whole picture of power transition. If these points 
are accepted, then it becomes essential for scholars to make use of such resources and 
materials as will enable identification of institutions governing power transition and 
interpretation of their meanings for actors. These include materials such as legal 
documents, treaties, declarations and political statements.  
Having said that, it is well to note that stressing the importance of the rationalist 
methodology cannot be a legitimate reason for denying the significance of recursive 
patterns of state behaviour for power transition analysis. Alan James repudiates the 
distinction between international system and international society on the ground that it is 
inconceivable that the interaction between states could possibly occur without there being 
any societal connections among them. 19  However, abandoning the system/society 
distinction would run counter to methodological pluralism underpinning ES theory.20 
From the point of view of methodological pluralism, the positivist and interpretivist 
perspectives are both important in shedding light on the multifaceted realities of world 
                                                   
18  Hedley Bull, ‘War and International Order’, in Alan James (ed.), The Bases of 
International Order: Essays in Honour of C.A.W. Manning, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1973, p. 120–121.  
19 See Alan James, ‘System or Society?’, Review of International Studies, 19/3, 1993, pp. 
269–288.  
20 See Richard Little, ‘History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism in the English 
School’, in Cornelia Navari (ed.), Theorising International Society: English School 
Methods, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 78–103.  
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politics, and therefore both of them should be taken into account if the whole picture of 
world political scenery is to be captured.  
 
Critical theory and the normativity of power transition studies  
For all the differences that set rationalism apart from positivism, they are similar in that 
they both aim to explain and understand the realities of world politics. Revolutionism, by 
contrast, seeks to challenge and change those realities in order to bring into being a just 
and equitable society wherein individuals are emancipated from oppression. For this 
purpose, it emphasises the normativity of IR theory. In ES theory, revolutionism has often 
been discussed in connection with the concept of world society which is founded upon 
the common interests and values uniting humanity.21  
On the face of it, power transition studies might seem to be incompatible with 
revolutionism for two reasons. Firstly, because of its state-centrism, the literature on 
power transition tends to neglect the existence of non-state actors including individual 
human beings whom revolutionists regard as the fundamental moral agents in world 
politics. Secondly, the occurrence and recurrence of wars associated with power transition 
might appear to deny the possibility of creating an ideal world society based on the 
common interests and values uniting humanity.  
In spite of this, however, power transition ought to be of great concern to 
revolutionists. There is no denying that wars significantly affect human beings’ lives by 
imposing ruinous ravages and suffering on them. Given this fact, there are good reasons 
for revolutionists to take a keen interest in power transition as a normative issue facing 
world society and to try to change the reality of the world by critically engaging with the 
problem of power transition.  
At this point, it is well to consider the analytical/normative divide that exists 
between positivism and rationalism, on the one hand, and revolutionism, on the other. As 
                                                   
21 See Little, ‘English School’s Contribution’, pp. 411–414.  
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discussed above, positivism and rationalism are interested in explaining and 
understanding how states interact in their relations with one another. Buzan, for example, 
argues that his main concern is to present a reformulation of ES theory on the basis of the 
claim that ‘the structural and normative strands within it’ can be distinguished from each 
other.22 To use his words, he is concerned not so much with ‘normative theory’ as with 
‘theory about norms’.23  
However, as John Williams rightly points out, this position is untenable because 
Buzan’s structural interpretation of ES theory cannot escape its own normativity as long 
as it concerns itself with questions concerning values in international and world 
societies. 24  As Buzan himself postulates, social structures are changeable and the 
interests and values underpinning them are historically contingent, although some 
structures often discussed in connection with the law of nature tend to be more stable and 
durable. If this be the case, the separation between the analytical and the normative has 
to be seen as highly questionable, and therefore efforts to explain and understand world 
politics should be considered as inseparable from efforts to challenge and change it. When 
things can be changed, the attitude of detachment is not neutral; it is a sign of unwarranted 
conservatism. Thus, we are well-advised to keep in mind the normativity of IR 
scholarship, including power transition studies.  
To sum up, methodological pluralism offers a distinctive way of looking at power 
transition from three different methodological viewpoints, enabling us to understand its 
multi-dimensional features. Although I will make extensive use of Buzan’s social 
structural reformulation of ES theory in the present study for examining the relationship 
                                                   
22 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the 
Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 14–
15.  
23 Ibid., p.14.  
24 See John Williams, ‘Structure, Norms and Normative Theory in a Re-defined English 
School: Accepting Buzan’s Challenge’, Review of International Studies, 37/3, 2011, pp. 
1235–1253.  
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between international social structure and power transition, all of the three 
methodological perspectives should be kept in mind, and we must avoid prioritising one 
methodology at the expense of the others.  
 
Interpreting the past: hermeneutics and the lessons of history  
This section seeks to provide the rationale for revisiting the interwar debate on peaceful 
change and to discuss how it should be interpreted. In addition, it discusses the nature of 
historical lessons and considers how the lessons and insights gained from the interwar 
debate can be applied in power transition analysis.  
 
Why revisit the interwar debate?  
Despite the discussion in the previous chapter, some readers might still wonder why it is 
necessary to revisit the debate and whether it is relevant to the present study. Therefore, 
it is well at this point to consider these issues in greater detail so that there shall be no 
doubt as to the significance of the debate for the present study.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the debate offers theoretical insights into the 
relationship between power transition—or, to be more accurate, international political 
change in the context of power transition—and international social structure. Indeed, it is 
the most rigorous and systematic attempt so far in IR scholarship to explore the role of 
international social structure in accommodating rising powers’ demands for international 
political change, and thus it provides a strong defence of the socio-structural conception 
of power transition which this study seeks to establish. Moreover, the focus on the debate 
is useful for the present purpose since it highlights the existence of different normative 
perspectives on power transition. Therefore, by revisiting the debate, it is possible to 
retrieve both analytical and normative insights on the basis of which to rework ES theory 
and to develop a framework for power transition analysis that accords with the ES’s 
methodological pluralism.  
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To be clear, this is not to suggest that the debate provides an intellectually neutral 
perspective. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, the debate took place in an 
intellectual context where the separation between the study of IR and that of international 
law had not been fully established. However, this should not be seen as a disadvantage. 
On the contrary, as we have seen earlier, there have been sustained efforts to bridge the 
gap between the two disciplines, and on this account alone the debate is worth revisiting.25  
Furthermore, the debate is worth revisiting since it reveals the basic character of 
contemporary international society, thereby providing an appropriate starting point from 
which to examine the features of contemporary international social structure governing 
international political change, including in the context of power transition. As Bull points 
out, the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of solidarism, as opposed to pluralism, 
or what he calls ‘neo-Grotian ideas’.26 The rise of the neo-Grotianism was a real game 
changer, with a lasting influence on contemporary international society. In the aftermath 
of the catastrophe caused by the First World War, the exponents of this doctrine 
envisioned a series of designs for improving the international conditions with a view to 
creating a lasting peace, as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Their efforts 
have been embodied in such international treaties as the General Treaty for Renunciation 
of War as an Instrument of National Policy (which is widely known as the Pact of Paris) 
and such international organisations as the League of Nations, and some of these 
embodiments continue to inform and constitute part of contemporary international social 
structure including the UN system. In other words, some of the most basic features of the 
contemporary international social structure have their historical origins in the solidarist 
or neo-Grotian efforts to reform the social structure of the interwar international system. 
                                                   
25 See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, 
‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship’, The American Journal of International Law, 92/3, 1998, 
pp. 367–397.  
26 Bull, Anarchical Society, pp. 230–232.  
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As will be shown in chapters 3 and 4, the interwar debate on peaceful change was 
inseparably linked to the development of the neo-Grotianism during the interwar period, 
and therefore revisiting the debate will help deepen the understanding of the character of 
contemporary international social structure governing international political change, 
including changes in the international status quo in the context of power transition.  
It is true that the League of Nations and the UN are the products of the First and 
Second World Wars respectively, and, as a consequence, these international organisations 
have different features that are reflective of the differences between the two world wars. 
However, the continuity between them cannot be denied. While they have different 
historical origins, these secondary institutions share common purposes and principles, 
and are designed to play a role in maintaining international peace and security through 
the promotion and entrenchment of non-use of force, collective security and, as will be 
discussed later in the present study, peaceful change. As Leland M. Goodrich, one of the 
founders of the UN, had revealed in his comparative study of the League and the UN, the 
differences between the two organisations are often exaggerated.27 As he remarked:  
 
… the point upon which attention needs to be focused for the serious student of 
international affairs is that the United Nations does not represent a break with 
the past, but rather the continued application of old ideas and methods with some 
changes deemed necessary in the light of past experience.28  
 
Surely when the founders of the UN were designing its organisational structures, 
powers and functions, they had both the First and Second World Wars in mind. This is 
not to downplay the important differences between the two organisations, but the present 
study seeks to show that there exist important points of continuity in terms of their role 
in promoting and entrenching the practice of peaceful change in international society.  
                                                   
27  Leland M. Goodrich, ‘From League of Nations to United Nations’, International 
Organization, 1/1, 1947, pp. 3–21.  
28 Ibid., p. 5.  
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It is for these reasons that this study turns to the interwar debate on peaceful change. 
However, this must be done with great caution since there exist some interpretational 
problems and pitfalls which must be avoided if we are to gain plausible lessons and 
insights of history. It is to this subject that I shall now move on to.  
 
The objectivity of text interpretation  
Although ES theorists often refer to history when trying to understand the development 
and current status of international societies, William Bain argues that they have done so 
on too shaky methodological foundations.29 Bain levels his criticism to the ways some 
founding fathers of ES theory treat history in their works. First, he scrutinises Bull’s 
conception of history, criticising its ambiguity resulting from the tension between the 
realist and constructivist conceptions of history in his argument.30 Bain then turns his 
attention to Herbert Butterfield’s conception of history, arguing that, while Butterfield 
rejects the idea that history offers practical lessons, he fails to free himself completely 
from the very idea he is trying to reject. 31  In search for a remedy for these 
historiographical ambiguities, Bain turns to Michael Oakeshott’s conception of history as 
a ‘fable’.32  
However, Oakeshott’s conception of history as a fable is by no means more 
straightforward than Bull and Butterfield’s conceptions of history. On the one hand, as 
the term ‘fable’ implies, Oakeshott takes a constructivist position, arguing that ‘we can 
never look at the past except through the spectacles of the present’.33 In his view, history 
is something that the historian constructs; the historian’s ‘business is to read the past 
                                                   
29 William Bain, ‘The English School and the Activity of Being a Historian’, in Cornelia 
Navari (ed.), Theorising International Society: English School Methods, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 148–166.  
30 Ibid., pp. 149–152.  
31 Ibid., pp. 152–154.  
32 Ibid., pp. 154–159.  
33 Michael Oakeshott, ‘History is a Fable’, in Michael Oakeshott, What is History? and 
Other Essays, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 37.  
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through the eyes of the present as accurately as possible’.34 However, despite the fact 
that he used the term ‘fable’, he denies that history provides practical lessons as to how 
we should conduct ourselves in contemporary situations. As he remarks:  
 
The world of history has no data to offer of which practical experience can make 
use; and to conceive it as offering such data is to misconceive its character.35  
 
As these examples show, there are a number of issues concerning the understanding 
of history and the interpretation of historical texts, and therefore it is well-advised to 
attend to them before we go about studying the interwar debate on peaceful change. For 
this purpose, I shall here address some hermeneutical issues concerning human 
knowledge and text interpretation.  
Etymologically, the origin of the word ‘hermeneutics’ can be traced back to the 
Greek word hermeneuein which, roughly translated, means ‘to interpret’.36 According to 
Richard Palmer, ‘[h]ermeneutics is the study of understanding, especially the task of 
understanding texts’. 37  Friedrich Schleiermacher is widely credited with theorising 
hermeneutics as the general ‘art of understanding’. 38  He held that understanding is 
achieved when the interpreter succeeds in reconstructing the creative psychological 
processes which led to the production of an object being interpreted such as a historical 
text. 39  He argued that literal or grammatical interpretation is not sufficient for 
understanding texts, for they are not completely reflective of the author’s intentions and 
                                                   
34 Ibid., p. 42.  
35 Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1933, p. 158.  
36 Stanley E. Porter and Jason C. Robinson (eds), Hermeneutics: An Introduction to 
Interpretive Theory, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011, p. 2; Richard E. Palmer, 
Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and 
Gadamer, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969, p. 12.   
37 Ibid., p. 8.  
38 Ibid., p. 84.  
39 Ibid., p. 86.  
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psychological processes. In other word, there always exist gaps between what the author 
intends to express by writing a text and the literal meaning of the text. In order to 
understand a given text, the interpreter should be able to reconstruct the inner processes 
of the author’s mind.40 For this purpose, Schleiermacher proposed a distinctive way of 
interpretation that became one of the central concepts in hermeneutics, i.e. the 
hermeneutical circle. The meaning of the parts constituting the whole can be determined 
only with reference to the meaning of the whole. However, the meaning of the whole can 
be understood only by interpreting what the parts constituting the whole mean.41 On the 
basis of the hermeneutical circle, Schleiermacher maintains that a text should be viewed 
in context rather than in a state of alienation from its social, cultural and historical 
surroundings. To quote Stanley Porter and Jason Robinson, ‘he accepts that no matter 
how unique a person’s writing (or spoken expression) might be, it will always reflect a 
wider cultural spirit (Geist) that may be discerned by the interpreter.’42  
Hermeneutics developed into an independent discipline thanks to Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s path-breaking attempt to establish the foundational basis for 
Geisteswissenschaften, which means the human sciences or humanities. According to 
Palmer, Dilthey’s goal was ‘to develop methods of gaining “objectively valid” 
interpretations of “expressions of inner life”’.43 As Dilthey pursued the objective validity 
of interpretation, he became less concerned with the reconstruction of psychological or 
internal processes and more concerned with interpreting and understanding external 
‘“objectification[s]” of the mind’ or ‘expressions of lived experience’ produced within, 
and reflective of, its social, cultural and historical environments and conditions. 44 
Schleiermacher’s idea of the hermeneutical circle was picked up on by Dilthey in this 
                                                   
40 Ibid., pp. 92–93.  
41 Ibid., pp. 87–88.  
42 Porter and Robinson, Hermeneutics, p. 32.  
43 Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 98.  
44  Ibid., pp. 112–114. See also William Outhwaite, Understanding Social Life: The 
Method Called Verstehen, Lewes: Jean Stroud, 1986, p. 26.  
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context, and provided a methodological principle for the contextual understanding of the 
objectifications of human life. 45  However, Dilthey’s argument is plagued with 
inconsistency, for there is an apparent discrepancy between his pursuit of ‘objectively 
valid knowledge’ and his idea of the ‘historicality’ of human beings, including the 
interpreter.46 Faced with this dilemma, he claimed that the way out of this dilemma was 
to heighten a sense of our own historicality and to overcome our own prejudices that 
hinder objective interpretation.47  
The same dilemma and solution can be detected in E.H. Carr’s historiography. In 
his well-read book What is History, he argued that if we are to understand a history book, 
it is essential that we understand who the author is and her/his socio-historical 
backdrops.48 At the same time, he insisted on the importance of being aware of our own 
historicality. As he remarked:  
 
But I shall venture to believe that the historian who is most conscious of his own 
situation is also more capable of transcending it, and more capable of 
appreciating the essential nature of the differences between his own society and 
outlook and those of other periods and other countries … Man’s capacity to rise 
above his social and historical situation seems to be conditioned by the 
sensitivity with which he recognizes the extent of his involvement in it.49  
 
The objectivity of historical understanding is one of the most controversial issues 
in historiography, and this issue has long been debated between realists and constructivists 
in historiography. However, it is not always easy to put historians into one of these groups. 
For example, it is particularly difficult to determine whether R.G. Collingwood was a 
                                                   
45 Palmer, Hermeneutics, pp. 118–121.  
46 Ibid., pp. 121–123.  
47 Porter and Robinson, Hermeneutics, p. 44.  
48 E.H. Carr, What is History?: The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures Delivered in 
the University of Cambridge, January–March 1961, 2nd edn, London: Penguin, 1987, p. 
44.  
49 Ibid.  
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realist or a constructivist in his understanding of history.50 Collingwood famously stated 
that ‘[a]ll history is the history of thought’,51 and, in his autobiography, he went so far as 
to write that ‘there is nothing else except thought that can be the object of historical 
knowledge’.52 As with Schleiermacher, he thought that the task of history should be 
focused upon the reconstruction of the psychological processes that occurred in the minds 
of historical figures. To quote his words, ‘[t]he history of thought, and therefore all history, 
is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind.’53  
Another distinguishing feature of Collingwood’s historiography, which is of great 
importance for successfully re-enacting past thoughts, is the logic of question and answer. 
To quote his own words at length:  
 
I began by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by simply 
studying his spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or written 
with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to 
find out his meaning you must also know what the question was (a question in 
his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has 
said or written was meant as an answer.54  
 
To put simply, if we are to understand a person’s thought we need to understand the 
question, imagined or real, which she/he is trying to answer. As Kenneth McIntyre points 
out, these arguments accord with historiographical realism since they assume ‘the 
existence of an external, persistent, and objective past’.55  
At the same time, however, Collingwood is often credited with offering a severe 
                                                   
50  See Kenneth B. McIntyre, ‘Historicity as Methodology or Hermeneutics: 
Collingwood’s Influence on Skinner and Gadamer’, Journal of the Philosophy of History, 
2/2, 2008, pp. 138–166.  
51 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993, p. 215.  
52 R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, London: Oxford University Press, 1939, p. 110.  
53 Collingwood, Idea of History, p. 215.  
54 Collingwood, Autobiography, p. 31.  
55 McIntyre, ‘Historicity’, p. 144.  
84 
 
criticism of realism, paving the way for constructivism in historiography.56 Collingwood 
held that the meaning of historical evidence or facts is determined only when they are 
examined by the historian who attends to them with a specific question in mind.57 Indeed, 
he wrote in Speculum Mentis that:  
 
… just as we remember not what happened but what we want to remember, as 
we perceive not what is ‘there’ but what we attend to, so we reconstruct history 
not as it was but as we choose to think it was.58  
 
The debates surrounding the objectivity of interpretation and historical 
understanding show no sign of conclusion, and the problem of objectivity in history 
deserves far more detailed treatment and discussion than can possibly be undertaken in 
this chapter. However, the difficulty of achieving the objectivity of interpretation does not 
absolve us from the scholarly responsibility to produce as accurate an analysis and 
interpretation as possible. Even if it be true that the objective understanding of history is 
impossible, this should not encourage us to indulge in writing a fake history. As we have 
already seen above, even Oakeshott, who regarded history as a fable created by the 
historian, remarked that the historian’s ‘business is to read the past through the eyes of 
the present as accurately as possible’.59 Since we do not have direct access to the author’s 
mind and the ideas in it, it is necessary to take the social, intellectual and cultural contexts 
into account as we go about interpreting historical texts so as to understand the authors’ 
intentions behind those texts and the question or questions she/he was addressing as best 
we can.  
                                                   
56  See, for example, Margit Hurup Nielsen, ‘Re-Enactment and Reconstruction in 
Collingwood’s Philosophy of History’, History and Theory, 20/1, 1981, pp. 1–31.  
57 See David Boucher, ‘The Significance of R. G. Collingwood’s “Principles of History”’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 58/2, 1997, pp. 314–317.  
58 R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, or, The Map of Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1924, p. 237.  
59 Oakeshott, ‘History is a Fable’, p. 42, emphasis added.  
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Contextualisation is vitally important for understanding the interwar debate on 
peaceful change, for the common understanding of the debate has been strongly informed 
by the First-Great-Debate narrative which simplistically represents the interwar IR 
scholarship as debates between realists and idealists.60  This simplistic narrative is a 
product of insufficient contextualisation, and has made it difficult for today’s students of 
IR to understand what it really was that was at stake in the interwar IR scholarship. Aware 
of the methodological importance of contextualisation, the next two chapters will place 
and study the interwar debate on peaceful change in its historical context.  
In this connection it is well to note that what has been discussed above holds true 
for the understanding of state behaviour inasmuch as, from the interpretivist 
methodological perspective discussed above, the social actions of states can be seen as 
texts to be interpreted. When understanding states’ actions and the intentions behind them, 
it is necessary to take their social and historical contexts into account. With this in mind, 
the analytical framework set out in chapter 6 will be framed in such a way as to enable 
the analysist to explain the behaviour of rising powers in connection with socially and 
historically constructed international social structure in a given international society.  
 
The nature of lessons of history  
Of greater importance is whether knowledge of the past provides any lessons or insights 
that are useful for understanding the present and the future. If it does, what are their use 
and limitations? It is necessary to address this issue since it is sometimes argued that 
history does not tell us what to do in a given situation, as in Oakeshott’s historiography 
as we have seen above.61 Furthermore, as Ernest May demonstrates, history has often 
                                                   
60 On the First Great Debate in IR, see Brian C. Schmidt (ed.), International Relations 
and the First Great Debate, London: Routledge, 2012.  
61 See also Michael Oakeshott, ‘On Arriving at a University’, in Michael Oakeshott, 
What is History? and Other Essays, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004, p. 339.  
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been misused by decision-makers, resulting in miscalculations and errors in judgement.62 
In light of this, it is advisable to discuss the nature of lessons of history at this point.  
At least, there are a couple of objections to the idea of drawing lessons from history. 
First, it is sometimes claimed that, since it is virtually impossible to arrive at a completely 
objective or neutral understanding of historical events, lessons of history cannot be but 
arbitrary. However, this argument is untenable because, even if there were some real 
difficulties in arriving at an objective interpretation of historical events, this would by no 
means justify the claim that any interpretation is equally plausible. Second, it is often 
argued that, since historical events are all unique and history does not repeat itself, history 
cannot offer any reliable guides as to what we should do in a given situation.63 Besides, 
the above discussion about the methodological importance of contextualisation might, on 
the face of it, seem to contradict the claim that it is possible to draw lessons and insights 
from the past that are relevant to the present situation. Even if we concede these points, 
however, it should still be asked whether there are any other kinds of lessons to be learned 
from history.  
As I see it, the uniqueness of historical events does not necessarily negate the 
practical relevance of history. The claim that history is of little practical value is based on 
a narrow conception of practicality. If the concept is broadly understood to mean the 
quality of being related to real situations and conditions of the world, it can well be argued 
that history is practically relevant in some respects.  
Collingwood provides valuable insights into the relationship between history and 
‘practical life’. 64  As with Oakeshott, he argues that ‘history never exactly repeats 
                                                   
62 Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American 
Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.  
63 This is one of the reasons behind Oakeshott’s denial of the practicality of the lessons 
of history. See Michael Oakeshott, On History and Other Essays, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1983, pp. 37–38.  
64 Collingwood, Autobiography, p. 106.  
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itself’. 65  Nevertheless, he maintains that history can provide insight that helps in 
‘diagnosing our moral and political problems’.66 As he remarks:  
 
The historian’s business is to reveal the less obvious features hidden from a 
careless eye in the present situation. What history can bring to moral and political 
life is a trained eye for the situation in which one has to act.67  
 
While history does not tell us what exactly we should do in a given situation, it does help 
us understand the situation by raising our awareness of issues to which we have been 
oblivious, and, for this reason, history is of practical value. And Collingwood’s argument 
is perfectly compatible with the contextualisation approach adopted in the present study 
since placing and studying a historical debate in context can sometimes raise our 
awareness of ‘the less obvious features hidden from a careless eye in the present 
situation’.68  
Moreover, history is of practical relevance since it brings change to our views of 
the real world by challenging our assumptions and prejudgments about it. This point is 
most robustly enunciated by Hans-Georg Gadamer who argues that understanding is 
achieved through fusion of horizons.69 He defines a ‘horizon’ as ‘the range of vision that 
includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point’.70 Understanding 
occurs when the horizon of the interpreter encounters and fuses with that of the text being 
interpreted. Fusion of horizons is a self-transformative process or experience in which the 
prejudices and prepossessions held by the interpreter are exposed, questioned and 
                                                   
65 Ibid., p. 100.  
66 Ibid., p. 101.  
67 Ibid., p. 100.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. His 
argument in this book was greatly influenced by Collingwood. On this point, see McIntyre, 
‘Historicity’.  
70 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 313.  
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challenged. 71  Consequently, the interpreter’s horizon is transformed and expanded, 
enabling her/him to view things from an expanded perspective. As Palmer explains:  
 
So the encounter with the horizon of the transmitted text in reality lights up one’s 
own horizon and leads to self-disclosure and self-understanding; the encounter 
becomes a moment of ontological disclosure. It is an event in which something 
emerges from negativity—the negativity of realizing that there is something one 
did not know, that things were not as one had assumed.72  
 
Fusion of horizons not only changes how we see things, but also brings change to our 
conceptions of ourselves, thereby affecting our attitudes towards practical life.  
Fusion of horizons also occurs when interpreting historical texts, and it is also for 
this reason that history, and the study of it, is of practical relevance. History does not tell 
us what exactly is going to happen in the future. Nor does it tell us what to do in a given 
situation. Yet history is of practical relevance since it expands our way of seeing and 
doing things. As discussed earlier, the interwar debate on peaceful change provides 
important insights into hitherto unrevealed aspects of power transition by highlighting the 
relationship between power transition and international social structure, and those 
insights will have the effect of challenging and reforming the way we look at, theorise 
and respond to the problem of power transition.  
 
Conclusion  
The discussions in this chapter can be summarised as follows. Drawing on the ES’s 
discussions about methodological pluralism, the chapter first discussed how power 
transition can be studied from the positivist, interpretivist and critical perspectives, and 
argued for the adoption of methodological pluralism as the basis of the present study so 
                                                   
71 See, for example, ibid., p. 317.  
72 Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 201.  
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as to be able to address both analytical and normative aspects of power transition. 
Secondly, it set out the rationale for revisiting the interwar debate on peaceful change, 
arguing that: (1) it offers insights into the relationship between power transition and 
international social structure; and (2) it provides the key to understanding the basic 
features of contemporary social structure governing international political change. 
Thirdly, it was argued that, while interpretation and understanding are constantly affected 
by one’s own historicity, it is possible to arrive at a more objective interpretation of 
historical texts by taking into account their social, intellectual and cultural contexts as 
well as the intentions of authors. It was also suggested that the same principle of 
interpretation applies to the understanding of state behaviour. Finally, it was pointed out 
that, although history does not tell us what to do in a given situation, it is of practical 
relevance inasmuch as it not only provides insights that help us better understand the 
present situation, but also challenges and reforms our views about and attitudes towards 
the real world by revealing its hitherto hidden aspects.  
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Chapter 3  
The Problem of Peaceful Change  
 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter traces the historical emergence of the problem of peaceful change and 
explores its nature. The goal of the chapter is threefold. Firstly, it aims at providing an 
outline of the historical background to the interwar debate on peaceful change. As 
discussed in chapter 2, contextualisation should be the first step in understanding the 
meaning and significance of historical events and texts; knowledge about context allows 
us to identify the question or questions which people were trying to answer. This task is 
particularly important when exploring interwar IR scholarship, the interpretation of which 
has been largely guided and informed by the idea of the First Great Debate and the 
simplistic realist/idealist dichotomy.1 Whatever merit there is in it, this interpretation 
does not offer a solid background knowledge required for the historical understanding of 
the debate on peaceful change. In order to gain such knowledge, it is necessary to look 
back afresh upon the history of interwar international relations without being dictated to 
by the narrative of the First Great Debate.  
Secondly, by looking at how war came to be regulated and outlawed via changes 
and developments in international norms and law during the interwar period, this chapter 
seeks to explore the relationship between war and international social structure. 
Highlighting how the role and status of war in interwar international society were 
                                                   
1 On the First Great Debate in IR scholarship, see Brian C. Schmidt (ed.), International 
Relations and the First Great Debate, London: Routledge, 2012.  
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inextricably intertwined with the development of international law and the League of 
Nations, the findings of this chapter provide a strong support for the socio-structural 
conception of power transition and international political change.  
Thirdly, this chapter also provides the background knowledge necessary to 
understand the development of contemporary international society after the Second World 
War. The UN of today is based on reflection of the lessons and failures of the League of 
Nations. It is therefore not surprising that these secondary institutions differ from one 
another in many significant ways. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that 
there are numerous similarities between these secondary institutions as well. Despite 
outward differences, there exists a common thread running through them: the promotion 
of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change as a key to 
international peace and security. It was during the interwar period that systematic efforts 
began to be made to promote the principle of non-use of force at the international level, 
and, as will be shown below, it was commonly believed that this required the 
entrenchment of both collective security and peaceful change in state practice, and the 
League was expected to play a central role in firmly establishing these practices as 
primary institutions of international society. The experiences of the League, both 
successes and failures, informed the institutional design of the UN and its Security 
Council, and, as will be discussed in chapter 5, this has had significant impacts on the 
character of contemporary international social structure governing power transition and 
international political change. These points have been neglected by much of the existing 
literature on power transition, which is marked by state-centrism and the materialist-
individualist ontology, as pointed out in chapter 1.  
The first section provides a historical overview of the development of the 
international quasi-constitutional structure during the interwar period. This will be done 
first by looking at the impacts of the First World War on traditional institutions of 
international society, and then by tracing the emergence of the League system and what I 
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call the trinity of international norms concerning the use of force. The second section 
gives a detailed look at the origin of Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
showing both the importance and complexity of the problem of peaceful change. These 
two sections provide the background knowledge necessary to understand the origins of 
the problem of peaceful change. The third section then explores some of the features of 
the problem by looking at how peaceful change relates to power transition, revolution, 
collective security and appeasement, with a particular focus on its relationship with 
collective security.  
 
The development of the international quasi-constitutional structure  
The Great War, international society and rising tides of solidarism  
The First World War had immense and multifaceted impacts on world politics. It was the 
first all-out war in world history in which states across the world mobilised all kinds of 
national resources available to continue fighting with each other and to gain a victory. To 
quote Francis Walters, the author of a magisterial book on the history of the League of 
Nations, the Great War ‘acted as a powerful stimulus to the political conscience of 
mankind’.2  
From the viewpoint of international society as a whole, one of the most significant 
repercussions of the war was the delegitimisation of the balance of power, which had been 
regarded by scholars and practitioners as one of the most basic institutions of classical 
European international society. The idea that power balances among states should be 
maintained in such a way as to ensure that no one state held a preponderance of power to 
overwhelm the other members of international society had been long considered as ‘the 
unwritten constitution of international society’. 3  The First World War revealed the 
limitations of the balance of power as an institution for the maintenance of international 
                                                   
2 F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, vol. 1, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1952, p. 16.  
3 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 174.  
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peace and security.4 In his address to the Senate on 22 January 1917, Woodrow Wilson 
advocated ‘a community of power’ instead of ‘a new balance of power’, and his 
commitment to a reformed international order was reaffirmed two months later in his 
second inaugural address in which he declared that ‘peace cannot securely or justly rest 
upon an armed balance of power’.5 In the introduction he contributed to a book published 
in 1919, Lord Robert Cecil, who also played an important role in the establishment of the 
League of Nations, expressly rejected the notion that the balance of power would 
contribute to the preservation of international peace, arguing that ‘[n]o one can seriously 
believe that any development of the idea of the Balance of Power can give any satisfactory 
result’.6  
Underlying much of the criticism against the balance of power was a change in the 
Clausewitzian conception of war as a means of national policy. Notwithstanding a great 
deal of attempts to restrain the use of force, as exemplified by the Hague Conferences, 
the idea that sovereign states were entitled to resort to war was still prevalent before the 
First World War, and international law had permitted, if not encouraged, states to make 
recourse to war for the purpose of achieving political goals including the maintenance of 
the balance of power. The First World War raised fundamental doubts about this 
traditional conception of war. Firstly, due to the increasing destructiveness of modern 
warfare, the recourse to war came to be widely considered as too costly a means for 
achieving any meaningful political objectives.7 Secondly, as Michael Howard pointed 
out, the twentieth century witnessed the undermining of the autonomy of politics by 
military imperatives and the emergence of directionless, unbridled and uncontrolled 
                                                   
4 Alfred Vagts and Detlev F. Vagts, ‘The Balance of Power in International Law: A 
History of an Idea’, The American Journal of International Law, 73/4, 1979, p. 576.  
5 Albert Bushnell Hart (ed.), Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
New York: Boni and Liveright, 1918, pp. 174–175, 186.  
6 Geoffrey Butler, A Handbook to the League of Nations, London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1919, p. vi.  
7 See, for example, H.G. Wells, The Idea of a League of Nations, Boston: The Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 1919, pp. 8–13.  
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violence.8 For these reasons, it came to be widely held that war should no longer serve 
as a means of national policy. It is important to note that war was viewed during the 
interwar period as a social practice or, in ES terminology, an institution of international 
society. This is evident, for example, in the following statement made by Lord Cecil at 
the outset of a commentary on the League of Nations:  
 
DO WE REALLY WANT to get rid of war and the war system?9  
 
Put shortly, as a result of the First World War, some of the traditional primary institutions 
of classical European international society lost their credit, and there emerged a need for 
the reworking of the international order and a set of alternative institutions based on 
principles conducive to international peace and security.  
Towards the end of the First World War, countless proposals were made to establish 
an international framework within which the use of force could be effectively regulated. 
Many of them were based on a doctrine which presumed the existence of the social 
solidarity among sovereign states, which Hedley Bull famously dubbed solidarism.10 
Solidarists held that there existed sufficient social solidarity and cohesion among 
members of international society for ‘the enforcement of the law’.11 On this view, the use 
of force should be permitted only for the purpose of law enforcement and the protection 
of rights. What solidarists were striving to do was to revive the distinction between just 
and unjust war. In the seventeenth century, Grotius, to whose ideas Bull ascribed the 
                                                   
8 Michael Howard, ‘War as an Instrument of Policy’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin 
Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 198.  
9  Viscount Cecil, ‘The League as a Road to Peace’, in Leonard Woolf (ed.), The 
Intelligent Man’s War to Prevent War, London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 256, emphasis 
added.  
10 Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Herbert Butterfield 
and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International 
Politics, London: Allen and Unwin, 1966, pp. 51–73.  
11 Ibid., p. 52.  
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solidarist doctrine, argued that wars fought for purposes other than ‘defence, the recovery 
of property and the infliction of punishment’ were unjust and therefore should not be 
permitted by international law. 12  One of the principal goals of solidarists was to 
resuscitate this Grotian jus-ad-bellum thinking and to reform the international social 
structure of the day accordingly.  
These were the ideas that underlay efforts to remove such traditional institutions as 
the balance of power and war in the aftermath of the First World War. As Graham Ross 
remarked, the international arrangements established after the war were ‘a mixture of old 
and new’, and they heavily drew upon knowledge and experience derived from the 
Concert of Europe, the Hague Peace Conferences and other diplomatic practices. 13 
However, there is no denying that the First World War provided a historical turning point 
for the development of international social structure.  
 
The establishment of the League of Nations  
The need to establish an institutional framework for the promotion of peace and security 
was strongly recognised from the early stages of the war. In 1915, two associations 
advocating the establishment of such a framework were founded on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In America, the League to Enforce Peace played a part in the dissemination of 
the idea of penalty and sanction, on which the League of Nations was based.14 In Britain, 
the League of Nations Society was set up, and, three years later, it merged with the League 
of Free Nations Association—another British group supporting the creation of a 
League—to establish the League of Nations Union.15 Similar associations existed in 
                                                   
12 Ibid., pp. 54–55.  
13 Graham Ross, The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System 1914–
1945, London: Longman, 1983, p. 8.  
14 Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935, London: 
Macmillan, 1939, pp. 161–164; F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 
1920–1946, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986, pp. 26–27.  
15 See Henry R. Winkler, ‘The Development of the League of Nations Idea in Great 
Britain, 1914–1919’, The Journal of Modern History, 20/2, 1948, pp. 95–112.  
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many parts of the world including Germany, France and Italy, and those groups gathered 
together to form the International Federation of League of Nations Societies in the 
aftermath of the war, embodying growing internationalism at that moment. 16  The 
historical fact that these groups of people existed demonstrates that the idea of setting up 
a League of Nations was receiving widespread support from diverse corners of the 
world.17  
Significant as these movements were, it was, as Ross rightly points out, statesmen 
and government officials who had a great influence over the framing of the League of 
Nations and its Covenant.18 As is widely known, there were differences between Britain 
and America in the perception of what the post-war international order should look like. 
To quote Martin Ceadel, there were ‘two versions of collective security’, which was 
instrumental in making the Covenant ‘eclectic’. 19  President Wilson emphasised and 
valued the notions of mutual guarantee and territorial integrity. In his address to the 
League to Enforce Peace on 27 May 1916, in which he declared his support for the idea 
of establishing ‘an universal association of the nations’, he expressly defined ‘a virtual 
guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence’ as one of its primary goals.20 
He reaffirmed his commitment to this idea in the Fourteen Points speech delivered to the 
Congress on 8 January 1918, in which he declared that:  
 
                                                   
16 See Thomas R. Davies, ‘Internationalism in a Divided World: The Experience of the 
International Federation of League of Nations Societies, 1919–1939’, Peace & Change, 
37/2, 2012, pp. 227–252.  
17 According to Davies, the Federation was comprised of associations in 24 countries at 
the time of its creation in 1921 (the founding members of the League numbered 42), and, 
by 1930, the figure had increased to as many as 40 countries. Ibid., p. 230. Moreover, the 
Congress of the Federation was seen by some as the ‘third chamber’ of the League. See 
ibid., p. 240.  
18 Ross, Great Powers, p. 109.  
19 Martin Ceadel, ‘Enforced Pacific Settlement or Guaranteed Mutual Defence? British 
and US Approaches to Collective Security in the Eclectic Covenant of the League of 
Nations’, The International History Review, 35/5, 2013, p. 993.  
20 Hart, Selected Addresses, p. 125.  
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A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the 
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small states alike.21  
 
Significant as Wilson’s contribution was, one must not underestimate the role 
British practitioners played in the drafting of the Covenant. Britain was in favor of 
improving mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes, which had been developing 
gradually since the nineteenth century. It was Lord Cecil, later Viscount Cecil of 
Chelwood, who took the lead in promoting the idea of a League of Nations within the 
British government. As early as the autumn of 1916, he wrote a memorandum titled 
‘Memorandum on Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars’, which was 
submitted to and circulated in the British Cabinet.22 In the memorandum, he propounded 
a couple of ideas that were later materialised in the Covenant.23 Firstly, he argued for the 
need to develop an international arrangement whereby states would be required to make 
use of international conference as a method for settling disputes and to refrain from taking 
any unilateral action before the conference had arrived at a decision. Secondly, he 
proposed to make such an arrangement effective by making provision for blockade and 
financial sanctions against states acting in violation of the arrangement.  
At Cecil’s request, the Phillimore Committee was set up and produced a report on 
20 March 1918 that contained plans generally known as the Phillimore Plan.24 Article 1 
of the Plan provided for what Alfred Zimmern called the idea of ‘Inquiry and Delay’,25 
the essence of which can be found in Cecil’s memorandum discussed above. It provided 
that the contracting states to the convention should not make recourse to war ‘without 
                                                   
21 Ibid., p. 249.  
22 See Viscount Cecil (Lord Robert Cecil), A Great Experiment: An Autobiography, 
London: Jonathan Cape, 1941, pp. 47–48.  
23 The memorandum is reproduced on ibid., pp. 353–357.  
24 George W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, 
Politics, and International Organization, 1914–1919, London: Scolar Press, 1979, pp. 
65–66; Zimmern, League of Nations, pp. 180–181.  
25 Ibid., p. 182.  
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previously submitting the matter in dispute to arbitration or to a Conference of the Allied 
States’ and ‘until there has been an award or a report by the Conference’.26 In addition, 
it prohibited states from waging war against a state which respected and observed ‘the 
award or … the recommendation (if any) made by the Conference in its report’.27 Article 
2 provided that if a contracting state was found to be acting in violation of these provisions, 
it would ‘become ipso facto at war with all the other Allied States’, and the article 
stipulated the measures of sanctions to be taken in such a case.28  
Having assumed a position as the leader of the League of Nations section in the 
Foreign Office in November 1918, Cecil requested an outline of a Foreign Office 
memorandum which had been written up by Zimmern. In the process, some elements of 
the Phillimore Plan were added to the outline, the result of which was the production of 
a document known as the Cecil Draft (or Cecil Plan).29 Cecil continued to rework the 
Draft, and it was eventually developed into the British Draft Convention.30 Cecil’s drafts 
were characterised by the following ideas.31 Firstly, along the lines suggested in the 
Foreign Office memorandum, they envisaged holding regular meetings or conferences of 
major powers. 32  Secondly, they proposed a system for peaceful settlement of 
international disputes, the essence of which had been suggested in the Phillimore Plan. 
Thirdly, they envisaged the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice.  
Along with Wilson’s drafts, the British Draft Convention carefully prepared by 
Cecil was influential in the process of drawing up the draft covenant submitted to the 
League of Nations Commission set up at Paris, which is known as the Hurst-Miller Draft. 
                                                   
26 David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2, New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1928, p. 3.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 See Zimmern, League of Nations, pp. 195–196; Egerton, Great Britain, pp. 99–101.  
30 See Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, pp. 51–64. Cecil’s Draft Convention can 
be found in ibid., vol. 2, pp. 106–116.  
31 See ibid., vol. 1, pp. 38, 51–52.  
32 For the explication of the Foreign Office memorandum, see Zimmern, League of 
Nations, pp. 190–196.  
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It was a product of compromise that came out of a series of negotiations between America 
and Britain. To give an example, the idea, which was floated by the Phillimore Plan and 
later adopted by Cecil, that a non-compliant state would be ‘ipso facto at war’ with all the 
other contracting states was diluted by adding the word ‘deemed’, thus allowing states to 
reserve the right to declare war.33  
Although the Hurst-Miller Draft served as a draft document at the Commission 
charged with the task of setting up the League, it must not be forgotten that many other 
countries were in support of the idea of a League. Léon Bourgeois, who attended the 
Commission as a representative of the French government, for example, had even more 
radical and ambitious plans than the American and British ones. He proposed the creation 
of ‘a supranational armed force’ that he believed would be necessary for the enforcement 
of law.34 Although this proposal, which was reflective of his commitment to the notion 
of solidarité, failed to materialise, it can be viewed as evidence showing that the project 
to set up a secondary institution of some sort for the maintenance of international peace 
and security was strongly backed up and supported with enthusiasm by a number of non-
Anglo-American statesmen. As discussed above, the support from politicians was a 
critical factor in the formation of the League.  
On 28 April 1919, the plenary meeting of the Paris Conference gave its approval to 
the final draft of the Covenant, which came into effect the following year. It was amended 
in 1924 so as to reflect the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice.35  
The Covenant codified the ideas and plans discussed above with a view to offering 
a legal framework for preventing the occurrence of future wars. In Article 10, member 
                                                   
33  See Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, p. 53. The Hurst-Miller Draft is 
reproduced on ibid., vol. 2, pp. 231–237.  
34 J.E.S. Hayward, ‘The Official Social Philosophy of the French Third Republic: Léon 
Bourgeois and Solidarism’, International Review of Social History, 6/1, 1961, p. 44.  
35 For a detailed account of the adoption, enforcement and amendment of the Covenant, 
see Manley O. Hudson, ‘Amendment of the Covenant of the League of Nations’, Harvard 
Law Review, 38/7, 1925, pp. 903–953.  
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states promised to ‘respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence’ of the other member states.36 Although this 
article did not actually contained the term ‘guarantee’, which had the effect of weakening 
this article, it was clearly reflective of Wilson’s strongly-held doctrine of mutual 
guarantee.37 Article 11 laid out a basic principle that ‘[a]ny war or threat of war’ would 
be regarded as a matter of international public concern and provided that ‘the League 
shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of 
nations’. 38  Articles 12, 13 and 15 provided for peaceful settlement of international 
disputes. Article 12 made it obligatory for members to refer international disputes ‘either 
to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council’ and imposed a three-
month moratorium on war from the date of pronouncement in the form of either an arbitral 
award, a judicial ruling or a report released by the Council. By Article 13 member states 
undertook not to go to war with a state which complied with the award or ruling, and by 
Article 15 they agreed not to wage war against a state acting in compliance with 
recommendations contained in the report unanimously agreed to by the members of the 
Council except those party to the dispute in question.39  Article 16 provided for the 
economic, financial and, potentially, military sanctions to be applied against a rule-
breaking state which ‘resort[ed] to war in disregard of’ these Articles, and Article 17 
supplemented these provisions for peaceful settlement of disputes and sanctions by 
declaring that they were also applicable to disputes between non-member states as well 
as to those between a member state and a non-member state.40  
While the League drew on various existing state practices, it was not simply 
designed as an accessory added to the existing international social structure. In his 
                                                   
36 League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html (accessed 2 July 2017), Art. 10.  
37 See Zimmern, League of Nations, pp. 245–246.  
38 League of Nations, Covenant, Art. 11.  
39 Ibid., Arts. 12, 13 and 15.  
40 Ibid., Arts. 16 and 17.  
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renowned tract written in 1918, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, General 
Jan Smuts advocated ‘a more fundamental conception of the League’, arguing that the 
League ought to be something that would bring about ‘an inner transformation of 
international conditions and institutions’.41 As he remarked:  
 
The League must be such as to mean much more than new Councils to provide 
for Arbitration and Conciliation in future troubles. The new institution of peace 
must not be something additional, something external, superimposed on the pre-
existing structure. It must be an organic change; it must be woven into the very 
texture of our political system. The new motif of peace must in future operate 
internally, constantly, inevitably from the very heart of our political 
organisation42  
 
On this view, the League was meant to bring a fundamental change to the modus vivendi 
of international society. In ES terminology, the League was expected to assist in bringing 
about a transformation of the international social structure comprised of such traditional 
primary institutions as war and the balance of power, the process of which could have 
constitutive effects of redefining states’ identities and interests. While such theoretical 
terms were not used at the time to describe the role of the League, the idea that the League 
would have constitutive as well as regulative effects was commonly shared by the 
founders of the League.43  
However, the Covenant did not completely deny the right of war. As is well known, 
there were gaps in the Covenant which allowed states to resort to war in certain cases. 
Firstly, Article 15(7) provided that, when the Council failed to produce a unanimous 
                                                   
41 J.C. Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1918, p. 47.  
42 Ibid.  
43 For example, Lord Cecil remarked that, in the presence of the League Covenant, 
‘[p]eace will be recognised as the interest of all nations in and out of Europe, and the duty 
of preserving it will be acknowledged by every one of them’. Butler, A Handbook to the 
League of Nations, p. vi, emphasis added.  
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report, states were permitted to ‘take such action as they shall consider necessary for the 
maintenance of right and justice’. 44  Moreover, even when the Council arrived at a 
unanimous report, war could still be resorted to if recommendations in the report were 
not respected and implemented by any of the parties to the dispute, albeit subject to the 
three-month-moratorium rule. Although the Covenant put a set of restrictions on recourse 
to war, it did not radically challenge the right of war, and therein lay the weakness of the 
Covenant.  
 
The Geneva Protocol of 1924 and the Pact of Paris  
After the Covenant was adopted, attempts were made to fill in the gaps that allowed states 
to resort to war under certain circumstances. The Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, or the Geneva Protocol of 1924 as it is often called, was one such 
example.45  The Protocol provided for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice over legal or justiciable disputes, and made it obligatory 
that non-legal or non-justiciable disputes be submitted to, and settled by, either the League 
Council or ‘the Committee of Arbitrators’. 46  The Protocol made arbitral decisions 
binding, whether it be a judicial decision, arbitral award or a Council report, and the 
Council was to see to it that the parties to the dispute complied with the ruling handed 
down on them. A signatory state which resorted to war in defiance of the Covenant and 
the Protocol was to be deemed as an aggressor, whatever the reason for the resort to force 
might be.47 The Protocol was pressed forward with by the Labour government led by 
                                                   
44 League of Nations, Covenant, Art. 15(7).  
45  League of Nations, Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
[hereafter Geneva Protocol], 2 October 1924, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid 
/40421a204.html (accessed 3 July 2017). For a detailed exposition of the Protocol, see 
John F. Williams, ‘The Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes’, Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, 3/6, 1924, 
pp. 288–304.  
46 Geneva Protocol, Art. 4(1)–(4).  
47 Ibid., Arts. 4(6) and 10.  
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James Ramsay MacDonald, who had been in favour of the idea of optional clause. 
However, it did not win support from Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative government which 
was formed in November 1924, and in the end the protocol passed by the board.48  
However, this setback did not stall the increasing international momentum towards 
the limitation of war. 1928 witnessed a significant turning point in the history of 
international society: the conclusion of the Pact of Paris.49 The need for outlawing war 
had long been vigorously discussed since the end of the First World War, and, as early as 
1921, Salmon Levinson published a pamphlet in which he advocated the need to 
criminalise and outlaw war.50 However, as was the case with the creation of the League 
of Nations, what mattered was the support from statesmen. The origins of the Pact can be 
traced back to French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand’s open letter to the United States 
published on 6 April 1927. In the letter, he proposed the conclusion of a bilateral treaty 
by which the two nations agree to forswear the resort to war in their relations with one 
another. In response to the French proposal, the Secretary of State Frank Kellogg came 
up with a counter offer to draw up and sign a multilateral treaty instead of a bilateral 
one.51  
The Pact, which was signed on 27 August 1928 and is still in effect today, obliges 
the signatory states to forswear making recourse to war in order to solve international 
disputes and to ‘renounce it [war] as an instrument of national policy’.52 By the second 
                                                   
48 For a well-documented account of the Protocol’s history, see Lorna Lloyd, Peace 
through Law: Britain and the International Court in the 1920s, Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 1997, esp. chap. 3.  
49 The official name for the treaty is the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an 
Instrument of National Policy.  
50 See Salmon O. Levinson, Outlawry of War, Chicago: American Committee for the 
Outlawry of War, 1921.  
51 See David Hunter Miller, The Peace Pact of Paris: A Study of the Briand-Kellogg 
Treaty, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928, chaps. 2–4.  
52  League of Nations, General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of 
National Policy, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 94, no. 2137, available at: https: 
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article, the signatory states promise to settle international disputes through peaceful 
means. The Pact was significant in that it placed legal obligations (as against mere moral 
obligations) on states and in that it was entered into by most of the states at the time, thus 
giving it a semi-universal character.53 The Covenant of the League of Nations and the 
Pact of Paris complemented each other, and ‘[t]hese twin charters’, as Zimmern called 
them, ‘formed a sort of constitutional framework within which the public affairs of the 
world were henceforward to be conducted’.54  
In addition, the Covenant and the Pact were instrumental in formulating the 
principle of non-recognition. 55  Following the outbreak of Manchurian Incident in 
September 1931, Secretary of State Henry Stimson dispatched a brief note to the Japanese 
government in which he stated that the United States would not ‘recognize any situation, 
treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and 
obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928’. 56  Here, the Pact of Paris is 
mentioned as a legal ground for the principle of non-recognition. This principle was 
further confirmed in the Assembly resolution of 11 March 1932 which declared that:  
 
[I]t is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognise 
any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means 
contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.57  
 
                                                   
53 See Quincy Wright, ‘The Meaning of the Pact of Paris’, The American Journal of 
International Law, 27/1, 1933, pp. 40–50; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use 
of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 75, 83–84.  
54 Zimmern, League of Nations, p. 405.  
55 Brownlie, International Law, p. 410.  
56 United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, Japan: 1931–1941, vol. I, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1931–1941, p. 76, available at: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRU 
S193141v01 (accessed 3 July 2017).  
57 League of Nations, Records of the Special Session of the Assembly Convened in 
Virtue of Article 15 of the Covenant at the Request of the Chinese Government, League 
of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement, no. 101, available at: http://digital.libra 
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The principle of non-recognition, or the Stimson doctrine as it was often called, was of 
historical importance since it decisively undermined the traditional theory and practice of 
international law that acknowledged the validity of treaties concluded in the presence of 
force and duress.58  
To sum up, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris and the 
principle of non-recognition, all of which were developed in the short span of 15 odd 
years after the end of the First World War, formed a trinity of international legal norms 
that formed the backbone of the quasi-constitutional structure of interwar international 
society, contributing to the development of the principle of non-use of force.  
 
Article 19 of the League Covenant and peaceful change  
A history of Article 19  
This trinity was based on the assumption that restrictions or prohibitions on the use of 
force would discourage states from making recourse to war as a means for settling 
international disputes. It was widely recognised, however, that legal discouragement was 
not enough to transform state practice, and that there was a need to provide some 
machinery whereby states could bring about international political change in a peaceful 
manner. It was this problem that the controversial Article 19 of the Covenant was 
expected to address.59 Article 19 read as follows:  
 
The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of 
the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of 
international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the 
world.60  
                                                   
58 See Jeffrey Golden, ‘Force and International Law’, in F.S. Northedge (ed.), The Use 
of Force in International Relations, London: Faber, 1974, p. 203.   
59 Quincy Wright, ‘Article 19 of the League Covenant and the Doctrine “Rebus Sic 
Stantibus”’, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual 
Meeting (1921–1969), 30, 1936, p. 65.  
60 League of Nations, Covenant, Art. 19.  
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Despite its brevity, Article 19 was a product of complex negotiations and 
compromise. The need to provide for peaceful change was recognised from the very 
beginning of the drafting process. At President Wilson’s request, Colonel House drew up 
a draft known as the House Draft which was handed to Wilson on 16 July 1918. Article 
20 of the Draft provided for mutual territorial guarantee, which had been one of the 
principles set out in Wilson’s Fourteen Points. What is noteworthy about this article is 
that it coupled the idea of mutual guarantee with the idea of peaceful territorial change.61 
The article runs as follows:  
 
Article 20. The Contracting Powers unite in several guarantees to each other of 
their territorial integrity and political independence, subject, however, to such 
territorial modifications, if any, as may become necessary in the future by reason 
of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations, pursuant to the principle 
of self-determination and as shall also be regarded by three fourths of the 
Delegates as necessary and proper for the welfare of the peoples concerned; 
recognizing also that all territorial changes involve equitable compensation and 
that the peace of the world is superior in importance and interest to questions of 
boundary.62  
 
According to House’s account, this article was included in the Draft in order to prevent 
the League from becoming too inflexible an organisation.63  
Wilson adopted this article as the basis for Article 3 of his first draft after some 
modifications.64 From this, it can be inferred that the idea underlying Article 20 of the 
House Draft was in line with, or at least did not contradict, Wilson’s own vision of the 
League. Indeed, he was of the opinion that mutual territorial guarantee did not preclude 
revisions or modifications that would help remedy injustice and accommodate changes in 
                                                   
61 Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, pp. 12–14.  
62 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 10.  
63 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 14.  
64 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 12–13.  
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circumstances. He held that such revisions would be feasible once the animosity that arose 
during the war was soothed, and he envisaged that the newly founded League would be 
instrumental in balancing ‘elasticity’ and ‘security’ in international society.65  
Such was Wilson’s conviction that he included the same article in his second draft 
written on 10 January 1919. However, David Hunter Miller, who was responsible for the 
Hurst-Miller Draft mentioned above, had a different view on the matter and demurred in 
his comments on Wilson’s second draft. He claimed that the proposed article, especially 
its provision for future revision, was such as to perpetuate, provoke and legitimise 
revanchist movements and campaigns. On that account, he suggested that such a 
provision be dropped from the article concerning territorial guarantee.66 Despite his legal 
adviser’s suggestion, Wilson did not drop the provision for future alteration of territories 
in his third draft of 20 January 1919.67 This episode shows Wilson’s commitment to the 
idea that the provision for mutual guarantee must be accompanied by the provision for 
just change.  
The need for the provision for future territorial change was also recognised by Lord 
Cecil. The British Draft Convention of 20 January 1919, which had been developed from 
Cecil’s earlier drafts went one step further than Wilson’s drafts with regard to territorial 
guarantee and change. It contained an article that not only empowered the League to make 
recommendations as to how territorial arrangements should be modified, but also allowed 
states to absolve themselves from their legal obligation to guarantee the territorial 
integrity of a state party to the dispute when the state failed to follow the League’s 
recommendations with regard to territorial modification.68 Miller criticised this article 
during a discussion with Cecil on 21 January 1919 on the same basis that informed his 
comments on Wilson’s second draft. In response, Cecil argued that there must be some 
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66 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 70–72.  
67 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 99.  
68 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 107.  
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provision allowing for treaty revision and suggested the addition of a general provision 
for revision which did not refer specifically to the problem of territorial revision.69 On 
27 January, they agreed on a joint draft. The Cecil-Miller Draft, as it was called, contained 
a lengthy article which was reflective of Wilson and Cecil’s ideas about mutual guarantee 
and future revision.70  
On 1 February, Miller met with Cecil Hurst, a British legal expert, with a view to 
finalising an Anglo-American joint draft. At the meeting, Hurst proposed that the second 
and third paragraphs of Article 3 of the Cecil-Miller Draft be deleted, which was 
welcomed by Miller. The amended article was adopted as Article 7 of the Hurst-Miller 
Draft, which was to become Article 10 of the Covenant. At this point, Wilson gave his 
consent to the omission.71  
As already explained above, the Hurst-Miller Draft was submitted to the 
Commission responsible for the setting up of the League, and therefore had a tremendous 
influence on the final shape of the Covenant. Had it not been for Lord Cecil’s efforts to 
amend the Hurst-Miller Draft, the Covenant would have been adopted without any 
provision specifically designed for addressing the problem of peaceful change. Cecil had 
been sceptical of the provision for mutual territorial guarantee and wanted to weaken it 
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by leaving room for future revisions of territorial boundaries. In his 1941 autobiography, 
he remarked as follows:  
 
I, for one, objected to it [Article 10] on the ground that it seemed to crystallize 
for all time the actual position which then existed. … It is right that if resort to 
war is forbidden, other means should be provided for correcting international 
injustice.72  
 
Such was his belief that the Hurst-Miller Draft did not sit well with him. In the 
British amendments submitted during the second meeting of the Commission on 4 
February, a proposal was submitted to modify the guarantee article by adding a provision 
regarding treaty revision which ran as follows:  
 
subject, however, to provision being made by the body of delegates for the 
periodic revision of treaties which have become obsolete and of International 
conditions, the continuance of which may endanger the Peace of the world.73  
 
At the fourth meeting of the Commission held on 6 February, Cecil expressed his 
disapproval of the guarantee article. Faced with Wilson’s opposition, Cecil proposed 
inserting the above-quoted provision for treaty revision into the guarantee article.74 The 
next day, Cecil proposed adding an article on treaty revision that was detached from the 
guarantee article.75 At the eighth meeting of the Commission held on 11 February, this 
proposal was put on the table. It was criticised on the ground that it was not clear as to 
whether the article was intended to endow the Assembly with the power to revise treaties 
or to enable it to make recommendations. The point at issue was whether the Assembly 
was to have legislative power or not. After much discussion, it was agreed that the 
                                                   
72 Cecil, Great Experiment, p. 77.  
73 Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2, p. 550.  
74 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 168–170.  
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Assembly would not be an international legislature and would only be allowed to make 
recommendations as necessary. Cecil’s article was amended accordingly to make this 
point clearer, and the amended article eventually became Article 19 of the Covenant.76  
The history of the drafting of Article 19, however, does not come to the end here. 
On 18 March, Cecil once again proposed amending the article on mutual territorial 
guarantee by inserting a reference to the article on treaty revision so as to make the 
connection between them more explicit, but Cecil’s proposal was rejected by Wilson on 
the ground that France would not agree to such an amendment.77 As a result of the 
separation or detachment of Article 19 from Article 10, the generality of the former was 
accentuated. Article 19 was applicable to all kinds of international issues and problems, 
including issues concerning territorial boundaries.78  
As these records show, the drafters of the Covenant had given serious thought to 
Article 19 and the problem of what later came to be called peaceful change. This had been 
so not only because they thought that changes in circumstances surrounding world politics 
were possible or likely in theory, but also because they thought that the settlements 
concluded in Paris in a rush would not be sustainable for a long time in practice unless 
they were open to revision. According to Peter Jackson, even Georges Clemenceau held 
the view that the territorial settlements are subject to revision. To quote Jackson:  
 
All of the major peacemakers in Paris had anticipated that future territorial 
adjustments were likely, if not inevitable. The purpose of Article 19 of the 
Covenant, it should be remembered, was to provide for peaceful revision of the 
peace settlement. The Franco-Polish military alliance, which was intended to 
protect Poland’s frontier with Germany, was not an ineluctable consequence of 
the Treaty of Versailles. On the contrary, even Clemenceau admitted the 
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possibility of future territorial revision. In his defence of the treaty before 
parliament, he stated explicitly that some territorial revision was to be expected. 
The virtue of the Covenant, he argued, was that it made it more likely that 
revision would be peaceful and under terms acceptable to France.79 
 
As the British diplomat Harold Nicolson, who attended the Paris Conference, 
recalled, those who were in charge of drawing up peace treaties were fully cognisant of 
the difficulty of realising the ideals of Wilson’s Fourteen Points due to the public 
sentiment at that time, and they thought that the final settlements should be reached later 
‘when the hysteria of the war had subsided’.80  
 
The rise of interest in Article 19 and peaceful change  
In spite of the importance statesmen and diplomats attached to it during the drafting of 
the Covenant, Article 19 did not feature prominently in debates within and outside the 
League of Nations during the 1920s. Indeed, the League Assembly showed its 
unwillingness to discuss issues under Article 19. For example, due to the objections from 
France, the League refrained from invoking Article 19 when Bolivia and China appealed 
for treaty revision.81 Even the above-mentioned Geneva Protocol of 1924, which was 
carefully designed to supplement the Covenant by strengthening its provisions for 
peaceful settlement of disputes and outlawing aggressive war, did not address the problem 
of peaceful change directly.82  
However, the 1930s saw the sudden revival of interest in Article 19. This was 
mainly due to changes in international situations that were taking place in Europe and the 
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Far East.83 During the 1930s, the status quo in these areas was increasingly challenged 
by rising powers such as Germany and Japan, which had been vigorously pushing 
forwards with militarisation and aggressive expansionist policies. In face of the 
challenges posed by the revisionist countries, there was an increase in the public and 
academic interest in the League. A series of international incidents such as the 
Manchurian Incident, Abyssinian Crisis and German remilitalisation generated debates 
as to what the League could do, and how it could be reformed, so as to deal with 
revisionist demands in a peaceful manner. It was this historical development which 
brought issues concerning Article 19 to the fore.  
By that time, it was generally believed that Article 19 was ineffective and of no 
practical use since the Assembly was not authorised to do more than ‘advise the 
reconsideration … of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of 
international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world’.84 In 
other words, the Assembly was not allowed, under Article 19, to determine terms of 
settlement, nor did it have the power to enforce them.85 The ineffectuality of the article 
was glaringly obvious. To quote Frederick Dunn, ‘Article 19 has been a dead letter from 
the beginning’.86 While the League Council could help bring about international political 
change by recommending solutions to international disputes under Article 15 of the 
Covenant, Council recommendations made under this article were not obligatory, 
regardless of whether a report containing them was agreed unanimously or not. In short, 
despite the fact that there existed the urgent need to respond to the demands for change 
made by the rising powers, the League lacked effective machinery for bringing about 
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international political change. It was against this background that the problem of peaceful 
change, which the Scottish philosopher H.J. Paton described as ‘the greatest of all 
problems for international justice’,87 drew public attention in the 1930s.  
 
Some aspects of the problem of peaceful change  
Ways of approaching the problem of peaceful change  
Peaceful change was being analysed and discussed from various viewpoints. The problem 
of peaceful change was discussed in connection with other specific problems facing 
interwar international society. For instance, it was discussed in relation to problems 
concerning colonies, migration and raw materials. 88  In particular, the problem of 
peaceful change was discussed in connection with the review of the Peace Treaties 
concluded by the belligerent powers at the end of the First World War, especially the 
Treaty of Versailles.89 Problems such as these were regarded as of vital importance to 
international peace and security. At the same time, however, the problem of peaceful 
change was widely studied and discussed in its own right, and was seen as posing general 
problems concerning international social structure. For example, Hersch Lauterpacht held 
the view that, to quote Martti Koskenniemi, ‘the problem was much more significant than 
a mere revision of the Peace Treaties’.90  
According to Charles Webster, there were three ways of approaching the problem 
of peaceful change.  
 
1. Peaceful change to avoid war.  
2. Peaceful change to produce justice, or perhaps, better expressed, to remedy 
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justice [sic].  
3. Peaceful change to produce a world order better adapted to the changing 
material and mental processes of to-day.91  
 
By ‘mental’ was meant some such thing as the rise of political nationalism.92  
These approaches can be seen as reflective of different points of view. The first 
approach was adopted mostly by those concerned with the maintenance of the status quo, 
whereas the second approach was taken mainly by revisionists who were trying to bring 
about a state of affairs which they claimed, rightly or wrongly, to be just and fair. The 
third approach was chiefly adopted by those who tried to address the problem of peaceful 
change from an academic or detached point of view. Although they were not mutually 
exclusive, these different approaches signalled that there existed significant differences 
in views on peaceful change (more on this in the next chapter).  
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall address some aspects of peaceful change by 
exploring its relationships with the following four concepts: (1) power transition; (2) 
revolution; (3) collective security; and (4) appeasement. Understanding these aspects will 
deepen the understanding of the problem of peaceful change and will serve as 
preliminaries for the next chapter.  
 
Peaceful change and power transition  
From the standpoint of the present study, it is important to recognise the close relationship 
between peaceful change and power transition. As we have already seen, the rise in 
interest in the problem of peaceful change was caused by the rise of the revisionist powers 
in Europe and the Far East, which had been vigorously pressing forward with military 
expansion. This was no coincidence since the growth of demands for international 
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political change and the growth of state power are interconnected in two ways. Firstly, 
states dissatisfied with, and therefore seeking to challenge, the international status quo 
can draw attention to their grievances by increasing their power via, for example, military 
expansion. It is well known that one of the reasons behind the (re-)militarisation of 
Germany and Italy was their dissatisfaction with the Versailles settlements. Secondly, 
states, which have successfully emerged as rising powers via economic growth, 
militarisation, etc., may well start calling for change in the status quo. Appetite grows 
with eating and avarice increases with wealth. The rising powers may begin to find the 
status quo increasingly unsatisfactory and to nurse grievances against it as they become 
more powerful. Ironically, power and dissatisfaction can grow simultaneously in world 
politics.  
This by no means implies that peaceful change has no relevance for small countries 
with little power to trigger significant power shifts in the international system. In principle, 
the problem of peaceful change arises whenever a state demands a change in the status 
quo, and therefore the connection between peaceful change and power transition is not 
essential. That said, as the history of interwar international society suggests, the need for 
devising some machinery for peaceful change is felt most strongly when there exists an 
international dispute involving one or more rising powers dissatisfied with the status quo.  
 
Peaceful change and revolution  
Secondly, in the interwar debate on peaceful change, war was frequently likened to 
revolution.93 The following citations show that the analogy between war and revolution 
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was common at that time.  
 
Any world system is doomed if it identifies peace and morality with a mere 
maintenance of the status quo. To do this is to breed, as we have bred, the forces 
of revolution and revolt.94  
 
Where this [a legislature with authority] is lacking we get revolution, which in 
the state is the counterpart of war in the international sphere.95  
 
The international form of revolution is war.96  
 
The analogy to war is not private vengeance,—it is revolution.97   
 
Revolution in domestic society tends to occur when there are no effective 
procedures to bring about changes demanded by a rising social class such as the middle 
class or working class. As history shows, some societies succeeded in averting revolution, 
while others had to suffer from social dislocation caused by it, and this difference can be 
largely ascribed to differences in their social structures and political institutions.  
That the metaphor of revolution was frequently used to describe war is worth noting 
since it shows how people of the day understood the problem of peaceful change, which, 
in turn, significantly determined their responses to the question they were trying to 
address. As will be examined in the next chapter, some scholars attempted to solve the 
problem by applying measures and methods which had proved to be successful in 
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95 Paton, ‘Justice among Nations’, p. 298.  
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domestic societies, while others opposed to such a domestic analogy. The validity of 
domestic analogy was one of the most important issues in the debate on peaceful change.98 
Although there were arguments for and against domestic analogy, the idea of revolution 
was commonly referred to when discussing the problem of peaceful change during the 
1930s, and it is essential to take this into account when we explore different views on 
peaceful change in the next chapter.  
 
Peaceful change and collective security  
Thirdly, it is essential to understand the symbiotic relationship between peaceful change 
and collective security. The symbiosis between peaceful change and collective security 
was generally recognised during the interwar period, and the knowledge about it formed 
one of the bases of the debate on peaceful change. For instance, Webster stated that these 
state practices ‘are two aspects of all efforts to produce a more peaceful and ordered world 
and it may be said that each is impossible without the other’.99 For another example, 
Arnold Toynbee stated as follows:  
 
We have not only to establish and maintain a system of “collective security” 
which will safeguard the existing international order against attempts to change 
it by violence; we have also, pari passu, to work out some method of “peaceful 
change” as an alternative to the violent method of change which, in the 
international field, has hitherto been provided by war.100  
 
As we have discussed earlier in the chapter, the significance of this symbiotic 
relationship was also understood by statesmen and diplomats including such prominent 
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26.  
118 
 
figures as President Wilson and Lord Cecil. As the records of the drafting process of the 
Covenant reveal, collective security was perceived to offer only a partial solution to 
international conflicts. Indeed, it was even argued that, without some machinery for 
peaceful change, collective security could even be detrimental to international peace and 
security. As Martin Wight later summarised:  
 
If collective security was seen as a means of law-enforcement in international 
society, it was necessary to balance it by some means of adapting the law to 
changing needs. If forcible change was forbidden, peaceful change must not be 
blocked. When treaties were manifestly obsolete or unjust, they should be 
subject to revision.101  
 
Collective security and peaceful change were supposed to complement each other in a 
mutually reinforcing way. 102  Collective security unaccompanied by peaceful change 
would be like, to borrow Toynbee’s phrase, ‘a boiler without a safety-valve’.103  
The need to establish collective security and peaceful change as legitimate state 
practices of international society derived from the need to firmly entrench the principle 
of non-use of force as a fundamental state practice in international society. Therefore, in 
ES terminology, non-use of force can be viewed as a master primary institution, while 
collective security and peaceful change can be conceptualised as derivative primary 
institutions derived from the master primary institution of non-use of force, although 
these emerging primary institutions were still in their embryo stages and in tension with 
the traditional primary institution of war at that time.  
Moreover, it is important to note the mutually constitutive relationship between 
these derivative primary institutions and the League of Nations. As noted earlier, the 
League was designed in such a way as to be reflective of the ideas and practices of 
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collective security and peaceful change, but, at the same time, the effectiveness of these 
emerging primary institutions were seen as dependent on the workings of the League. In 
ES terminology, the League was a secondary institution reflecting and reinforcing the 
primary institutions of collective security and peaceful change. During the interwar period, 
there was a commonly held view that the League could deal with the demands from the 
revisionist rising powers via the promotion of collective security and peaceful change, 
ant this is why much of the debate on peaceful change centered around issues concerning 
the workings and reform of the League system, as we shall see in the next chapter.104  
The understanding of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and 
peaceful change, and of their mutually constitutive relationship with the League, is not 
only necessary to understand the interwar debate on peaceful change (which is explored 
in chapter 4), but also vitally important for understanding the basic features of 
contemporary international social structure governing change, including changes induced 
by power transition (more on this in chapter 5).  
 
Peaceful change and appeasement  
Lastly, it is necessary to look at the relationship between peaceful change and 
appeasement. As will be examined in the next chapter, the term ‘peaceful change’ was 
from time to time used to describe the policy of appeasement. However, the term does 
not refer to some specific policy; it refers to a state practice aimed at bringing about 
international political change in a peaceful manner, and this can be achieved in many 
different ways. It cannot be denied that appeasement is one such way, but they are by no 
means identical. If we take appeasement to mean a concession made by the strong at the 
sacrifice of the weak, in which sense the term has often been used by many, it can even 
be argued that the policy of appeasement actually goes against the purpose of collective 
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security and hence against peaceful change. For these two practices, as noted above, 
symbiotically coexist in international society. This is why Toynbee was adamant in 
distinguishing peaceful change from appeasement, arguing that the policy of appeasement 
was ‘not a practicable alternative to the policy of collective security combined with 
peaceful change’.105 Whether we agree with Toynbee or not, it needs to be stressed that 
peaceful change is not the same as appeasement. Decoupling peaceful change from 
appeasement is particularly important for saving the former from gratuitous accusation, 
for the latter has gained an infamous reputation and is considered by many as 
insupportable as a matter of principle.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has explained the historical background to the problem of peaceful change, 
examined the history of Article 19 of the Covenant, and explored some of the features of 
peaceful change in connection with power transition, revolution, collective security and 
appeasement. In the conclusion, I shall restate the historical background to the problem 
of peaceful change in theoretical terms, using the ES frameworks introduced in chapter 1.  
In traditional Westphalian international society, which can be classified as a 
Coexistence international society, war was socially recognised as a primary institution.106 
Indeed, war was a legitimate state practice not only regulative of state practice, but also 
constitutive of the state itself. As Charles Tilly remarked, ‘war made the state, and the 
state made war’.107 Moreover, as discussed in chapter 1, war as a primary institution had 
social functions, one of which being to bring about just change in international society.108  
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However, the catastrophe of the First World War called this traditional primary 
institution into question. In the aftermath of the war, a series of efforts were made to 
entrench non-use of force as a primary institution in international society. The 
establishment of the League of Nations was the most important attempt in this regard. 
The League was a secondary institution reflective of two derivative primary institutions 
derived from the master primary institution of non-use of force: collective security and 
peaceful change. At the same time, the League was expected to assist in maintaining 
international peace and security via the promotion of the institutional symbiosis between 
these derivative primary institutions in international society. In terms of the degree of 
internalisation, the international social structures introduced in consequence of the 
Versailles and other peace treaties were only shallowly internalised and were maintained 
largely by force and coercion.109 In other words, they were based on the delicate power 
balances that existed at the end of the First World War. However, as noted above, they 
were also reflective of emerging primary institutions such as non-use of force, collective 
security and peaceful change. The establishment of the League was followed by further 
efforts to place limitations on war, such as the Geneva Protocol, the Pact of Paris and the 
principle of non-recognition. These developments signaled the emergence of a 
Cooperative international society.110 Despite these developments, however, the League 
system lacked effective machinery for promoting and entrenching peaceful change as a 
primary institution in international society, which was widely held to be detrimental to 
international peace and security. It was this problem that the interwar debate on peaceful 
change addressed.  
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Chapter 4  
Three Normative Perspectives on Peaceful Change  
 
 
 
Introduction  
As shown in the preceding chapter, it was widely held during the interwar period that 
there existed a symbiotic and mutually reinforcing relationship between collective 
security and peaceful change and that therein lay the key to managing change in 
international society, including changes in the international status quo in the context of 
power transition—an important point that has been neglected in the existing literature on 
power transition. Moreover, it was commonly understood that there existed a mutually 
constitutive relationship between these primary institutions and the League of Nations. 
Furthermore, in the 1930s, it was widely acknowledged that the League system lacked 
effective machinery for promoting peaceful change. However, the interwar debate on 
peaceful change brought into sharp relief the existence of different, even conflicting views 
about what should be done about the problem of peaceful change, which concerns how 
to establish and entrench the practice of peaceful change in international society. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explore three different normative positions on this problem.  
This chapter advances the conception of international political change in 
international society, including changes in the context of power transition, as an 
institutionally governed process, and demonstrates the inescapable normativity of debates 
surrounding power transition by highlighting that international political change can be 
managed differently by different institutions of international society. This in turn confirms 
the validity of the ES’s methodological pluralism—the methodological position that, as 
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discussed in chapter 2, seeks to address both analytical and normative issues in world 
politics—in studying power transition. As was also discussed in chapter 2, the meaning 
of historical texts and debates can be interpreted only by putting them in context. The 
findings of the preceding chapter provide the historical knowledge necessary for 
contextualising the ideas and arguments explored in the present chapter.  
The first section excogitates the revisionist views on peaceful change, focusing on 
the political and legal thoughts of Fumimaro Konoe, who was Prime Minister of Japan 
from 1937 to 1939 and from 1940 to 1941, and those of Carl Schmitt, a prominent German 
constitutional theorist. They both had a strong antipathy for the League of Nations and 
presented arguments in favour of forcible transformation of the international status quo. 
Although Konoe’s essay, which is examined in the next section, was originally published 
in 1918 and therefore cannot be seen as a direct contribution to the debate, it deserves 
attention since it prefigured the emergence of the problem of peaceful change. The second 
section explores Hersch Lauterpacht’s contributions to the debate. His legal theory was 
based on the view that the problem of peaceful change could be solved by developing 
international legal frameworks, especially the League system. 1  The third section 
examines E.H. Carr’s political thought from the point of view of peaceful change. Critical 
of the effectiveness of the League, he proposed a pragmatist solution to the problem of 
peaceful change that emphasised the importance of negotiation and compromise.  
 
Revisionism and forcible change  
Konoe’s criticism of the Anglo-American conception of peace  
In 1918, Konoe published a short essay entitled ‘Against a Pacifism Centered on England 
and America (英米本位の平和主義を排す )’, the purpose of which was to warn the 
Japanese people against uncritically hailing the forthcoming establishment of the League 
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of Nations as a major step forward for the realisation of democracy, justice and 
humanism.2 At the beginning of the article, he stated that the development of democracy 
and humanism was the trend of the times. These ideas, he argued, were grounded in the 
basic principle of the equality of all human beings and, in the sphere of international 
relations, they manifested themselves in the form of the national right to existence and 
survival. He went on to maintain that these ideas were not necessarily incompatible with 
the traditional Japanese political system and culture, expressing his hope that they would 
take root in Japan in the future. At the same time, however, Konoe directed a critical look 
at Anglo-American arguments made in the name of democracy, humanism and justice 
and bemoaned the uncritical attitude of those who tended to take such arguments at face 
value.3  
Konoe questioned the assumption consciously or unconsciously made in Anglo-
American thinking: the equation of peace with justice and humanism. He claimed that, 
when the word peace was used in American and British arguments, it must be understood 
or interpreted as meaning the maintenance of the status quo favourable to their countries’ 
interests, and asserted that such peace could hardly be considered as identical with justice 
and humanism. He maintained that the maintenance of peace would only serve the cause 
of justice and humanism when the status quo being maintained was in harmony with the 
demands of justice and humanism. In his view, when the status quo was in conflict with 
the demands of justice and humanism, the use of force for challenging it might be 
justified.4 Indeed, he went as far as to argue that ‘[a]dherence to peace even when one’s 
just right to survival is trampled is the enemy of humanism. Pacifism and humanism are 
not always compatible; sometimes we must abandon peace for the sake of humanism.’5  
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Having criticised the Anglo-American conception of peace, Konoe turned to the 
project to establish the League of Nations. He argued that he would support the League 
as long as it was based upon true justice and humanism. However, he expressed his 
concern that the League could function as a mere vehicle for the maintenance of the status 
quo in favour of Anglo-American economic imperialism, thereby compromising Japan 
and other countries’ legitimate right to self-preservation and development. In order to 
avert this ‘truly intolerable state of affairs’, he suggested that Japan should strongly resist 
economic imperialism ‘not only for the sake of Japan but for the sake of establishing the 
equal right to life of all nations of the world on the basis of justice and humanism’.6 
Putting aside the validity of his argument and of his conception of justice and humanity, 
Konoe’s argument can be interpreted as a normative justification for war as a primary 
institution of international society governing change therein.  
Although written in 1918, Konoe’s essay prefigured what was to come with 
uncanny accuracy. He foresaw the possibility that the postwar plans to establish peace 
would stand in the way of the national development of rising powers, and argued that 
these countries need not have any qualms about having to resort to force in such cases. In 
a sense, his essay prefigured the emergence of the problem of, and debate on, peaceful 
change. That said, it is important to remember that he did not only predict the future 
course of Japan’s foreign policy, but also, as Prime Minister of Japan, led the country 
during the war in East Asia and pursued the creation of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere.7  
Revisionist arguments of this kind were influential in other countries which had 
also been dissatisfied with the status quo. We shall now turn to Carl Schmitt, who 
provided theoretical grounds for German grievances.  
 
                                                   
6 Ibid., p. 14. See also Thomas W. Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire 
and World Order, 1914–1938, Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2008, pp. 56–57.  
7 On the development of Konoe’s views on the League, see ibid., pp. 95–96, 206–209.  
126 
 
Carl Schmitt and the criminalisation of aggressive war  
According to Schmitt, international law after the First World War was characterised by 
what he called ‘contractual positivism’ that emphasised the paramountcy of the doctrine 
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) and sought to legitimise the status quo as 
determined at the Paris Conference. However, in the 1930s, the focus shifted from pacta 
sunt servanda to such concepts as ‘revision’, ‘collective security’ and ‘peaceful change’.8 
On the assumption that ‘the history of international law is a history of the concept of war’, 
Schmitt set out to critically analyse the transformation of the conception of war 
underlying developments in international law during the interwar period.9  
Schmitt described this conceptual change as one from the ‘non-discriminating 
concept of war’ to the ‘discriminating concept of war’. The former refers to the 
conception of war which had long been prevalent in European international legal thinking 
before the First World War. According to him, it was the exclusion of justa causa (just 
cause) from the realm of international law that opened the way for the non-discriminating 
concept of war. This in turn enabled sovereign states to mutually recognise each other as 
justi hostes (just enemies) since, under the non-discriminating concept of war, it was 
theoretically impossible to determine which side was fighting for a just cause.10 As he 
remarked:  
 
Instead of justa causa, international law among states was based on justus hostis. 
Any war between states, between equal sovereigns, was legitimate.11  
 
The non-discriminating concept of war had been conducive to what he called the 
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‘bracketing of war’, which he regarded as ‘[t]he essence of European international law’.12 
In classical European international society, sovereign states, which recognised one 
another as justi hostes, were the only legitimate actors in war.13 In his view, that states 
saw each other as justi hostes had the positive effect of preventing wars fought between 
them from degenerating into wars of annihilation.14  
Another factor which Schmitt considered as having contributed to the bracketing 
of war was the right of neutrality as a corollary of the non-discriminating concept of war. 
Since sovereign states were equal peers and there existed no higher authority above them 
de jure, each state could individually determine which belligerent had justa causa, and 
those who preferred not to make a judgement with regard to justa causa were allowed to 
remain neutral on condition that they would treat all the belligerents equally.15 Under the 
non-discriminating concept of war, war was understood as a duel fought between equal 
peers. As Koskenniemi points out, ‘[w]ar became a duel, a Kabinettkrieg, a regulated 
procedure for resolving inter-European rivalries’.16 In ES terminology, Schmitt regarded 
war as a kind of institution of traditional European international society.  
Schmitt pointed out that this traditional conception of war, which provided the 
conceptual basis of the bracketing of war, underwent a drastic transformation after 
Woodrow Wilson’s War Message on 2 April 1917, which marked the beginning of a series 
of attempts to replace the non-discriminating concept of war with the discriminating 
concept of war with a view to distinguishing just wars from unjust ones.17 According to 
him, this turn was so radical that it called into question the raison d’etre of the concept of 
war itself in international law. As he remarked:  
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Justice and injustice cannot be legally bound to the same concept [i.e. war]. A 
recognized legal act and a recognized illegal act cannot, within the same legal 
order, constitute one and the same legal concept.18  
 
He claimed that, under the discriminating concept of war, legally sanctioned use of force 
turned into the execution of law and justice, while legally unsanctioned exercise of force 
was equivalent to an international criminal offence. 19  Accordingly, a state illegally 
resorting to the use of force was to be treated as an offender or a ‘felon’.20  With the 
introduction of the discriminating concept of war, the traditional notion of justus hostis 
was obliterated.  
What he was particularly concerned about was the way in which the line between 
the just and legal use of force and the unjust and illegal use of force was drawn under the 
discriminating concept of war. Under the international legal system based on this 
conception of war, a state which resorted to arms first without complying with the rules 
of international law was to be deemed ipso facto to be an aggressor with no regard for the 
justa causa behind the act of aggression. As he stated:  
 
Whoever fires the first shot or engages in any equivalent action is the “felon” in 
this new criminal offense. The problem of justa causa remains outside the 
definition of terms.21  
 
This passage suggests that he was critical of equating peace, defined as the absence of 
aggression, with justice, as was the case with Konoe. He was critical of the formalistic 
prohibition of aggression that failed to take into account the question of justa causa.  
Indeed, he devoted much space to the analysis of this issue in his Nomos of the 
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Earth.22 His arguments in the treatise were aimed at politicising interwar attempts to 
legitimise the international status quo via the criminalisation of forcible change. The 
following three points support this interpretation. Firstly, one of the themes that run 
through the treatise is the critical reflection on the nature of the status quo.23 Secondly, 
he noted that war had been a legitimate means for bringing about political change in 
traditional European international law. He even claimed that ‘it is not only possible, but 
often even necessary to recognize wars, feuds, reprisals, and applications of force of 
various kinds as a means of effecting changes’.24 Thirdly, he remarked that the Geneva 
Protocol, which was an attempt to give substance to the discriminating concept of war by 
outlawing wars of aggression, ‘became caught up in the struggle between revisionism and 
anti-revisionism’.25 While the professed goal of the treatise was to trace the historical 
development of international law, it is clear from these points that the treatise was written 
in response to the debate on peaceful change.  
On top of this, the discriminating concept of war was incompatible with Schmitt’s 
belief, for it amounted to the negation of what he called the political. As is well known, 
he claimed in The Concept of the Political that the essence of the political consists in the 
fundamental distinction between friend and enemy. 26  According to him, enemy is 
someone who literally threatens ‘us’, jeopardises ‘our’ way of being, and against whom 
‘we’ ought to fight in order to protect ‘ourselves’ at all costs.27 Political enemy is an 
existential threat in the true sense of the word because it poses ‘the real possibility of 
physical killing’, namely war.28 The decision as to who the enemy is cannot be made via 
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the application of ‘a previously determined general norm’; nor can it be made by ‘the 
judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party’.29 It can only be made by 
the subjective and autonomous judgement of a people or the state representing it. He 
places a particular emphasis on this point because of his conviction that the inability or 
unwillingness on the part of a people or a nation to autonomously draw a line between 
friend and enemy signifies the termination of its existence as a political entity.30  
In Schmitt’s view, the discriminating concept of war was politically problematic 
from the viewpoint of the political. For it meant that states could no longer identify 
enemies against whom to wage war of their own volition, the capacity to do which he 
considered to be vital for their self-identification and self-preservation as political 
communities. In concrete terms, it meant that the League of Nations, which was 
essentially ‘a system that monopolized judgment on the just war’, could decide who the 
common enemy was via the identification of an act of aggression.31 His concern can be 
clearly observed in the following passage.  
 
In praxi [in practice] the real question is whether every state can make the 
decision, can have the jus supremae decisionis [right of supreme decision] of the 
justice or injustice of a war, or whether another state or group can make the legal 
decision on the justness or unjustness of a war in such a way that this decision 
becomes valid for a third party.32  
 
Furthermore, Schmitt warned about the possibility that the League would 
exacerbate rather than terminate international conflicts. The fact that the League legalised 
and endorsed the use of force against ‘a disturber of peace’ or ‘an outlaw of humanity’ 
opened the way for war in the name of humanity, which would take the form of 
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‘executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, 
international police, and measures to assure peace’.33 He denounced this as nothing less 
than an unwarranted appropriation of the universal authority of humanity for the political 
purpose of ‘denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an 
outlaw of humanity’, the process of which would lead to the escalation of violence and 
would result in an unrestricted war of annihilation.34 The scope of such a war would be 
geographically expanded as a consequence of the change in the conception of neutrality.35 
Under the discriminating concept of war, states were not expected to stay neutral in the 
face of an act of aggression.36 In view of these changes in international law, Schmitt held 
that, contrary to its goal of maintaining international peace and security, the League 
system based on the principle of collective security was in fact setting the stage for a total 
war.37  
 
Großraum and the radical transformation of the international order  
Although Schmitt had a clear understanding of the problem of peaceful change, his strong 
antipathy toward the League system led him to seek a solution outside its framework. 
However, he also held the view that the return to the old non-discriminating concept of 
war was impracticable.38 In his view, what was required was ‘the concept of a concrete 
great spatial order’ as the basis for a new international legal order which would replace 
the existing League system.39 This is where his famous concept of Großraum (greater 
space) comes into the picture. Großraum literally means a large geographical and spatial 
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area, but he used this term to refer to a spatial area governed by a Reich (empire) on the 
basis of some political principles.  
 
Reichs … are the leading and bearing powers whose political ideas radiate into a 
certain Großraum and which fundamentally exclude the interventions of spatially 
alien powers into this Großraum. … The connection of Reich, Großraum, and the 
non-intervention principle is fundamental.40  
 
In developing these ideas, Schmitt was inspired by the Monroe Doctrine. He 
viewed this doctrine as the first attempt in history to establish a Großraum in which a 
dominant power governed according to its political ideas, while staving off foreign 
interferences in the internal affairs of Großraum.41  He envisaged the creation of a 
German-centred regional order modelled on the Monroe Doctrine that would allegedly 
promote ‘mutual respect for every nationhood’.42 However, there is no doubt that his 
chief intention was to provide theoretical grounds for German dominance on the 
European continent. As Peter Stirk points out, his purpose was ‘to justify German 
hegemony’.43 The following long passage is worth reading since it exhibits a strange 
blend of self-centeredness and self-proclaimed altruism that was typical of Schmitt and 
other revisionist thinkers.  
 
The concept of a Deutsches Reich belonging to the upholders and designers of a 
new international law would earlier have been a utopian dream, an international 
law built upon the Reich but an empty legal fantasy. Today, however, a powerful 
German Reich has arisen. From what was only weak and impotent, there has 
emerged a strong center of Europe that is impossible to attach and ready to 
provide its great political idea, the respect of every nation as a reality of life 
                                                   
40 Ibid., p. 101.  
41 Ibid., pp. 87–88.  
42 Ibid., pp. 99–100.  
43 Peter Stirk, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung’, History of Political 
Thought, 20/2, 1999, p. 372.  
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determined through species and origin, blood and soil, with its radiation into the 
Middle and East European space, and to reject the interference of spatially alien 
and unvölkisch powers. The action of the Führer has lent the concept of our 
Reich political reality, historical truth, and a great future in international law.44  
 
This passage is also of interest since it hints at the connection between power transition 
and international institutional change.  
The concept of Großraum had an unignorable influence on scholars and 
practitioners in Japan, amongst whom the idea of the Asian Monroe Doctrine had been 
popular.45 It was invoked as a theoretical basis for the slogan ‘the Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere’ announced in 1940 under Konoe’s premiership.46 As was the case 
with Großraum, this concept was used as a justification for the expansionist policy of the 
rising power in East Asia.  
 
Revisionist vision of international order  
What Konoe and Schmitt had in common was their scepticism towards the League of 
Nations which they regarded as the greatest impediment to the development of their 
countries. In ES terminology, they were sceptical about the legitimacy and role of the 
secondary institution created in the aftermath of the First World War on the basis of the 
emerging primary institution of collective security.47 Instead, they placed their hope in 
                                                   
44 Schmitt, ‘Großraum Order’, p. 111.  
45  For an account of the historical development of the idea, see Sven Saaler, ‘The 
Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan: Kodera Kenkichi and His “Treatise on 
Greater Asianism” (1916)’, Modern Asian Studies, 41/6, 2007, pp. 1261–1294.  
46 See Tetsuya Sakai, ‘The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 
1868–1945’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 9/2, 2008, pp. 233–249. In fact, it 
could be plausibly argued that Schmitt derived his idea from the Asian Monroe Doctrine 
inasmuch as he made reference to the latter in his work on Großraum. See Schmitt, 
‘Großraum Order’, pp. 89–90.  
47 See Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and 
the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 
161–204.  
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the establishment of a regional hegemonic political system in which their respective 
nations would play a central role. Such a vision of international order was commonly 
shared by revisionists at that time. However, such a goal could only be accomplished by 
forcibly overthrowing the status quo defined by the Versailles and Washington systems, 
which amounted to the rejection of the primary institution of peaceful change. The 
rejection of peaceful change in revisionist countries was accompanied by fascist 
discourses re-legitimating war as a means for bringing about international political 
change.  
Such a vision of international order was diametrically opposed to the liberal vision 
underpinning the international order centered on such primary institutions as non-use of 
force, collective security and peaceful change. In terms of Buzan’s typology of 
international societies, the international order envisaged by revisionists verged on a 
Power Political international society in which military conquest is viewed as a legitimate 
means of national policy. 48  To revisionists, who embraced such a conception of 
international order, the idea of peaceful change was merely a liberal ideology 
promulgated in order to consecrate the status quo.  
 
International law, secondary institutions and peaceful change  
Lauterpacht’s legal theory and the role of international courts and tribunals  
Although the possibility of peaceful change was out of question for some people, there 
were those who believed that the problem could be solved by developing secondary 
institutions, especially the League system. Hersch Lauterpacht was one such person. He 
began to address the problem as early as the late 1920s, albeit in the context of the debate 
over compulsory international arbitration.49  
                                                   
48 Ibid., pp. 190–191.  
49 See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes in International Law’, 
Economica, 24, 1928, pp. 277–317; H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Absence of an International 
Legislature and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Tribunals’, The British 
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At that time, many states were unwilling to undertake the legal obligation to submit 
all international disputes to international courts or tribunals for a judicial judgement. 
Their reluctance found its theoretical justification in, and was based on, the doctrine of 
non-justiciable disputes. This doctrine classified international disputes into justiciable (or 
legal) disputes and non-justiciable (or political) disputes, and it was held that only the 
former was amenable to judicial resolution. Lauterpacht criticised this widely-accepted 
theoretical distinction as ‘formally untenable and legally unsound’.50 To borrow a phrase 
from Martti Koskenniemi, this doctrine could give rise to ‘an unlimited right to opt out 
of third party settlement’.51 Aware of such a potential danger to the international legal 
order, Lauterpacht set out to debunk the rationales behind the doctrine.  
According to Lauterpacht, one of the reasons frequently given in support of the 
doctrine of non-justiciable disputes was the nonexistence of an international legislature 
endowed with the power to amend and repeal existing rules of international law in 
response to changing social realities and demands.52 This basic feature of world politics 
generated concern about the possibility that the application of existing rules and treaties 
would lead to judicial decisions which ‘would be so manifestly unjust and so little in 
accord with the changes continuously taking place in the international society that … they 
would have the unavoidable effect of perpetuating injustice and friction’.53  For this 
reason, supporters of the doctrine claimed that the fundamental distinction between the 
two categories of disputes should be upheld and that there should be ‘alternative methods’ 
for settling non-justiciable disputes, such as conciliation.54 On that account, the idea of 
compulsory arbitration by international tribunals was strongly resisted by the supporters 
                                                   
Yearbook of International Law, 11, 1930, pp. 134–157.  
50 Lauterpacht, ‘Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes’, p. 315.  
51  Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law’, 
European Journal of International Law, 8/2, 1997, p. 227.  
52 Lauterpacht, ‘Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes’, p. 307; Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of 
an International Legislature’, p. 134.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid., p. 135.  
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of the doctrine.  
Lauterpacht employed a two-step strategy in order to prove the advantage and 
practicality of compulsory arbitration by international tribunals. Firstly, he questioned the 
effectiveness of procedures proposed as alternatives to judicial settlement. In his view, 
alternative avenues for bringing about change in the status quo had their own limitations, 
which made them less effective than they appeared to be. He pointed out that, whilst the 
arbitral awards of international tribunals were binding, international conciliation was less 
effective in that the decisions arrived at through conciliation were of non-binding nature.55 
He also discussed whether the presence of an international legislature would cut the 
Gordian knot. Although he saw it as ‘an ideal worthy of pursuance’, he did not think that 
it could be established in the near future.56 Moreover, he pointed to the possibilities that 
legislative processes of changing the legal rights and obligations of states by majority 
vote might intensify the tension between the disputants by making ‘the outvoted state 
dissatisfied, resentful, and clamouring for a change’.57 He held that the effectiveness of 
these alternatives could not be assumed and argued that ‘judicial settlement is the only 
ultimate means of disposing of disputes’.58  
Having questioned the effectiveness of alternative methods for dispute settlement, 
Lauterpacht set out to illustrate that international tribunals had a capacity to adapt 
international law to changing realities of world politics. He pointed out that international 
judges and arbitrators could perform law-making role ‘by way of interpreting the existing 
law and applying its general principles’.59 As he remarked:  
 
International tribunals are judicial tribunals administering rules of law. But, like 
                                                   
55 Ibid., pp. 138–141.  
56 Lauterpacht, ‘Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes’, p. 308.  
57 Ibid., p. 309. See also Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, pp. 141–
144.  
58 Lauterpacht, ‘Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes’, p. 309.  
59 Ibid., p. 310.  
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the law applied by municipal courts, the law administered by them is tempered 
by a spirit of legal equity, common sense and natural justice which, while paying 
full consideration to acquired rights, finds ways and means to prevent the law 
from becoming an instrument of oppression, or from giving its sanction to 
manifest absurdities.60  
 
In his view, international tribunals had a broader judicial discretion than do municipal 
courts in the process of making arbitral decisions due to the fact that they were bound by 
less ‘hard and fast rules’ of international law and were ‘in a position to exercise their law-
creating function in a spirit of progress’. 61  According to Lauterpacht, international 
tribunals could perform this function through the application of the doctrine of abuse of 
rights.62 In addition, international courts could make use of the doctrine clausula rebus 
sic stantibus (things thus standing) for the same purpose.63  
Moreover, he argued that international courts and tribunals could play a more 
constructive role when states party to the dispute were willing to cooperate. 64  For 
example, he pointed out that states could ask and authorise an international court or 
tribunal to pronounce a ruling ex aequo et bono (according to what is equitable and good), 
which was ‘in effect tantamount to endowing it with a legislative function’.65 Referring 
to Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which 
provided that ‘the Court may “decide a case ex aequo et bono if the parties agree thereto”’, 
he maintained that the Court would not be deemed to have acted ultra vires in deciding 
ex aequo et bono as long as this action was performed on the basis of the consent of the 
                                                   
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid. See also Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, p. 145.  
62  This doctrine enabled judges to render the claims made on the basis of existing 
sovereign rights null and void when they were causing unwarranted harm or injustice. 
See ibid., pp. 145–147; H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International 
Community, Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966[1933], pp. 286–306.  
63 Ibid., pp. 270–285; Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, p. 147.  
64 Ibid., pp. 147ff.  
65 Ibid., p. 150.  
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states parties to the dispute.66 Although he acknowledged that this option was only 
feasible when there was ‘a great and determined will to peace on the part of governments’, 
he held that this was feasible given state practices at that time. 67  Furthermore, 
Lauterpacht argued that the states parties to the dispute could draw on the Court’s 
decisions and advisory opinions as a basis for further diplomatic negotiations.68  
In short, Lauterpacht held that the nonexistence of an international legislature could 
not be a good reason for objecting to compulsory arbitration, and that international courts 
and tribunals could be expected to play a positive role in adjusting international law to 
changing realities of world politics via their judicial activities and practices.  
However, he was well aware of the limits of the above-mentioned remedies. With 
regard to international judges, he pointed out that ‘the task of explicitly amending the 
existing law is not within their province’. 69  Moreover, he did not have complete 
confidence in states’ willingness to settle disputes by voluntary agreement and was of the 
opinion that the question at stake was ‘of too great importance … to be left entirely to the 
initiative of states’. 70  It was his belief that the effectiveness of the rule of law in 
international society must not hinge completely on the will or whim of sovereign states.71 
As he stated:  
 
the task of amending the law and adapting it to changed conditions must, in so 
far as this function cannot be fulfilled by the normal judicial activity or by 
agreement of the parties, necessarily fall upon the political organs of the 
international community.72  
 
                                                   
66 Lauterpacht, ‘Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes’, p. 313.  
67 Ibid., pp. 313–314. See also Lauterpacht, Function of Law, pp. 307–329.  
68 Ibid., pp. 332–336.  
69 Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, p. 157.  
70 Ibid., p. 155.  
71 See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Nature of International Law and General Jurisprudence’, 
Economica, 37, 1932, pp. 301–320.  
72 Lauterpacht, Function of Law, p. 339.  
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From this perspective, Lauterpacht proposed giving substance to Article 19 of the 
Covenant by entrusting the League Council with the task of deliberating on changes in 
the existing international rules and rights. He suggested that the Statute be so amended as 
to enable the Permanent Court to call on the Council to give consideration to its judgement 
pronounced ‘in accordance with the existing legal position … with a view to a possible 
modification of its terms in the wider interest of international peace’, the result of which 
could have an effect of permanently suspending the execution of the Court’s judgement.73 
As he remarked:  
 
In fact, the time has come to consider whether the present deadlock of Article 19 
cannot, in a restricted sphere, be successfully overcome by making a judicial 
pronouncement, having no binding effect, the starting-point for putting into 
operation the political machinery for revising the existing law or at least for 
rendering inoperative obsolete law.74  
 
Lauterpacht’s suggestions could be questioned from different perspectives. First, it 
was far from certain whether making non-binding judgements of the Court the ‘starting-
point’ for negotiations would have proved effective in practice. He insisted that the 
ascertainment of the exact contents of the law would create ‘an attitude of accommodation’ 
on the part of disputants.75 However, it could also be argued that, once legal rights and 
obligations pertaining to a dispute had been determined by an international court, the state 
which would benefit from the continuation of the status quo might well take a tougher 
line against the other party or parties involved. Secondly, it was not clear as to when and 
under what circumstances the Court should call on the Council to give consideration to 
their judgements. Obviously, the act of asking the Council to reconsider the status quo 
would have had an immense political significance. On this point, Lauterpacht seems to 
                                                   
73 Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, pp. 155–156.  
74 Ibid., p. 156.  
75 Lauterpacht, Function of Law, p 330.  
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have relied on his tacit assumption that international judges were capable of making 
decisions from an impartial point of view for the sake of the progress, good and interest 
of the whole international community. Thirdly, he did not provide a clear and convincing 
justification as to why it was not the League Assembly but the Council that should play a 
major role in initiating this quasi-legislative process when Article 19 stipulated the right 
of the Assembly to make recommendations with regard to peaceful change.76  
Lauterpacht himself acknowledged that none of his proposed solutions was 
sufficient by itself. Yet he maintained that ‘however small each of these remedies may be, 
their cumulative effect is to supply a working alternative to a purely negative attitude’.77 
He insisted on the importance of compulsory arbitration for a reason. He held that the 
denial of compulsory arbitration would ran counter to the emerging principle or, in ES 
terminology, primary institution of non-use of force. As he remarked:  
 
the rejection on this account [that there existed no international legislature] of 
obligatory arbitration amounts in the last resort to a sanction of the reign of force, 
and the question arises whether force is more likely to prove an instrument of 
just change.78  
 
This passage clearly shows his underlying motivation for arguing for the need for 
compulsory arbitration. Although his stated objective of his earlier works was to deny the 
validity of the legal doctrine of non-justiciable disputes, he had been driven by a deeper 
conviction that it was his duty as an international lawyer to uphold the rule of law, as 
against ‘the reign of force’, in the international community and to assist in the promotion 
of non-use of force. He held the view that the acceptance of compulsory arbitration by 
states was the sine qua non of the rule of law and non-use of force in the international 
community and that this could be realised only with the help of some machinery for 
                                                   
76 See ibid., p. 340.  
77 Ibid., p. 345.  
78 Ibid., pp. 345–346.  
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peaceful change.  
 
Peaceful change and world government  
In his 1937 lecture on ‘the legal aspect’ of peaceful change, he expounded on the 
significance of peaceful change for international law.79 According to him, the authority 
of international law as law had been questioned by sceptics on the grounds that it had 
traditionally recognised war as a legitimate and legal means for political change. 
Therefore, establishing some alternative to war was of vital importance in terms of the 
maintenance and enhancement of the authority of international law.80 He went on to point 
out that the absence of means of peaceful change would necessarily result in either the 
inequitable rule of law or recourse to violence.81 In addition, the presence of the Pact of 
Paris had made the provision of effective means of peaceful change a matter of great 
urgency.82  
What was most striking about this lecture was that he placed great importance on 
the setting up of an international legislature. As he remarked:  
 
What is peaceful change as an effective institution of international law or of 
international society? It is the acceptance by States of a legal duty to acquiesce 
in changes in the law decreed by a competent international organ. It is the 
existence of a legislature imposing, if necessary, its fiat upon the dissenting State. 
This, it is submitted, is the only proper meaning of peaceful change as an 
effective legal institution of the international society. … An international 
legislature of that nature may without impropriety be described as a super-
State.83  
 
                                                   
79 H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Legal Aspect’, in C.A.W. Manning (ed.), Peaceful Change: An 
International Problem, London: Macmillan, 1937, p. 136.  
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid., pp. 137–138.  
82 Ibid., pp. 139–140.  
83 Ibid., pp. 141–142.  
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In contrast with his championship of world government, his attitude towards the above-
mentioned judicial remedies was surprisingly ambiguous in the lecture. Although he 
mentioned such procedures as the application of the doctrines of rebus sic stantibus and 
abuse of rights, they were described in a less positive tone than previously done.84  
Another shift in his thinking can be observed in his critical stance towards the 
League Covenant. As we have seen above, he had previously proposed giving substance 
to Article 19 of the Covenant.85 Yet, in the 1937 lecture, he criticised it for having 
obfuscated ‘the need for the only true solution, namely, a legally binding and effective 
machinery for peaceful change through international legislation’.86  
His belief in the need for an international legislature is clearly expressed in his 
review article of Lord Cecil’s autobiography published in 1941. In this review, he argued 
that the ‘resurrection’ of the League after the Second World War would require the 
curtailment of sovereignty and the establishment of an international legislature which he 
regarded as ‘the only instrument capable of a true solution of the problem of peaceful 
change’.87 As he remarked:  
 
The problem of peaceful change cannot be solved on any other than legislative 
basis, i.e. by way of decisions of an international organ endowed with effective 
authority in law and in fact to impose its decrees upon a dissenting minority.88  
 
                                                   
84 For instance, he stated as follows: ‘It would seem, therefore, that international judicial 
and arbitral organs cannot legitimately play a prominent part in the process of peaceful 
change. Their principal object is to apply the law and not to change it’. Ibid., p. 149.  
85 Lauterpacht, ‘Absence of an International Legislature’, pp. 155–156.  
86 Lauterpacht, ‘Legal Aspect’, p. 158. He went on to argue as follows: ‘Whatever may 
be the merits or shortcomings of Article 19, it cannot … be considered as [a] legal 
institution of effective peaceful change … Such an institution is tantamount to 
international legislation, that is to say, to a process of a peaceful alteration of the law for 
which the consent of the State affected is not required. But international legislation means 
an International Legislature. And International Legislature is a World State.’ Ibid.  
87 H. Lauterpacht, ‘Resurrection of the League’, The Political Quarterly, 12/2, 1941, pp. 
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88 Ibid., p. 131.  
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It is worth noting that he did not elaborate on the role of international judges and other 
alternative means of peaceful change in this review article. In view of this, it is safe to 
conclude that his view on the problem of peaceful change had undergone a significant 
shift over the years. As will be discussed shortly, the idea of international legislature was 
bitterly criticised by Carr, but its importance for the promotion of peaceful change was 
recognised by some prominent international legal scholars such as Georges Scelle.89  
 
Progressive view of international order  
Despite the shift in his thinking about peaceful change, one thing that ran through all his 
thinking on the subject was the insistence on the need to bring in some dispute settlement 
system that would make recourse to judgement of a third party, be it an international court, 
an international tribunal, the League of Nations or a World State. He held that the 
promotion and entrenchment of peaceful change in international society were possible 
only by introducing some form of third-party intervention. Such a thinking was not 
peculiar to him, but was shared by other liberal thinkers at the time. For example, W. 
Arnold-Forster remarked that:  
 
RENUNCIATION OF WAR is not enough: nations must also renounce the right 
to be judge in their own cause. They must accept pacific settlement in the last 
resort by a third party’s judgment.90  
 
Establishing some such system entailed curtailing or modifying the traditional concept 
and practice of sovereignty in some way. This was what Josef L. Kunz meant when he 
described the problem of peaceful change as follows:  
                                                   
89  Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
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90 W. Arnold-Forster, ‘Arbitration, Security, Disarmament’, in Leonard Woolf (ed.), The 
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The problem of revision is, in its deepest meaning, the problem of “national 
sovereignty.” “Peaceful change” as a fact, not merely as a word, presupposes not 
an international law between the nations, but an international law above the 
nations.91 
 
In this connection, it is well to recall that Schmitt was opposed to the League on the 
grounds that it limited the ability of political communities, including sovereign states, to 
make autonomous judgements.  
Lauterpacht held the belief that the problem of peaceful change could be solved by, 
and only by, reinforcing secondary institutions that would make use of some form of third-
party judgement in international dispute settlement, such as the League of Nations and 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. In his view, the primary institution of 
international law and strengthened secondary institutions would provide a set of means 
for promoting the primary institution of peaceful change and for eliminating the primary 
institution of war. Lauterpacht’s thinking about, and treatment of, the problem of peaceful 
change typified the view that international political change, including changes in the 
context of power transition, could be managed and controlled via the progressive 
development of international social structure. Such a development would signal the 
transformation of a Coexistence international society into a Cooperative international 
society.92  
 
Pragmatism and peaceful change  
Carr on peaceful change  
Lauterpacht’s suggestions met with criticism from pragmatic thinkers of the period. E.H. 
Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 is the most important text in this regard.93 It 
                                                   
91 Josef L. Kunz, ‘The Problem of Revision in International Law’, The American Journal 
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is often said that the treatise provides a realist criticism of utopianism and idealism.94 
However, the treatise will be cast in a different light in this section, with a focus on Part 
4 ‘Law and Change’ and, in particular, Chapter 13 entitled ‘Peaceful Change’. His 
statement that ‘[t]o establish methods of peaceful change is … the fundamental problem 
of international morality and of international politics’ indicates that the problem of 
peaceful change had been central to his thinking about international relations in general.95 
Indeed, the following passage from his inaugural lecture as the Woodrow Wilson 
Professor of International Politics at the University College of Wales, which was 
delivered on 14 October 1936, confirms this interpretation.  
 
There is a growing realisation in this country that, just as you can have no rule 
of law unless you have machinery at work for the re-making and unmaking of 
law, so you can have no sanctity of treaties unless some ready and effective 
means can be devised for the alteration or unmaking of treaties. There is no more 
urgent problem, if peace is to be preserved and democracy survive, than what is 
known as the problem of peaceful change. But that is another vast subject which 
I cannot approach to-day.96  
 
As I see it, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, which he published three years afterwards, was 
meant as a contribution to the debate on peaceful change; in Collingwoodian terminology, 
it represented his answer to the question of peaceful change. His arguments in the treatise 
cannot be fully understood unless they are put in this historical and intellectual context.  
According to Carr, the interwar period witnessed efforts to ‘treat the rule pacta sunt 
servanda not merely as a fundamental rule of international law, but as the cornerstone of 
                                                   
Study of International Relations, London: Macmillan, 1939.  
94  The sheer number of attempts at reconsidering the so-called First Great Debate 
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international society’, and he quoted Lauterpacht as saying that the rule ‘constitute[d] the 
highest, irreducible, final criterion’ governing state behavior in the society of states.97 
Such efforts were part of the interwar movement for the rule of law in international society. 
However, efforts to establish the sanctity of treaties failed to prevent states from breaching 
international law and treaties. After examining cases in which international legal rules 
and agreements had been violated during the interwar period, Carr pointed out that in 
many cases the violation had been justified on the basis of morality rather than of 
legality.98  
Being a realist, Carr had no difficulty in recognising that there could be a 
discrepancy between legality and morality. For example, he argued that treaties concluded 
under duress or international agreements which contained inequitable contents could be 
viewed as morally questionable. 99  Moreover, he examined and even showed some 
understanding of the radical view that treaties are essentially ‘instruments of power and 
therefore devoid of moral value’.100 After mentioning the Marxist conception of law and 
society, he stated as follows:  
 
In the same way, it can be maintained with considerable show of reason that 
insistence on the legal validity of international treaties is a weapon used by the 
ruling nations to maintain their supremacy over weaker nations on whom the 
treaties have been imposed.101  
 
He argued that this was plausible in light of the arbitrariness with which the principle 
pacta sunt servanda had been invoked by states in practice.102  
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99 Ibid., pp. 239–242.  
100 Ibid., p. 242.  
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid. 
147 
 
He then contended that the power-political and conservative dimensions of 
international law had been further strengthened as a result of the outlawing of war as an 
instrument of national policy. As he remarked:  
 
The rude pre-War system, or lack of system, was logical in recognising as legal 
the one effective method of changing the status quo [namely, war]. The rejection 
of the traditional method as illegal and the failure to provide any effective 
alternative have made contemporary international law a bulwark of the existing 
order to an extent unknown in previous international law or in the municipal law 
of any civilised country.103  
 
Carr pointed out that this one-sidedness had been the ‘most fundamental cause of 
the recent decline of respect for international law’.104 In short, the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda eventually failed to secure wide support and obedience because it came to be 
seen as a symbol of the conservative character or quality of the interwar international 
legal order, and this perception led to the diminished deference to international law. The 
one-sidedness of interwar international law had to be overcome, he argued, since 
‘[r]espect for law and treaties will be maintained only in so far as the law recognises 
effective political machinery through which it can itself be modified and superseded’.105  
Although he was critical of the conservatism of the interwar international legal 
order, Carr never concurred with the idea that recourse to war should be permitted for the 
purpose of bringing about international political change. 106  Nor did he blame 
international law for not providing a mechanism for change. For the primary function of 
law was ‘to promote stability and maintain the existing framework of society’.107  
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In Carr’s view, what was lacking was a political mechanism for peaceful change. 
As was common at that time, he made a sharp distinction between legal disputes, in which 
the interpretation and application of the existing rules and rights were at issue, and 
political disputes, in which disputants were seeking changes in the existing rules and 
rights.108 With this distinction in mind, he unequivocally denied that arbitral tribunals 
and international courts, including the Permanent Court of International Justice, could be 
counted on to resolve the problem of peaceful change since their primary function was to 
‘apply the legal “rule applicable to the dispute”’.109 Moreover, he explicitly ruled out the 
possibility that such secondary institutions could effectively carry out legislative 
functions for the reason that they would not take due account of the political importance 
of power relations between the states parties to the dispute. To quote his own words, 
‘[c]onflicts of interest can be dealt with only by an organ which takes the power factor 
into account’.110 He also pointed out that there was a genuine difficulty for international 
judicial organs to decide the case ex aequo et bono since there existed no common 
framework of values upon which the judges or arbitrators could base their decisions.111 
For these reasons, Carr concluded that international judicial organs were not fit for 
purpose as far as the problem of peaceful change was concerned.  
Carr was also critical of legislative solutions. He recognised that, in domestic 
politics, legislative measures provided reliable means of peaceful change. However, he 
was wary of domestic analogy and was of the opinion that the same solutions could not 
be applied in the sphere of world politics.112 He criticised Lauterpacht’s later argument, 
which emphasised the need for an international legislature, as a futile attempt to establish 
a world government with no chance of success. For he could hardly believe that such 
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political and social conditions as were necessary for setting up a world state existed at 
that time.113 As he trenchantly stated:  
 
The difficulty lies not in the lack of machinery for international legislation, but 
in the absence of an international political order sufficiently well integrated to 
make possible the establishment of a legislative authority whose decrees will be 
recognised as binding on states without their specific assent.114  
 
For these reasons, Carr was critical of approaches that emphasised the role of 
secondary institutions in general. In particular, he did not lay his hopes on the League 
since he viewed it as based upon a series of false assumptions, one of which being that 
there existed infallible world public opinion.115 His sceptical attitude towards secondary 
institutions led him to explore the role of primary institutions in managing international 
political change.  
 
Negotiation and compromise  
The solution he proposed was remarkably simple: negotiation and compromise. However, 
never once did he imply that this solution was easy to implement. As is well known, he 
was highly critical of the notion of the harmony of interests.116 The absence of the 
harmony of interests meant that negotiations would always be tough and intense, and the 
only way to reach an agreement was to split the difference and to reach a compromise 
through diplomatic maneuvering. In his view, it was concessions on the part of the 
beneficiaries of the existing international order that were crucial for the success of 
diplomatic negotiations. Peaceful change could not be effected if the status quo powers 
held fast to their vested interests protected by the existing international arrangements. To 
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quote his words, ‘[t]he process of give-and-take must apply to challenges to the existing 
order’.117  
Although Carr defined the purpose of peaceful change as the realisation of 
‘necessary and desirable’ revisions of the international order ‘without war’,118 he denied 
that moral persuasion alone could bring about such changes. If a compromise settlement 
was to be reached, powerful pressure must be put on those actors who had benefited from 
the maintenance of the status quo. As he noted, ‘[a]n operation of peaceful change, 
generally recognised as salutary, could not be effected save under a threat of war’.119 For 
this reason, he repeatedly stressed that the problem of peaceful change needed to be 
settled on the basis of ‘a compromise between morality and power’.120  
Carr viewed the interplay between power and morality as the essential factor in the 
dynamics of political change in both domestic and international domains. This conception 
of the nature of political change allowed him to turn his attention to the conflict between 
labour and capital in search of insights applicable to the relations among states. The 
history of the relationship between labour and capital was of particular interest to him not 
only because he understood the problem of international peaceful change in analogy with 
domestic class struggle, but also because it provided many real-life examples of political 
and social changes that had been achieved without actual resort to violence, that is, 
without revolutionary convulsions. According to Carr, repeated industrial actions fostered 
willingness on the part of both capital and labour to have the dispute between them settled 
through conciliation and arbitration, thereby ‘creating something like a regular system of 
“peaceful change”’.121 This process had been facilitated by the existence of ‘a certain 
measure of common feeling as to what is just and reasonable in their mutual relations’.122 
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Therefore, the process of negotiation between capital and labour had been guided by 
considerations of both power and morality, which he viewed as the basis of any political 
settlement and change.  
Although Carr was sceptical of simplistic domestic analogy, he sought to find a 
clue to the solution to the problem of peaceful change in the insights and lessons offered 
by the labour-capital relationship in industrialised domestic societies. As he remarked:  
 
If we could apply this analogy to international relations, we might hope that, 
once the dissatisfied Powers had realised the possibility of remedying grievances 
by peaceful negotiations (preceded no doubt in the first instance by threats of 
force), some regular procedure of “peaceful change” might gradually be 
established and win the confidence of the dissatisfied; and that, once such a 
system had been recognised, conciliation would come to be regarded as a matter 
of course, and the threat of force, while never formally abandoned, recede further 
and further into the background.123  
 
Although he laid his hopes on this approach, he conceded that it remained to be seen 
whether the insights drawn from domestic experiences were really applicable to the 
relations among sovereign states.124 As elements of power are always present in world 
politics, the effectiveness of Carr’s solution in establishing some machinery for peaceful 
change largely depended on whether there existed, at the international level, ‘a certain 
measure of common feeling as to what is just and reasonable’, which had made peaceful 
change possible in domestic societies.125 As ES theorists point out, the creation and 
maintenance of rules and institutions among states is accompanied by the forging and 
cultivation of common interests and values among states.126 This holds true for any 
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machinery for peaceful change, including the one proposed by Carr.  
This accounts for why Carr’s solution to the problem of peaceful change failed to 
produce positive outcomes in the 1930s. In the first edition of The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 
he (in)famously observed that the diplomatic negotiations that led to the Munich 
Agreement was ‘the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major 
international issue by a procedure of peaceful change’ inasmuch as ‘[t]he change in itself 
was one which corresponded both to a change in the European equilibrium of forces and 
to accepted canons of international morality’.127 Despite his observations, however, the 
Munich Agreement failed to provide a springboard for peaceful change since there existed 
very few common interests and values among states involved in the process. The 
Schmittian conception of international society prevalent at the time in Germany 
emphasised struggle between political communities and allowed little room for common 
interests and values among them.  
The meaning and implications of Carr’s argument with regard to peaceful change 
can be understood only by putting it in the historical context. As discussed in chapter 2, 
contextualisation is a necessary first step for interpreting historical texts. Although much 
of his argument regarding the Munich Agreement was deleted from the later editions of 
the treatise, it is necessary to bear in mind that the Munich Agreement was mentioned in 
the first edition published in 1939 as an empirical case supporting his give-and-take 
approach.  
 
The limitations of the give-and-take approach  
Carr’s pragmatic approach may well be welcomed by many as the most realistic solution 
to the problem of peaceful change. However, it was flawed in three respects. Firstly, it is 
questionable if the Munich Agreement was in accord with his approach. Carr repeatedly 
claimed that the process of give and take required self-sacrifice on the part of the strong 
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and wealthy, who benefited most from the continuance of the status quo.128 However, it 
is difficult to regard the Agreement as a product of self-sacrifice on the part of those who 
had benefited most from the Versailles system. The Agreement was nothing less than a 
product of political trade-offs at the expense of Czechoslovakia, whose delegates were 
not even allowed to attend the conference.  
Secondly, it is equally questionable if we can really look on his give-and-take 
approach as a solution in the first place. For his approach, which emphasised negotiation 
and compromise, did not propose anything new or fresh. As discussed earlier, war had 
long been recognised as a legitimate means of political change. However, this by no 
means suggests that negotiation and compromise had been seen as unimportant in world 
politics. Even at the time when war was regarded as a legitimate instrument of national 
policy, there existed a common understanding that war was an ultima ratio (last resort) 
that should be resorted to when, and only when, all the other methods had been tried in 
good faith.129 In fact, it was precisely because negotiation and compromise had proved 
to be not enough that a series of attempts were made during the interwar period to develop 
the machinery for pacific settlement of disputes, including the League system.  
Finally, it must be pointed out that Carr’s argument fails to distinguish between 
peaceful change and appeasement. As we have seen above, he maintained that peaceful 
change had to be grounded in ‘a compromise between morality and power’.130 However, 
he could not differentiate moral claims supported by power from those used for 
concealing ulterior motive, for his argument that morality and ethics were reflective of 
power and interests led to the denial of the autonomy of moral claims.131 As Morgenthau 
trenchantly criticised, Carr possessed ‘no transcendent point of view from which to 
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survey the political scene and to appraise the phenomenon of power’.132 This led to the 
confusion between peaceful change aimed at bringing about just changes and 
appeasement aimed at avoiding war through ad hoc reconciliation of great powers’ 
interests. Although it is not always easy to distinguish the former from the latter, 
abandoning this distinction would be fatal to the practice of peaceful change.  
 
Pragmatist vision of international order  
Carr’s treatise typified a pragmatist way of thinking about the problem of peaceful change. 
Unlike Schmitt, he did not dismiss the problem as being formulated in such a way as to 
be loaded in favour of liberals. However, unlike Lauterpacht who embodied interwar 
liberalism, he was critical of the role of secondary institutions and international law in 
solving the problem. Instead, he took a middle ground or pragmatist stance on the problem, 
exploring the possibility of bringing about peaceful change through negotiation and 
compromise. This, he argued, could be obtained by invigorating, in ES terminology, the 
primary institutions of diplomacy and great power management.133 Carr’s pragmatist 
vision of international order can be interpreted as based on what Buzan calls the 
Coexistence model of international society.134  While he was sceptical of the role of 
secondary institutions in managing international political change, he did not dismiss the 
role of third-party settlement, for great power management could take the form of 
mediation in practice. Indeed, the Munich Conference can be interpreted as an example 
of great power mediation, although Czechoslovakia was absent from it.  
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Conclusion  
Unlike political debates in which people fall into disagreement over the nature of the 
problem, those engaged in the interwar debate on peaceful change shared a common 
understanding of what the problem was about. However, there were radically different, 
even conflicting normative perspectives on what ought to be done about it. This chapter 
focused on four political and legal thinkers whose ideas and arguments set the parameters 
of the debate.  
The essence of the first normative position, as represented by Konoe and Schmitt, 
boils down to the denial of the relevance of peaceful change. Despite the emergence of 
the norm of non-use of force, the idea that states retained the prerogative right to resort 
to war in order to effect political changes was strongly embraced by revisionists. The 
revisionist vision of international order emphasised the role of war and underplayed the 
importance of secondary institutions in world politics. The international order envisaged 
by revisionists was akin to what Buzan calls a Power Political international society in 
which war has a legitimate place as a primary institution.135  
The second normative position, as represented by Lauterpacht, had its roots in the 
belief in the importance of the emerging primary institution of non-use of force and sought 
to promote it by entrenching the primary institution of peaceful change in international 
society via the invigoration of secondary institutions, such as the League of Nations and 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, with the help of the primary institution of 
international law. Although there were different suggestions as to how and to what extent 
secondary institutions could help entrench peaceful change in international society, most 
suggestions based on this normative position contained plans to bring in some form of 
third-party judgement in processes of dispute settlement, which could potentially amount 
to the curtailment of state sovereignty. The international order envisaged by progressivists 
was akin to what Buzan calls a Cooperative international society, in which war is 
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delegitimised and secondary institutions flourish.136  
The third normative stance, as represented by Carr, emphasised pragmatic solutions 
based on the realities of world politics. Pragmatists were sceptical of the possibilities that 
the problem of peaceful change could be resolved by following a set of pre-arranged 
procedures offered by secondary institutions, such as the League Covenant or the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. They held the view that the demands for 
political change must be dealt with via negotiation and compromise. The pragmatist 
vision of international order emphasised the role of such primary institutions as 
diplomacy and great power management. This position was not opposed to third-party 
judgement per se since great power management could take the form of great power 
mediation. The international order envisaged by pragmatists was similar to what Buzan 
calls a Coexistence international society.137  
As significant as these normative differences were, there was one thing that united 
these thinkers (with the exception of Konoe): the recognition of the significance of socio-
structural contexts for international political change, including changes in the context of 
power transition. Lauterpacht’s arguments were based on the recognition of the role of 
the primary institution of international law and secondary institutions reflective of it in 
managing international political change. While Carr severely criticised Lauterpacht’s 
ideas, his own arguments were also marked by the focus on such primary institutions as 
diplomacy and great power management and their role in managing international political 
change. Even Schmitt was concerned with the status and role of war as stipulated in 
international law, and this reveals his reliance on the socio-structural conception of world 
politics. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the debate among these scholars 
represents a distinctive way of theorising power transition that emphasises the role of 
international social structure in managing the process of international political change in 
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the context of power transition. The task of the next chapter is to clearly set out what this 
socio-structural perspective is, to establish its enduring importance for power transition 
analysis, and to examine contemporary international social structure governing 
international political change from that perspective.  
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Chapter 5  
Peaceful Change in Contemporary International Society  
 
 
 
Introduction  
The preceding two chapters explored the interwar debate on peaceful change, which is 
the most rigorous and systematic attempt so far in IR scholarship at exploring the role of 
international social structure in international political change. The debate exemplifies a 
distinctive way of looking at, and presents an alternative mode of theorising power 
transition that emphasises the role of international social structure, thereby providing a 
strong defence of the socio-structural conception of power transition as an institutionally 
governed process. Drawing on the theoretical insights from the debate, the present chapter 
seeks to set out the socio-structural conception of power transition and to establish its 
enduring significance for power transition analysis. The development of peaceful change 
as a primary institution since the end of the Second World War, along with that of other 
primary institutions such as non-use of force and collective security, has made the socio-
structural perspective even more valuable for power transition studies. The chapter shows 
the institutionalisation of peaceful change in postwar international society by examining 
the structures and practices of the UN and its Security Council—secondary institutions 
that are expected to play a major role in promoting and entrenching peaceful change in 
contemporary international society.  
This chapter proceeds in four stages. The first section contrasts the mode of 
theorising power transition that was widely adopted by those engaged in the interwar 
debate with that which has been prevalent in the existing literature on power transition. 
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This helps establish the socio-structural conception of power transition—or, to be more 
accurate, of international political change in the context of power transition—as an 
institutionally governed process. The following sections aim at showing the enduring 
significance of the socio-structural conception of power transition. The second section 
looks into the institutional development of the primary institutions of non-use of force, 
collective security and peaceful change in postwar international society. The third section 
overviews methods and techniques that help states practise the primary institution of 
peaceful change in contemporary international society. The final section closely examines 
the role of the UN in the promotion of peaceful change with a focus on the role of the 
Security Council. In particular, it focuses on Chapter VI of the UN Charter since it is 
primarily via exercise of the powers under this Chapter that the Council seeks to promote 
peaceful change in contemporary international society.  
The present chapter examines various cases of peaceful change including cases 
which may not be seen as instances of power transition. While some of the cases covered 
in the present chapter and the methods and institutions mentioned in relation to them 
might not seem to be particularly relevant to power transition, they all serve to illustrate 
the diversity and multifariousness of the international social structure governing change 
in contemporary international society, including changes in the context of power 
transition. The interests and goals pursued by rising powers are, from the perspective of 
the idealist-holist ontology underpinning the present study, largely, if not entirely, affected 
and redefined by the social structure of international society, and the range of possible 
and legitimate means by which rising powers pursue their interests and goals varies 
depending on the institutions and methods governing international political change in the 
issue-area or areas at stake in a given instance of power transition. For these reasons, and 
also for the purpose of developing a framework for the socio-structural analysis of power 
transition, it is important to become conversant with the multifariousness of the 
international social structure governing change in contemporary international society and 
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to be cognizant of the actual and potential diversity of the modalities of change in the 
context of power transition.  
 
Power transition as an institutionally governed process  
Two modes of theorising power transition  
As discussed in chapter 2, the benefit of studying history is that it exposes and challenges 
the assumptions and prejudgments one has about the world in which one resides by 
revealing hidden aspects of that world, thereby enabling one to conduct oneself with a 
better understanding and knowledge of the situation. Such being the case, then what does 
the interwar debate on peaceful change tell us about power transition, and how does it 
reform the way we look at and theorise power transition? I shall here address these 
questions by contrasting the theoretical approach that underpinned the debate with that 
adopted in much of the existing literature on power transition. As with contemporary 
theories of power transition, the debate was primarily concerned with how the demands 
of rising powers could be dealt with so as to prevent wars. Back then, however, this 
problem was being addressed in a distinctive manner, which contrasts markedly with the 
manner in which power transition is being theorised and addressed in much of the existing 
literature.  
What characterised the interwar debate on peaceful change was the wide 
acceptance of the socio-structural conception of power transition. It was widely held at 
that time that the process of international political change in the context of power 
transition was something governed by such factors as state practice, norms, international 
law and international organisations. In other words, much of the debate was based on the 
premise that power transition—or, to be more accurate, international political change in 
the context of power transition—is an institutionally governed process, and that the 
behaviour of rising powers is subject, in varying degrees, to international social structure. 
It is to be noted that this conception of power transition and the insights it offers are 
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compatible with ES theory and the socio-structural conception of world politics 
underpinning the theory.  
Under the socio-structural conception of power transition and international political 
change, war was seen as a state practice constituting part of international social structure 
and therefore was supposed to be subject to critical reflection and amenable to social 
control. This accords with the ES conception of war as a primary institution of 
international society.1 The socio-structural conception of war is markedly different from 
what may be called the mechanistic conception of war which underlies much of the 
existing literature on power transition. In the contemporary literature, war is very often 
described as if it were something that occurs or happens mechanistically in response to 
power shifts within the international system in the ES sense.2  
The socio-structural conception of war was shared by statesmen such as Woodrow 
Wilson, Lord Cecil and Jan Christiaan Smuts, as we have seen in chapter 3. These 
statesmen held the view that changes in states’ understanding of, and their attitudes 
towards, war would lead to a transformation of international social structure, with impacts 
on rules and institutions governing state behaviour and potentially on states’ identities and 
interests. In other words, the interwar efforts to eliminate war from international society 
were premised on the idea of, or even the belief in, the co-constitution of states and 
international social structure.  
As discussed in the conclusion of the preceding chapter, the socio-structural 
perspective also underlay the ideas and arguments of Schmitt, Lauterpacht and Carr. It 
should be easy to see that Lauterpacht’s view on peaceful change was based on such a 
perspective. Although Carr was critical of the role of secondary institutions on which 
                                                   
1 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 4th edn, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 13.  
2 See Bull, Anarchical Society, pp. 9–10; Barry Buzan, From International to World 
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Lauterpacht placed his expectations, his arguments were also based on the premise that 
war had been a state practice, or a primary institution, of international society, whose role 
in international political change could be reduced by invigorating other primary 
institutions such as diplomacy and great power management. Schmitt was highly sceptical 
about peaceful change, but his jurisprudential analyses of the role and status of war in 
international law in general, and under the League system in particular, show his reliance 
on the socio-structural conception of world politics.  
 
Multifariousness of international social structure governing power transition  
Understanding war as part of international social structure governing power transition 
entails recognising the following two points. Firstly, the proposition that war is an 
institution constituting part of international social structure governing power transition 
suggests the existence of other primary and/or secondary institutions governing the 
process. Much of the existing literature on power transition has been devoted to the 
examination of the relationship between war and change. However, from the socio-
structural perspective, it is necessary to take due account of the role of other primary and 
secondary institutions in international political change. This partly explains why the focus 
of the interwar debate on peaceful change, based as it was on the socio-structural 
conception of power transition and international political change, was on discovering and 
inventing alternative methods or mechanisms for bringing about international political 
change.  
Secondly, the role that war as a primary institution does play in processes of change 
in a given international society cannot be understood apart from the development and 
nature of other primary and secondary institutions of that international society. One of the 
important insights the interwar debate on peaceful change offers is that the role of war in 
international political change and its status in international society may change in 
response to developments in international law. International law is ‘the bedrock 
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institution’3  that sets principles and rules governing state behaviour in international 
society. In particular, it provides a common framework within which the use of force in a 
given international society is to be seen and judged. Prior to the First World War, there 
were no legal rules in general international law proscribing war as a means of 
international political change, although there did exist debates on what were the morally 
right and acceptable reasons for resorting to it. 4  However, as shown in chapter 3, 
international law has tightened its restrictions on the use of force since the end of the First 
World War by legally establishing ad bellum thresholds. This led to the emergence of the 
primary institution of non-use of force and the twin derivative primary institutions of 
collective security and peaceful change, as a result of which war lost its status as a 
legitimate means of international political change. As will be shown in the next section, 
these institutions have established themselves in contemporary international society, with 
significant impacts on power transition and international political change.  
 
The focus on secondary institutions  
Another characteristic of the interwar debate was its focus on the role of secondary 
institutions in managing change in international society. As we have seen in chapters 3 
and 4, much of the debate on the problem of peaceful change centered around the role of 
such secondary institutions as the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in international political change. In particular, it was shown that there 
existed a commonly held view that the entrenchment of the institutional symbiosis 
between collective security and peaceful change required the support of secondary 
                                                   
3 James Mayall, World Politics: Progress and its Limits, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, 
p. 94.  
4 There were even international treaties and agreements providing for the limitation of 
the use of force amongst the contracting states, such as Bryan Treaties concluded by the 
US and other countries. However, under the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt 
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institutions designed for the maintenance of international peace and security such as the 
League. That the majority of the books and articles on peaceful change published during 
the interwar period focused on how secondary institutions could, through interaction with 
primary institutions, manage international political change shows how widely the socio-
structural conception of power transition was being shared by practitioners and scholars 
at that time.  
This contrasts markedly with state-centrism prevalent in the existing literature on 
power transition, in which the role of secondary institutions rarely features. For instance, 
the role of the existing secondary institutions such as the UN and the International Court 
of Justice is rarely taken into account in theoretical debates on China’s peaceful rise.5 
While some liberal thinkers, such as G. John Ikenberry, discuss the role of secondary 
institutions such as the UN, they do not address how primary and secondary institutions 
interact to manage international political change, nor do they examine constitutive effects 
that secondary institutions may have on rising powers.6 By adopting the socio-structural 
conception of power transition, state-centrism prevalent in the existing literature can be 
corrected, and due attention can be given to the role of secondary institutions in the 
management of power transition and to their constitutive effects on rising powers.  
The interwar debate on peaceful change sheds light on these hidden aspects of 
power transition to which much of the existing literature on power transition has been 
blind. The theoretical insights the debate offers are in accord with and supportive of the 
ES’s conception of world politics, as set out in chapter 1. The question that rises here is 
                                                   
5 See, for example, Yi Feng, ‘Global Power Transitions and Their Implications for the 
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pp. 56–68.  
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whether those insights are applicable to, and have any significance for, the analysis of 
power transition in contemporary international society. This question has to be answered 
in the affirmative since, as the following sections show, the post-war international order 
is characterised by, among other things, the development of international law regarding 
non-use of force, the institutionalisation of peaceful change, and the development of the 
machinery for managing international political change. All these developments make the 
insights the interwar debate offers valuable for power transition studies.  
 
The post-war development of peaceful change in international society  
Non-use of force in contemporary international society  
As we have seen in chapter 3, non-use of force emerged as a principle, albeit an inchoate 
one, of international society in the aftermath of the First World War, and the Second World 
War brought home to practitioners and scholars alike the necessity of entrenching this 
principle more firmly in international society as an actual practice or institution. Thus, 
the UN Charter articulates its significance by enshrining it as one of the basic principles 
governing the behaviour of the UN member states. Article 2(4) reads as follows:  
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.7  
 
The importance of the prohibition of the use of force has been reconfirmed in many 
international documents and declarations. For example, the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereafter the Declaration on Friendly 
                                                   
7 UN, Charter of the United Nations [hereafter UN Charter], 26 June 1945, Art. 2(4), 
available at: http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html (accessed 26 July 
2017).  
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Relations) reconfirmed the significance of non-use of force and stated that ‘[s]uch a threat 
or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United 
Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues’.8 It is to 
be noted that Article 2(4) not only prohibits the actual use of force, but also the threat of 
force. This principle has been confirmed in Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties which provides that ‘[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured 
by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied 
in the Charter of the United Nations’.9 This has been reaffirmed in the Declaration of the 
Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use 
of Force in International Relations adopted in 1987.10 Moreover, the International Court 
of Justice (hereafter ICJ) has, in its judgement on the merits of the famous Nicaragua 
case, recognised the principle of non-use of force as a principle of customary international 
law underpinned by state practice and opinio juris.11 There is disagreement as to whether 
the principle can also be regarded as a peremptory norm or jus cogens, even though the 
ICJ has taken a positive view of its peremptory status in the Nicaragua case.12 Putting 
aside the question of its peremptory status, it cannot be denied that states no longer sign 
                                                   
8  UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations [hereafter the Declaration on Friendly Relations], UN Doc 
A/RES/2625(XXV), 24 October 1970.  
9 UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations Treaty 
Series, vol. 1155, p. 344.  
10 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the 
Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, UN 
Doc A/RES/42/22, 18 November 1987.  
11 International Court of Justice [hereafter ICJ], Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) [hereafter the Nicaragua 
case], Merits, Judgement of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 188.  
12  See, for example, James A. Green, ‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the 
Prohibitions of the Use of Force’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 32/2, 2011, pp. 
215–257. For the ICJ’s view on this point, see ICJ, the Nicaragua case, para. 190. See 
also Claus Kreß, ‘The International Court of Justice and the “Principle of Non-Use of 
Force”’, in Marc Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 561–604.  
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treaties that are incompatible with the principle of non-use of force, although this does 
not preclude the possibility that states can be actually violating the principle in 
purportedly implementing their treaty obligations. Therefore, the existing treaty-based 
military alliances in contemporary international society, such as the NATO and CSTO, 
are all explained to be defensive in purpose.  
As is well known, the two legal exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of 
force as set out in Article 2(4) are the use of force in self-defence under Article 51 of the 
Charter and the use of force as part of enforcement action authorised by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, there have been efforts to loosen the 
legal restrictions on the use of force. It has been claimed from time to time that the Charter 
does not prohibit the use of force in pursuit of the purposes of the United Nations such as 
the promotion of self-determination, democracy and human rights.13 Some have even 
claimed that Article 2(4) is just one of many factors against which the lawfulness of the 
use of force is to be assessed. 14  However, it is to be noted that these arguments 
presuppose the validity and importance of the principle of non-use of force and are not 
meant as the denial of it. There are those who claim that Article 2(4) has become a dead 
letter due to the recurrent non-compliance with it on the part of states.15 Indeed, it is 
undeniable that states have from time to time conducted themselves in a manner 
incompatible with the prohibition set out in the article. However, as Claus Kreß rightly 
points out, this point has already been worked out by the ICJ in its decision on the 
Nicaragua case.16 In its ruling, the Court stated that:  
                                                   
13 Christine Gray, ‘The Use of Force and the International Legal Order’, in Malcolm D. 
Evans (ed.), International Law, 4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 622–
626.  
14 W. Michael Reisman, ‘Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International 
Law’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 78, 
1984, pp. 74–87.  
15 See, for example, Thomas M. Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms 
Governing the Use of Force by States’, The American Journal of International Law, 64/5, 
1970, pp. 809–837.  
16 Kreß, ‘International Court of Justice’, p. 570.  
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It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules 
in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have 
refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force … The Court does 
not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding 
practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. … If a State 
acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its 
conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule 
itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, 
the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.17  
 
The Russian annexation of Crimea has been criticised as a clear violation of the 
principle set out in Article 2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits not only the use of, but 
also the threat of, force. For instance, the G7 leaders stated in the 2016 G7 Summit 
Declaration that ‘[w]e reiterate our condemnation of the illegal annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula by Russia and reaffirm our policy of its non-recognition’.18 In order to shake 
off accusations, Russia has tried to vindicate itself by providing a series of justifications 
based on various reasons such as consent, self-defence, the protection of nationals, etc.19 
While it is often argued that the Russian conduct in Crimea poses a challenge to the 
principle of non-use of force, the fact that Russia has had to try to justify its actions attests 
to the validity of, and the importance attached to, the principle.  
In view of these, it can be argued that non-use of force—a fundamental and durable 
state practice underpinned by opinio juris, i.e. the belief that it is a legitimate pattern of 
behaviour in international society—has been firmly entrenched in international society as 
an entrenched practice or primary institution governing international dispute settlement 
in contemporary international society.20 This marks a significant and historic change in 
                                                   
17 ICJ, the Nicaragua case, para. 186.  
18 G7, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, 26–27 May 2016, available at: http://
www.mofa.go.jp/files/000160266.pdf (accessed 26 July 2017), p. 22.  
19 See Roy Allison, ‘Russian “Deniable” Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia 
Broke the Rules’, International Affairs, 90/6, 2014, pp. 1261–1268.  
20 For the definition of primary institutions, see Buzan, From International to World 
Society?, p. 167.  
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international social structure regulating the use of force. This also represents the 
undermining of the Schmittian position that emphasises the role of the primary institution 
of war in world politics.21 As shown below, the post-war international social structure 
governing change is founded on the combination of Carrian ideas, which emphasise the 
role of primary institutions such as diplomacy and great power management, and 
Lauterpachtian ideas, which emphasise the role of the primary institutions of non-use of 
force and international law and that of various secondary institutions reflective of these 
primary institutions. In ES terminology, contemporary international society can be 
interpreted as being in the process of transition from a Coexistence international society 
to a Cooperative international society.22  
 
Collective security and peaceful change in contemporary international society  
This trend has been reinforced by the institutionalisation of collective security and 
peaceful change, which are, as discussed in chapter 3, derivative primary institutions 
derived from the master primary institution of non-use of force. The UN Charter 
reconfirms the importance of these two derivative primary institutions and the symbiotic 
relationship between them for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 
1(1) of the Charter reads as follows:  
 
[The Purposes of the United Nations are:] 1. To maintain international peace and 
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression 
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in 
                                                   
21 This is not to imply that war in the sense of the use of force has altogether ceased to 
be a primary institution of international society. As Buzan points out, the use of force is 
still being considered as legitimate for certain specific purposes in contemporary 
international society, and recent debates around responsibility to protect (R2P) can be 
interpreted as an effort to change the nature and purpose of war as a primary institution 
of international society. See Barry Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of 
International Relations, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, pp. 150–153.  
22 Buzan, From International to World Society?, pp. 191–194.  
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conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of 
the peace23  
 
As is clearly stated in this article, the Charter emphasises the importance of promoting 
both collective security and peaceful change, and this demonstrates that the drafters of 
the Charter had fully understood the significance of the symbiotic relationship between 
collective security and peaceful change for safeguarding international peace and security. 
This also shows that the drafting of the Charter had been informed by the interwar debate 
on peaceful change.24  
It is well known that the UN is given greater powers than the League of Nations in 
terms of collective security. Chapter VII of the UN Charter confers on the Security 
Council the power to make binding decisions and take necessary measures to enforce 
peace, including military ones. This contrasts sharply with the fact that some of the 
founders of the League, such as Lord Cecil, had relied almost solely on the agency of 
international public opinion as a mechanism to implement decisions made by the 
League.25 The UN was founded on the basis of the realisation that international public 
opinion, if not shored up by some form of material power, is not sufficient to constrain 
the aggressive behaviour of rising, revisionist powers. The Charter seeks to provide the 
material underpinning necessary to enforce peace by means of its strengthened 
mechanisms for promoting collective security.  
Informed by the interwar debate on peaceful change, and its founders being aware 
                                                   
23 UN Charter, Art. 1(1), emphasis added.  
24 In ES theory, the UN and its Security Council have often been understood as reflective 
of the primary institutions of diplomacy and great power management respectively. See 
Buzan, From International to World Society?, p. 187. The present study duly takes 
account of this, but focuses on the primary institutions of collective security and peaceful 
change in order to shed light on another, hitherto insufficiently explored aspect of these 
secondary institutions.  
25 See Lord Robert Cecil, World Opinion and the League of Nations, London: League of 
Nations Union, 1918.  
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of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change, the Charter 
combines the strengthened machinery for collective security with that for peaceful change. 
Indeed, the Charter puts significant emphasis on peaceful change and seeks to 
institutionalise it by promoting the principle of pacific settlement of disputes. Article 2(3) 
which provides that ‘[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered’.26 Peaceful change is vitally important for non-use of force, for collective 
security cannot in itself eliminate root causes of international disputes and conflicts. As 
Tomuschat remarks:  
 
… since the use of coercive means is unlawful under the prohibition of 
intervention and the principle of non-use of force, a different mechanism of 
conflict resolution is required. Disputes which are left unsettled can lead to 
eruptive disturbances. Hence, the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes 
occupies a pivotal position within a world order whose hallmark is the ban on 
force and coercion.27  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, collective security and peaceful change are mutually dependent 
and they cannot exist without each other, and the symbiotic relationship between them is 
the key to giving substance to non-use of force.  
States have reaffirmed their commitment to the principle of pacific settlement of 
disputes in many international documents and instruments. The aforementioned 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement 
of International Disputes (hereafter the Manila Declaration) are among the most often 
cited international documents.28 Moreover, the principle has been recognised by the ICJ 
                                                   
26 UN Charter, Art. 2(3).  
27 Christian Tomuschat, ‘Article 2 (3)’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg 
Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd 
edn, vol. I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 184.  
28 UN General Assembly, the Declaration on Friendly Relations; UN General Assembly, 
172 
 
as a principle of customary international law underpinned by state practice and opinio 
juris.29 In view of these, it can be argued that peaceful change has also been firmly 
established not merely as an idea or principle, but also as a practice or primary institution 
governing international political change in contemporary international society. The next 
section turns to different methods or techniques that help states to practise peaceful 
change in contemporary international society.  
 
Methods for peaceful change in contemporary international society  
As discussed above, contemporary international social structure governing political 
change is based on both Carrian and Lauterpachtian ideas and is comprised of both 
primary and secondary institutions. Moreover, it combines methods which involve a third 
party and those which do not. On the basis of the principle of free choice of means, states 
are free to choose whatever means they consider appropriate for settling their disputes as 
long as the means employed is compatible with the rules and principles of international 
law in general and of the UN Charter in particular. There are various methods or 
techniques that help states to practise peaceful change in contemporary international 
society. In this section, I will focus on methods and techniques which may be employed 
by states without the involvement of the UN as a third party. These methods and 
techniques include negotiation, mediation, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement and resort to regional organisations. These methods or techniques are listed in 
Article 33(1) of the UN Charter and in such documents as the aforementioned declarations, 
                                                   
Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes [hereafter the 
Manila Declaration], UN Doc A/RES/37/10, 15 November 1982. These documents are 
cited or referred to in Tomuschat, ‘Article 2 (3)’, p. 186; Simon O’Connor and Cecilia M. 
Bailliet, ‘The Good Faith Obligation to Maintain International Peace and Security and the 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes’, in Cecilia Marcela Bailliet and Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen 
(eds), Promoting Peace Through International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015, pp. 68–69; John Merrills, ‘The Means of Dispute Settlement’, in Malcolm D. Evans 
(ed.), International Law, 4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 564.  
29 See ICJ, the Nicaragua case, para. 290.  
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and are premised on different primary and secondary institutions in different ways.  
 
Negotiation, mediation, inquiry and conciliation  
I shall start by examining methods and techniques underpinned by the primary institution 
of diplomacy: negotiation, mediation, inquiry and conciliation. To start with, negotiation 
is used routinely by states as a means for dispute settlement. Indeed, it is the most basic 
method used for settling international differences and is often employed in combination 
with other methods and techniques.30 Since the outcomes of diplomatic negotiations tend 
to reflect power differentials between parties to disputes, this method is, understandably, 
often preferred by states with a strong bargaining power.31 It is therefore one of the 
methods most likely to be preferred by rising powers in the context of power transition. 
For example, with regard to the South China Sea dispute, China has shown its preference 
for negotiation over judicial settlement including arbitration.32 Diplomatic negotiation 
can be either bilateral or multilateral. When multilateral negotiation among a group of 
states become an established practice, this can be seen as a sign of the emergence of 
multilateralism, which is a derivative primary institution derived from the master primary 
institution of diplomacy.33 Such groupings of states as the G7 and G20 can be viewed as 
manifestations of multilateralism. Mediation is among the most commonly employed 
methods for dispute settlement and is also underpinned by the primary institution of 
diplomacy. It is a method whereby an appointed third party seeks to settle international 
differences by proposing a non-binding solution based on the claims and information 
provided by the parties. 34  The method has been widely used in practice, and its 
                                                   
30 Merrills, ‘Means of Dispute Settlement’, pp. 564–565.  
31 Ibid., p. 565.  
32 See Yu Mincai, ‘China’s Responses to the Compulsory Arbitration on the South China 
Sea Dispute: Legal Effects and Policy Options’, Ocean Development & International Law, 
45/1, 2014, pp. 1–16.  
33 See Buzan, From International to World Society?, pp. 183–184.  
34 Merrills, ‘Means of Dispute Settlement’, p. 566; O’Connor and Bailliet, ‘Good Faith 
Obligation’, p. 74.  
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importance has been reaffirmed in a recent General Assembly resolution.35 When the 
role of the mediator is assumed by a great power, the method of mediation can be said to 
be premised on the primary institution of great power management as well as on 
diplomacy. Such great power mediation can, by virtue of the mediator’s power and 
authority, often facilitate pacific settlement of disputes and mitigate the effect of power 
imbalances between the parties on terms of settlement. On the other side of the coin, the 
great power assuming the role of the mediator might use its position to press for a solution 
which suits its own interest. In short, there is a dilemma between effectiveness and 
impartiality here. Inquiry is a method whereby the parties to a dispute appoint a 
commission of inquiry which will carry out fact-finding inquiry in order to ascertain the 
facts relevant to the dispute. Conciliation is a method that ‘combin[es] inquiry with the 
power to make recommendations’ on terms of settlement.36  Peaceful change can be 
practised in contemporary international society by encouraging states to utilise these 
methods and techniques based on diplomacy and great power management.  
 
Arbitration and judicial settlement  
Peaceful change can also be practised with the help of the primary institution of 
international law. Arbitration and judicial settlement are methods for dispute settlement 
whose effectiveness depends on international law and secondary institutions reflecting 
and reinforcing it, such as the ICJ, the Permanent Court of Arbitration and other arbitral 
tribunals. Significant as they are, these legal methods are not very suitable for settling 
political disputes where one or more of the parties concerned are seeking to challenge 
and change the status quo, and hence not always the best way to manage changes in the 
context of power transition. Indeed, as the recent South China Sea Arbitration clearly 
demonstrated, it is unlikely that rising powers will accept the jurisdiction of international 
                                                   
35  See UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283, UN Doc 
A/RES/65/283, 22 June 2011.  
36 Merrills, ‘Means of Dispute Settlement’, p. 569.  
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courts or tribunals when they believe they can obtain better diplomatic results through 
negotiation. However, the ICJ can still contribute to the management of international 
political change by issuing advisory opinions at the request of the UN General Assembly 
or the Security Council.  
Since arbitration and judicial settlement are established practices of contemporary 
international society, these methods can be seen as derivative primary institutions derived 
from the master primary institution of international law. Categorising these methods as 
institutions is not peculiar to the present study, and it is, in fact, in accord with Martin 
Wight’s conception of institutions. As he remarked:  
 
Arbitration is an institution for the settlement of minor differences between states. 
War is the institution for the final decision of differences.37  
 
Similarly, since the four methods described above—negotiation, mediation, inquiry and 
conciliation—are all established practices of contemporary international society, these 
methods can also be viewed as derivative primary institutions derived from diplomacy 
(and, in the case of mediation, from great power management). The institutionalisation of 
these methods and techniques for dispute settlement has added to the diversity and 
multifariousness of the social structure governing change in contemporary international 
society.  
  
Regional organisations and issue-specific secondary institutions  
In contemporary international society, regional organisations have been increasingly and 
actively engaged in dispute settlement. The importance of regional organisations, which 
can be seen as secondary institutions at the regional level, has been recognised for a long 
time. For example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace emphasised the need 
                                                   
37 Martin Wight, Power Politics, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 112, 
emphasis added.  
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to build a cooperative relationship between the UN and regional organisations, and the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document reaffirmed this point.38  
For example, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the 
African Union (AU), have worked towards achieving peace and security in Africa. 
Although the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was set up by the 
OAU Charter, the OAU had sought to settle disputes and resolve conflicts by employing 
informal methods such as good offices and mediation and by setting up ad hoc committees 
for mediation, as was the case with the border dispute between Algeria and Morocco.39 
In 2004, the AU member states established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which 
is a standing decision-making body tasked with promoting regional peace and security, 
and this can be seen an effort to strengthen the AU’s formal and institutional structure for 
peaceful change.40  
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is another example of 
regional organisations which have contributed to the maintenance of regional peace and 
security. As was the case with the OAU, the member states of ASEAN have placed 
emphasis on informal approaches to dealing with disputes among its members despite the 
                                                   
38 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking 
and Peace-keeping, UN Doc A/47/277, 17 June 1992, paras. 60–65; UN General 
Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN 
Doc A/RES/60/1, 16 September, 2005, para. 170.  
39 See P. Mweti Munya, ‘Organization of African Unity and its Role in Regional Conflict 
Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation’, The Boston College Third 
World Law Journal, 19/2, 1999, pp. 547–553, 556–558. See also Tiyanjana Maluwa, ‘The 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among African States, 1963–1983: Some Conceptual 
Issues and Practical Trends’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 38/2, 1989, 
pp. 307–308. While it is true that the OAU has contributed to the settlement of border 
disputes, it is debatable whether those settlements can be seen as examples of peaceful 
change in view of the fact that most of those settlements were based on the principle of 
uti possidetis juris, that is the recognition of the validity of the territorial status quo.  
40 Whether this organ will be able to play a meaningful role in future dispute settlement 
processes remains to be seen. On the PSC and the challenges it faces, see Paul D. Williams, 
‘The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: Evaluating an Embryonic 
International Institution’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 47/4, 2009, pp. 603–626.  
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fact that ASEAN has formal mechanisms for settling disputes. 41  In this regard, the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) shows a similar trend. 
While there exists the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, it has remained 
inactive since its inception in 1992.42  Instead, the OSCE has focused its efforts on 
conflict management and resolution through field operations and through ad hoc 
frameworks such as the Minsk process and the 5+2 talks on the Transnistrian settlement 
process.43  
The EU has not only been successful in managing disputes among its member states, 
but also has increased its capacity for external actions and, under the Common Security 
and Defence Policy, engaged with processes of conflict prevention and peace building in 
extra-regional countries and areas over the years.44  
These are but some of the examples of regional organisations that have contributed 
to the maintenance of peace and security. The growth in the number of regional secondary 
institutions can be interpreted as a regional expression of the primary institution of 
multilateralism or, to put it another way, a manifestation of multilateralism at the regional 
level. This ‘regional multilateralism’ 45  is one of the features of contemporary 
international social structure.  
                                                   
41  See Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN 
Experience’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 20/1, 1998, pp. 38–66.  
42 For a general account of the Court, see OSCE, Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, 
available at: http://www.osce.org/cca (accessed 3 February 2017).  
43 See OSCE, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, available at: http://www.osce.or
g/conflict-prevention-and-resolution (accessed 3 February 2017).  
44 See European Union External Action, The Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-
policy-csdp_en?page=2 (accessed 3 February 2017). See also Eva Gross and Ana E. 
Juncos (eds), EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Roles, Institutions and 
Policies, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010.  
45 This term has been coined and used by Harris Mylonas and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, 
albeit in a slightly different context. See Harris Mylonas and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, 
‘Regional Multilateralism’, Global Public Square, 14 January 2012, available at: 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/14/regional-multilateralism-should-
be-the-next-paradigm-in-global-affairs/ (accessed 26 July 2017).  
178 
 
These methods, techniques and organisations can help bring about peaceful change 
in contemporary international society, albeit in different ways. Which of these methods is 
the most appropriate way of settling a dispute depends largely on the nature of the dispute 
and the goals pursued by the parties concerned. In some specific issue-areas, there are 
issue-specific arrangements or treaties prescribing specific norms, rules and procedures 
for dispute settlement and international disputes falling within those issue-areas are 
normally dealt with in accordance with those requirements. Examples of such issue-
specific arrangements and treaties include, but are not limited to, the Law of the Sea 
Convention and the WTO dispute settlement system.  
It is noteworthy that there has been an increase in the number of secondary 
institutions in contemporary international society at the regional level, as in the case of 
the EU and the ASEAN, and in some specific issue-areas, as in the case of the WTO and 
the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). As James Crawford remarked:  
 
In clear contrast with Grotius’ view of international law as [secondary] 
institution-less, the 20th century saw the development of a large number of 
[secondary] institutions and the struggle against the ‘ad hoc’: not a struggle 
against the existing conception of arbitration, but rather a struggle against ad hoc 
arrangements for dispute settlement. … So the 20th century has brought 
[secondary] institutions and it has, especially in the last 15 years, brought a vast 
increase in the number of disputes being submitted to these institutions.46  
 
The growth in the number of secondary institutions at the regional level and in some 
specific issue-areas can be interpreted as a manifestation of this struggle for permanence 
in the field of international dispute settlement.  
 Some of the above-mentioned methods or secondary institutions might not seem 
to be particularly relevant to power transition. However, such a view can only be justified 
                                                   
46 James Crawford, ‘Continuity and Discontinuity in International Dispute Settlement: 
An Inaugural Lecture’, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 1/1, 2010, pp. 13–14.  
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on the basis of what may be called the essentialist conception of power transition, which 
sees changes induced by power transition as confined to limited issue-areas and as 
brought about by limited means. While such a conception of power transition may be 
compatible with theories of power transition based on the materialist-individualist 
ontology, it is insupportable from the point of view of the present study which is based 
on the idealist-holist ontology.47 IR theories based on the latter ontological position, 
including constructivism and ES theory on which the present study draws on, have argued 
that states’ interests and identities are constituted and redefined by international social 
structure and that the means by which they pursue their interests and preserve their 
identities is dependent on the character of international social structure.48 If this be the 
case, there are no theoretical reasons to think that some methods of peaceful change are 
irrelevant to power transition. While it is important to distinguish between changes 
induced by power transition and those which are not, it is not possible to assume a priori 
that some issue-areas are essentially connected to the problem of power transition, nor is 
it possible to identify a priori the means or methods by which changes 
are invariably brought about in the context of power transition. As will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapter, rising powers can, and indeed they have, pursued 
widely different goals and they have made use of different methods reflecting different 
primary and secondary institutions for the purpose of obtaining desired changes.  
 
The centrality of the UN system  
As significant as these methods, techniques and organisations are for international dispute 
settlement, it is the UN and, especially, its Security Council that are expected to play a 
central role in promoting the primary institution of peaceful change in contemporary 
                                                   
47 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, pp. 22–33.  
48 Buzan, From International to World Society?; Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics.  
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international society. As discussed in chapter 3, if peaceful change is to be promoted and 
entrenched in international society as a primary institution, it is imperative that it be 
supported and upheld by secondary institutions designed for this purpose, such as the 
League of Nations. This is not to imply that every single primary institution requires the 
support of secondary institutions. However, some primary institutions require the support 
of secondary institutions because they are in tension with other primary institutions. As 
Buzan points out, there can be ‘[t]ensions and contradictions among primary institutions’, 
which could potentially lead to an international socio-structural change.49 As can be 
readily imagined, such a tension is likely to arise when a new primary institution aimed 
at reforming international social structure is emerging. Such was the case with peaceful 
change since it was in tension with the classical primary institution of war at the most 
fundamental level, and it was for this reason that peaceful change needed to be reinforced 
by the League. Moreover, although peaceful change has been established as a primary 
institution in contemporary international society, it is still in need of the support of the 
UN and its Security Council given the fact that states have from time to time resorted to 
war.  
Issue-specific secondary institutions such as the WTO and the ITLOS and regional 
secondary institutions such as the EU, AU and ASEAN may well prove effective in 
settling international disputes that fall within their own jurisdiction, but the development 
of secondary institutions encompassing all issue-areas and regions across the globe is a 
sine qua non in order for peaceful change to be promoted and firmly entrenched in 
contemporary international society as a general primary institution governing 
international political change. The centrality of the UN system in this respect is reaffirmed 
in the above-mentioned Manila Declaration.  
 
Member States should make full use of the provisions of the Charter of the 
                                                   
49 Buzan, From International to World Society?, p. 250.  
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United Nations, including the procedures and means provided for therein, 
particularly Chapter VI, concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes.50  
 
If the UN is expected to play a central role in promoting peaceful change, then how can 
it carry out such a function? What are the provisions of the Charter concerning peaceful 
change and how effective are they? What are the limitations of the current UN system 
with regard to peaceful change? It is to these questions that we now turn.  
 
Peaceful change and the UN Charter  
This section will have a close look at Article 14 and Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which 
are the Charter’s main provisions for peaceful change. I shall compare these provisions 
with some of the provisions in the League Covenant in order to highlight the distinct 
features of the Charter with regard to peaceful change. I shall also consider how those 
provisions of the Charter have been applied in practice and examine how the UN practice 
with regard to peaceful change has developed since its inception in 1945, for mere textual 
exegesis of the Charter would not suffice to present a realistic picture of the UN as it 
exists today.  
 
Article 14 and the General Assembly  
Article 14 falls within Chapter IV of the Charter which defines the powers of the General 
Assembly. The article provides that:  
 
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend 
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which 
it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, 
including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present 
Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.51  
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51 UN Charter, Art. 14.  
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As Markus Zöckler and Donald Riznik explain, Article 14 may appear to confer 
broader powers on the Assembly than did its counterpart in the League Covenant, Article 
19, for the following reasons.52 Firstly, while Article 19 of the Covenant gave the League 
Assembly the right to ‘advise the reconsideration … of treaties which have become 
inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might 
endanger the peace of the world’, Article 14 of the Charter gives the General Assembly 
the right to ‘recommend measures’ necessary for peaceful adjustment. Secondly, while, 
pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Covenant, decisions under Article 19 had to be approved 
by unanimous assent of the member states attending the League Assembly meeting, 
General Assembly decisions under Article 14 of the Charter can be made by two-thirds 
majority vote. Thirdly, whereas Article 19 of the Covenant set limits on the subjects and 
situations which the League Assembly could address, the General Assembly, under 
Article 14 of the Charter, is given the right to address ‘any situation, regardless of origin, 
which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations’, 
including matters concerning treaty revision.53  
While Article 14 of the Charter can be seen as conferring broader powers on the 
General Assembly in these respects, it must be noted that the powers given by Article 14 
to the General Assembly are the powers to make recommendations, which are non-
binding de jure. This is not to say that General Assembly recommendations are 
insignificant; they can even be binding de facto in some cases. Generally speaking, 
General Assembly recommendations are viewed as reflecting the weight of international 
opinion, if not a consensus, among the UN member states, and therefore they carry 
political and moral weight.54  
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After all is said, however, this basic limitation on the power and authority of the 
General Assembly puts it in much the same position as the League Assembly so far as 
peaceful change is concerned. In view of this, Leland Goodrich, who attended the San 
Francisco Conference as the secretary of the committee in charge of drafting the Charter 
provisions on pacific settlement of disputes, wrote in 1947 that ‘the power conferred 
under this Article does not go substantially beyond that of the Assembly under Article 19 
of the Covenant and there is the same chance, if not likelihood, that the United Nations 
will be ineffective as an instrument for treaty revision’.55 In a sense, this is not entirely 
unintentional inasmuch as some delegates to the San Francisco Conference were actually 
against adding provisions for treaty revision. Indeed, some of them sought to and 
succeeded in removing the word ‘treaty revision’ from Article 14 ‘on the ground that it 
would weaken the structure of international contractual obligations which provides the 
basis for orderly relations among the nations of the world’.56 The result of this political 
wrangling is what is known as the Vandenberg Amendment which introduced the phrase 
‘any situation, regardless of origin’.57 It is generally understood that treaty revision can 
be discussed under Article 14, but this episode in the drafting history of the Charter 
reveals the extent to which some statesmen and diplomats had been reluctant to address 
or even talk about the issue of treaty revision. When Argentina floated the idea to discuss 
and review its peace treaty with Italy under Article 14 at the second General Assembly 
session, the Argentine proposal met with opposition from several states which 
emphasised the sanctity of treaties. This was the first ever attempt to invoke Article 14 
for the purpose of treaty revision in the history of the UN, but the proposal to utilise the 
article was eventually withdrawn by Argentina itself.58  
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Despite this inauspicious start, Article 14 has appeared in a number of General 
Assembly resolutions on various topics and issues.59 For example, General Assembly 
Resolution 721(VIII) regarding race conflict in South Africa asked the United Nations 
Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa to carry on its inquiry 
into the racial situation in South Africa in ‘relation to the provisions of the Charter and, 
in particular, to Article 14’.60  
While Article 14 has been invoked, and the language of the article employed, in a 
number of General Assembly resolutions, it has seldom been used as an avenue for treaty 
revision. In fact, the Argentine attempt to invoke it at the second Assembly session is the 
only example of it being used as a means for treaty revision, as far as I can find. Moreover, 
although the article has appeared in a number of General Assembly resolutions, the 
General Assembly usually does not go beyond calling on the parties to a dispute to agree 
to a cease-fire and to commence negotiations with a view to arriving at an amicable 
settlement or adjustment, and it often shies away from making recommendations 
concerning terms of settlement or the principles on which terms of settlement must be 
based. The most prominent example of this approach taken by the General Assembly can 
be found in Resolution 2793(XXVI) adopted in 7 December 1971 against the backdrop 
of the hostilities over the status of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).61 Although this 
resolution, which employed the wording of but did not explicitly refer to Article 14, 
recognised ‘the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of 
the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities’, 
it did not specify or suggest terms of settlement or the principles on which a settlement 
between the belligerents must be based, such as the principle of self-determination, and 
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instead merely ‘[c]all[ed] upon the Government of India and Pakistan to take forthwith 
all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the 
territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders’.62  
In view of these, it has to be admitted that the General Assembly’s track record for 
peaceful change has been by no means satisfactory, and it is therefore necessary to explore 
ways to enhance its capacity to promote and entrench peaceful change in international 
society. However, it must be noted that, under the present Charter, the role of the General 
Assembly in promoting and entrenching peaceful change is secondary to the role of the 
Security Council. Indeed, the Charter explicitly stipulates that the provisions of Article 
14 are subject to Article 12, which means that the General Assembly is obliged not to 
‘make any recommendation with regard to’ the dispute or situation in question while the 
Security Council is dealing with it ‘unless the Security Council so requests’.63 In short, 
it is the Security Council that carries the primary responsibility for promoting and 
entrenching peaceful change in contemporary international society. The Council 
promotes and entrenches the primary institution of peaceful change by facilitating 
peaceful settlement of disputes among states, and it is therefore necessary to look at 
Chapter VI of the Charter which provides for the Council’s powers with regard to peaceful 
settlement of disputes.  
Before moving on to discuss the role of the Security Council, it will be well to pay 
attention to the role that the General Assembly played in entrenching peaceful change 
without recourse to its powers under Article 14 in the context of the North-South divide. 
As is well known among ES scholars, Hedley Bull understood the North-South divide in 
terms of the problem of peaceful change. While Bull held the view that the problem of 
peaceful change had become less prominent as a result of the advent of nuclear weapons 
and other developments in contemporary international society, he was of the view that the 
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problem concerning the establishment and entrenchment of the international practice of 
peacefully revising the status quo remained relevant in the context of decolonisation or 
what he later called ‘the revolt against the West’.64 In a famous lecture in which he 
articulated his understanding of justice in international society, he pointed out that the 
problems posed by the North-South divide were commonly seen as analogous to those 
posed by the rise of the fascist powers.65 As he remarked:  
 
It is common to view the conflict between the Third World and the West as one 
between the values of justice and of order in international relations (just as in the 
interwar period the conflict between the revisionist states, Germany, Italy and 
Japan, and the status quo powers, Great Britain and France, was so regarded).66  
 
Although he thought this was too much of a simplification, he did stress the 
importance of accommodating the demands of the Third World for just changes from the 
point of view of the maintenance of international order.67 Bull took the North-South 
divide very seriously not primarily because he thought this issue was of great moral or 
ethical significance; nor can his worries be fully explained with reference to the concern, 
most clearly expressed by Martin Wight, that decolonisation resulted in the cultural 
fragmentation of international society.68 Bull directed a serious look at the North-South 
divide because he regarded it as an instance of potential power transition. As he remarked:  
 
There is, however, a more disturbing side to these adjustments. The Western 
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countries are asked to accept not merely the ending of their privileges, but also 
a reduction of their power. This is what the revolt against Western dominance is 
chiefly about, more than it is about national self-determination or human rights 
or closing the gap between rich and poor. As the Third World countries develop 
their economies, their societies, their polities and their military strength and 
reduce or eliminate their vulnerability to Western (and Soviet) intervention, they 
will create an international system, the political structure of which will be vastly 
different from that to which the Western peoples have long been accustomed.69  
 
While the problems surrounding the North-South divide have not been completely 
solved, some of those problems have been addressed by the emergence of development 
as a primary institution of international society and by the demise of the primary 
institution of imperialism/colonialism which took place concomitantly. 70  The UN 
General Assembly played a role in this process and assisted in the entrenchment of the 
primary institution of development, for example, by adopting the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and by establishing the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which is a secondary 
institution aimed at redressing the inequalities existing among developed and developing 
countries. While Article 14 of the Charter has remained ineffectual as we have seen above, 
this does not mean that the Assembly has been completely irrelevant to the promotion of 
peaceful change in contemporary international society.71  
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Chapter VI of the UN Charter and the Security Council  
The Security Council is a secondary institution not only reflective of the primary 
institution of peaceful change, but is also responsible for promoting and entrenching it in 
international society; the Council and peaceful change are mutually constitutive in the 
sense that the Council is an integral part of the entrenched practice of peacefully bringing 
about changes in international society and, at the same time, the existence of such a 
practice forms the basis on which the Council carries out its responsibilities with regard 
to international peace and security. What makes this process of mutual constitution 
operative is the Council’s role as an agent of international political change, and the 
Council performs this role via exercise of its powers under Chapter VI (and potentially 
Chapter VII) of the Charter.  
The Charter is based on the principle of free choice of means in the sphere of 
international dispute settlement, and Article 33(1) of Chapter VI obliges the parties to a 
dispute to seek to settle the dispute by ‘peaceful means of their own choice’.72 However, 
the Charter also empowers the Security Council to intervene as a third party and to make 
procedural and/or substantive recommendations for the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes. Under Article 34, the Security Council is entitled to look into ‘any 
dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, 
in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’.73  When the Security 
Council determines that a dispute or situation is of such a nature as to be likely to endanger 
international peace and security, it is authorised, under Article 33(2), to ‘call upon the 
parties to settle their dispute’ by means of their own choice. 74  Alternatively, it is 
empowered under Article 36(1) to ‘recommend appropriate procedures or methods of 
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adjustment’.75 These provisions in the Charter empower the Security Council to make 
procedural recommendations with a view to peacefully settling disputes.  
Furthermore, the Charter authorises the Council to make substantive 
recommendations as well as procedural ones in certain circumstances, and it is this power 
of the Council that is most relevant to our discussion here. As stipulated in Article 37(1), 
the parties to a dispute are obliged to refer the dispute to the Council when they fail to 
settle the dispute by means of their own choice, and, as provided for under Article 37(2), 
the Council may ‘recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate’.76 
In suggesting terms of settlement, the Council may take into account existing legal rights 
and obligations relevant to the dispute, but it is not bound to base its substantive 
recommendations on them. As Hans Kelsen points out:  
 
… the Security Council is authorised to recommend a settlement which might 
involve an infringement upon the rights which the one or the other party has 
under existing international law, if the Security Council considers such 
settlement as ‘just’ or, under Article 37, paragraph 2, as ‘appropriate’.77  
 
There has been a difference of opinion as to the legally binding force of Security 
Council recommendations made under Article 37. On the one hand, Leland Goodrich and 
Edvard Hambro emphasise the non-binding nature of Council recommendations and 
claim that they cannot acquire binding force in any circumstances under the present 
Charter.78 According to their accounts, the delegates to the San Francisco Conference 
agreed that the power of the Council under Article 39 to make binding decisions was 
confined to the domain of enforcement measures pursuant to Article 41 and Article 42, 
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and that the power must be exercised not for the purpose of imposing specific terms of 
settlement, but for the purpose of bringing hostilities between the parties to a conflict to 
an end. 79  According to this interpretation, the Security Council’s powers under the 
Charter are not substantially different from those conferred upon the League Council by 
the Covenant as far as peaceful change is concerned; as with the League Council, the 
Security Council can make substantive recommendations, but they are non-obligatory and 
unenforceable.  
This interpretation is also supported by the following episode in the drafting history 
of the Charter. Since the Dumbarton Oaks draft contained no provisions concerning the 
Council’s power to recommend or determine terms of settlement, the draft was open to 
different interpretations. At the San Francisco Conference, the following two 
amendments were made so as to make it clear that the Council did not have the right to 
determine substantive recommendations and impose them on the parties concerned. 
Firstly, Article 37(2) was added to the draft to make it clear that the Council may only 
recommend terms of settlement after one or more of the parties to a dispute, having failed 
to settle it by means of their own choice, have referred it to the Council for settlement. 
Secondly, the delegates to the Conference decided to remove the provisions in the 
Dumbarton Oaks draft which could be interpreted as suggesting ‘the possibility that 
failure to settle a dispute [by the means and procedures provided for in what later became 
Chapter VI of the Charter] might be deemed a threat to the peace’ by the Council.80 In 
other words, it was agreed that the Council could not regard a failure to settle a dispute 
as constituting a threat to the peace, which is one of the thresholds for invoking Articles 
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41 and 42 for the purpose of implementing enforcement measures.81 Such a change was 
necessary in order to give the delegates to the Conference assurances about the non-
binding nature of Council recommendations for dispute settlement made under what later 
became Chapter VI.82 Such assurances were necessary for securing support from small 
and middle powers, many of which had been sceptical of great power management in the 
wake of the great powers’ (mis)handling of the issue over Sudeten and the Munich 
agreement.83  
On the other hand, many scholars have argued that it is legitimate for the Council 
to take enforcement measures against states when they have declined or rejected a Council 
recommendation made under Chapter VI, and that the recommendation virtually acquires 
binding force in such a case. The most famous and prominent scholar supporting this view 
is Hans Kelsen. Having explained that Council recommendations have no binding force 
in themselves, he goes on to argue that:  
 
However, under Article 39 the Security Council may consider non-compliance 
with its recommendation a threat to the peace and resort to enforcement action 
against the recalcitrant State. If such enforcement action is interpreted to be a 
sanction, a recommendation of the Security Council may constitute the 
obligation to comply with the recommendation, that is to say, the so-called 
‘recommendation’ may have the same character as a ‘decision’ of the Security 
Council, binding upon the members under Article 25. This is of great importance 
in case of a recommendation of terms of settlement.84  
 
While Kelsen’s interpretation of the Charter conflicts with the intentions of some of its 
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drafters, the Council has in practice expressed its readiness to take such a step to ensure 
the effectiveness of its recommendation.85  
Although it is commonly argued that the Council had been ineffective and 
dysfunctional during the Cold War period due to the rivalry amongst its permanent 
members, it is noteworthy that it has more than once adopted resolutions containing 
substantive recommendations. Security Council Resolution 67 adopted in 1949 endorsed 
the establishment of ‘a federal, independent and sovereign United States of Indonesia’ 
and a transfer of sovereignty to this state as the target to be achieved through negotiations 
between the parties, namely the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. It also 
specified the principles on the basis of which negotiations should be conducted and set a 
timetable for achieving this goal. 86  Security Council Resolution 188 adopted on 13 
October 1956–about two weeks before the Israeli attack on Egypt–specified six 
requirements which any settlement of the dispute must respect. 87  Security Council 
Resolution 242 adopted on 22 November 1967 in the wake of the outbreak of the Six-
Day War also specified the principles which must form the basis of ‘the establishment of 
a just and lasting peace in the Middle East’, including ‘[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces 
from territories occupied in the recent conflict’. 88  Security Council Resolution 457 
regarding the Iran hostage crisis emphasised the importance of respecting ‘the 
inviolability of diplomatic personnel and the premises of their missions’ in its preamble 
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and then ‘[u]rgently call[ed] upon the Government of Iran to release immediately the 
personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held at Teheran, to 
provide them with protection and to allow them to leave the country’.89 These resolutions 
can all be viewed as adopted under Article 37(2).  
However, it has to be asked whether these resolutions were successful in promoting 
peaceful change. That the Security Council adopted resolutions aimed at peaceful change 
is one thing, and it is quite another that the Council was effective in bringing about 
peaceful change. According to Steven Ratner, Security Council Resolutions 67 and 242, 
which have been mentioned above, were put to a vote only when the Council was 
informed that the terms of settlement recommended in these resolutions would be 
accepted by the parties concerned. 90  This implies that it is doubtful whether the 
resolutions had any significant influence on the parties’ behaviour.91 As for Resolution 
118, suffice it to say that the Suez crisis can hardly be seen as an instance of peaceful 
change. The Iran hostage crisis was settled peacefully in the sense that it did not lead to 
an armed conflict between the parties, but the role Resolution 457 played in the dispute 
settlement process should not be overstated.92  
During the Cold War period, the Security Council showed the general tendency to 
refrain from issuing substantive recommendations. Instead of recommending terms of 
settlement, it placed a stronger emphasis on bringing disputes under control and keeping 
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conflicts from escalating by calling for a cease-fire.93 Such a tendency on the part of the 
Council evolved in tandem with its increasing reliance on mediation by the Secretary-
General and his special representatives and on peacekeeping operations.94 While these 
mechanisms have contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
Council could, in theory at least, have engaged more actively and proactively with 
processes of conflict resolution by exercising its power under Article 37(2).  
The end of the Cold War ushered in an age characterised by what is often called 
Security Council activism, and the Council has deepened its engagement in the promotion 
and entrenchment of peaceful change. What is remarkable is that the Council has shown 
a greater willingness to engage in the promotion of peaceful change by issuing 
recommendations containing not only calls for a cease-fire but also specific terms of 
settlement. According to Ratner, it ‘has regularly either endorsed or proposed principles 
and terms for settlement of conflicts’, and he cites internal and international conflicts in 
Cambodia, Central American and Southern African states as examples.95 What is even 
more noteworthy is the fact that some Council resolutions containing substantive 
recommendations have on occasion been adopted under Chapter VII. Adopted under 
Chapter VII, Security Council Resolution 824 on the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict 
recognised ‘the unique character of the city of Sarajevo, as a multicultural, multi-ethnic 
and pluri-religious centre’ and Resolution 1031, which was also adopted under Chapter 
VII, endorsed the Dayton Agreement.96 This change is remarkable since it clearly breaks 
away from the traditional understanding and interpretation of the Charter as prohibiting 
the Council from determining and enforcing substantive recommendations on the parties 
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to a dispute.  
While these represent a positive advance in international dispute settlement, it can 
be questioned if they truly represent an advance in the promotion of peaceful change. For, 
in most of the cases mentioned above, the Security Council’s approach was reactive rather 
than proactive in the sense that it took action only after disputes had turned into armed 
conflicts. For this reason, they can be seen as representing not so much peaceful change 
as the failure to bring about peaceful change. In light of this, it is vital that the Security 
Council improve its capacity to act proactively and to prevent disputes from escalating 
into armed confrontation in the first place.  
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the Council would show the same 
willingness to issue substantive recommendations when faced with disputes involving 
one or more rising or great powers. The preceding discussions suggest that the mere 
existence of an institution supporting the practice of peaceful change does not guarantee 
that international political changes, including changes in the context of power transition, 
are always brought about in a peaceful manner. That an institution exists is one thing, and 
that it is effective is another thing. Under the UN Charter, there exists a normative 
agreement in contemporary international society that the Council ought to play a role in 
managing international political change, but the extent to which the Council actually 
impacts on the process of international political change is debatable and needs to be 
empirically observed by means of case studies. A series of crises in Ukraine provides an 
important case study to evaluate the Council’s ability and willingness to manage 
international political change in the context of power transition. Russia’s conduct with 
regard to the crises in Ukraine has posed a fundamental challenge to ‘the ideal of a rule-
governed international order’.97 The long-drawn conflicts in Ukraine may well lead one 
to ask what the Council can do to help bring about a peaceful settlement between the 
                                                   
97 Roy Allison, ‘Russia and the Post-2014 International Legal Order: Revisionism and 
Realpolitik’, International Affairs, 93/3, 2017, p. 519.  
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parties. In fact, there have been contested political debates about the possibility and 
desirability of sending peacekeepers to eastern Ukraine, and the Russian government has 
recently proclaimed its support for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to eastern 
Ukraine.98 The crisis in Ukraine is putting to the test the Council’s ability with regard to 
the promotion and entrenchment of the practice or primary institution of peaceful change 
in the context of power transition.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter started out by discussing how the interwar debate on peaceful change 
reforms our understanding of power transition by underscoring the socio-structural 
conception of power transition underpinning the debate. The socio-structural conception 
of power transition as an institutionally governed process sheds light on the 
multifariousness of institutions governing international political change, highlights the 
relationship between war and international law, and underlines the importance of the role 
of secondary institutions in managing change in international society. The issue raised at 
that stage was whether these insights were applicable to the analysis of power transition 
in contemporary international society. The goal of the subsequent sections was to show 
that those insights have enduring significance for power transition studies since the post-
war international order has been characterised by the entrenchment of non-use of force, 
the institutionalisation of peaceful change, and the development of various methods, 
techniques and institutions that help states practise peaceful change. These developments 
in international social structure strongly indicate the enduring importance of the socio-
                                                   
98  See Mario Baumann, ‘Does Peacekeeping Work in Ukraine’, Russian Analytical 
Digest, 214, 2018, pp. 9–12. Ilaria Zavoli has put forward the idea of deploying a 
peacekeeping mission to eastern Ukraine on the basis of the General Assembly’s 
authorisation. This proposal is a reminder that the Assembly can also play a role in the 
management of international political change in contemporary international society. Ilaria 
Zavoli, ‘Peacekeeping in Eastern Ukraine: The Legitimacy of a Request and the 
Competence of the United Nations General Assembly’, Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law, 22/1, 2017, pp. 147–173.  
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structural conception of power transition. Indeed, it can even be argued that the increasing 
elaborateness and diversity of contemporary methods, techniques and institutions for 
managing international political change not only confirms, but also increases the need for 
the socio-structural perspective.  
Among others, this chapter has emphasised the centrality of the UN Security 
Council in contemporary international social structure governing peaceful change, 
examined in some detail its powers under the UN Charter, and explored its practices with 
regard to peaceful change and how they have changed since the end of the Second World 
War. The Security Council is flawed in many respects, and this is also true as regards its 
role in promoting and entrenching peaceful change in international society. As pointed 
out above, while the Security Council has become relatively more active in the field of 
international dispute settlement, its response has been reactive rather than proactive, and 
hence failed in many cases to bring about international political changes peacefully. 
Despite these limitations on the powers of the Security Council, it nevertheless represents 
a central secondary institution designed and responsible for promoting and entrenching 
peaceful change in contemporary international society. As emphasised in the present 
study, there exists a mutually constitutive relationship between the primary institution of 
peaceful change and secondary institutions reflecting and supporting it, and it is the 
Security Council that is expected to play a major role in this regard in contemporary 
international society. The present chapter has shown that the Security Council carries out 
this function via exercise of its powers under Chapter VI of the Charter.  
Despite this, however, conventional theories of power transition—focused as they 
are on the role of the primary institution of war—have failed to take into account the role 
of the Security Council in managing international political change and that of other 
primary and secondary institutions. On the basis of elements of ES theory, the socio-
structural conception of power transition, and the theoretical insights gained from the 
interwar debate on peaceful change, the next chapter sets out to develop an alternative 
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analytical framework that will enable us to explain the behaviour of rising powers and 
international political change with reference to primary and secondary institutions.  
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Chapter 6  
Reframing Power Transition Theory  
 
 
 
Introduction  
The preceding chapter discussed how the interwar debate on peaceful change challenges 
and reforms our conception of power transition, and considered the theoretical insights it 
offers. Moreover, the chapter showed that the postwar international social structure has 
been characterised by the entrenchment of non-use of force, the institutionalisation of 
peaceful change, and the role of the UN Security Council in managing international 
political change, which strongly indicates the need for the reformed, socio-structural 
conception of power transition if we are to understand the dynamics of power transition 
and international political change in contemporary international society. What is required 
at present is an analytical framework that enables us to examine actual cases of power 
transition from the reformed, socio-structural perspective, i.e. with reference to socially 
and historically constructed international social structure. As discussed in chapter 2, 
knowledge of context is vitally important for the understanding of the behaviour of states, 
including rising powers.  
With this in mind, this chapter sets out to develop an analytical framework for 
examining the relationship between power transition and international social structure via 
integration of elements of ES theory with the insights gained from the interwar debate on 
peaceful change. The framework, which is presented in the form of a series of key 
questions to be addressed in power transition analysis, not only enables us to explain the 
process of international political change in the context of power transition and the 
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behaviour of rising powers in connection with the character of international social 
structure, but also enables us to address normative issues involved in the management of 
power transition. The differing views on peaceful change, as highlighted in chapter 4, 
mean that it is not enough to explain the process of international political change in the 
context of power transition; it is also necessary to address how it should be managed. The 
framework is framed in such a way as to enable us to address this normative question. 
This accords with the ES’s methodological pluralism which, as discussed in chapter 2, 
regards the analytical and the normative as having equal importance to the study of world 
politics. Moreover, as will be discussed in the conclusion of the present study, the 
framework enables us to conduct diachronic and synchronic comparative studies of power 
transition and the behaviour of rising powers in connection with the character of, and 
changes in, international social structure, thereby contributing to the ES’s efforts to 
provide a grand-theoretical perspective on the history of world politics.1  
 
Constructing a framework for analysing power transition  
The following analytical framework, which is presented in the form of six key questions 
to be addressed in power transition analysis, is a heuristic toolkit for guiding inquiry into 
actual cases of power transition. It can be used for producing socio-structural accounts of 
international political change in the context of power transition.  
 
1. What are rising powers’ attitudes towards the status quo of a given international society, 
and how are they affected by primary and secondary institutions?  
The first key question to address is how rising powers in a given international society 
                                                   
1 See Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems 
in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000; Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A 
Comparative Historical Analysis, London: Routledge, 1992.  
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view the status quo. To understand rising powers’ attitudes towards the status quo, it is 
necessary to examine the meanings they attach to it. As Wendt argues, ‘[a] key premise 
of idealist social theory [i.e. idealist-holist theory] is that people act toward objects, 
including each other, on the basis of the meanings those objects have for them’.2 In the 
present context, it is of particular importance whether the rising power or powers in a 
given international society consider the status quo to be desirable and satisfactory, for this 
largely shapes their attitudes towards it.3  As Organski points out, a rising power is 
satisfied with the status quo when it feels that it can benefit from the continued existence 
of the status quo.4 Conversely, a rising power is dissatisfied when it feels or believes that 
it cannot receive much benefit from the continuance of the status quo.  
While rising powers’ attitudes towards the status quo of a given international 
society are largely determined by their feelings and beliefs about it, the standards with 
which they evaluate the status quo are not independent of international social structure. 
ES theory, based as it is on the idealist-holist ontology, views rising powers’ preferences 
and identities as constituted at least partly, if not entirely, by international social 
structure. 5  Rising powers’ satisfaction and dissatisfaction is something that can be 
explained only with reference to their interests, preferences and identities, and these 
cannot be understood without reference to the intersubjective understanding and 
knowledge among states in a given international society as to who they are and what 
constitutes their interests. It is true that how states define their national interests is affected 
by unit-level factors such as the personality of decision-makers and the character of 
                                                   
2  Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, p. 140.  
3  See Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, ‘The End of Hegemony?’, International 
Interactions, 15/2, 1989, p. 117.  
4 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd edn, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968[1958], p. 
366.  
5 See Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and 
the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 
162; Wendt, Social Theory, pp. 22–33.  
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domestic political systems. However, as Wendt argues, interests are also constituted, at 
least to a certain extent, by intersubjectively shared ideas and knowledge among states.6 
In the past, for example, it was commonly held that territorial conquest and expansion 
would bring benefits to states, but this conception of national interests has been largely 
replaced today by the idea that international trade is a better means of pursuing national 
interests. 7  Moreover, it has come to be widely recognised that participation in 
international rule-making and agenda-setting is vitally important for the pursuit of 
national interests.8 In short, national interests and preferences are, in varying degrees, 
socially constructed and historically contingent. The same holds true for state identity 
which also affects states’ attitudes towards the status quo.  
The ES’s ideas of primary and secondary institutions provide a useful framework 
for examining rising powers’ identities and preferences in a given context and for 
monitoring their changes over time. Primary institutions of international society not only 
regulate state behaviour, but are also constitutive of states’ identities and preferences.9 
Primary institutions are not mere recurring patterns of behaviour; they are underpinned 
by the ‘values’ shared by states in a given international society and by ‘the foundational 
normative claims inherent in’ those values.10 Therefore, rising powers’ preferences and 
hence their attitudes towards the status quo in a given historical context need to be 
examined in connection with primary institutions operating in that context.  
Moreover, it is also necessary to examine whether and to what extent secondary 
institutions in a given international society have constitutive effects on rising powers’ 
                                                   
6 Ibid., pp. 1, 113–135.  
7 See Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the 
Modern World, New York: Basic Books, 1986.  
8 See, for example, Zhongtao Zhang, ‘China’s Road to Participate in the International 
Rule-Making’, Canadian Social Science, 12/4, 2016, pp. 51–55.  
9 Buzan, From International to World Society?, pp. 162, 167.  
10 John Williams, ‘Structure, Norms and Normative Theory in a Re-defined English 
School: Accepting Buzan’s Challenge’, Review of International Studies, 37/3, 2011, p. 
1247.  
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identities and preferences. As discussed in chapter 1, secondary institutions can serve as 
‘a site of interest and identity formation’. 11  Moreover, as Kilian Spandler suggests, 
secondary institutions can, through interaction with primary institutions, bring about a 
transformation of international social structure, with constitutive impacts on states’ 
identities and preferences. 12  When ascertaining rising powers’ attitudes towards the 
status quo, it is therefore vitally important to examine the constitutive impacts that 
secondary as well as primary institutions in a given international society have on their 
identities and preferences.  
Having said that, it needs to be reiterated that international social structure do not 
determine rising powers’ identities, interests and preferences. States’ interests and 
identities are also affected by unit level and sub-unit level factors. This means that 
different rising powers in a given international society may make different evaluations of 
the status quo, and may be dissatisfied with different aspects of the existing international 
order for different reasons.  
From the socio-structural perspective, it is vitally important to ascertain what 
exactly rising powers are dissatisfied with on a case-by-case basis. For, as pointed out in 
the preceding chapter, the ways in which international disputes are settled can be different 
in different issue areas. For example, the methods and techniques that are considered 
appropriate for the settlement of territorial disputes can be different from those deemed 
appropriate for the settlement of trade disputes. This suggests that processes of 
international political change in one issue area may be very different from those in another. 
Moreover, the methods, techniques and organisations that are available for dispute 
settlement are better developed in some issue areas than in others. For example, the issue-
area of trade disputes is characterised by the development of sophisticated methods and 
                                                   
11  Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, 
European Journal of International Relations, 3/3, 1997, p. 345.  
12  Kilian Spandler, ‘The Political International Society: Change in Primary and 
Secondary Institutions’, Review of International Studies, 41/3, 2015, pp. 601–622.  
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procedures for disputes settlement. The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, for 
example, provides quasi-judicial procedures that are specifically designed for settling 
trade disputes. By contrast, territorial disputes, which have a direct bearing on state 
sovereignty, tend to be settled through more traditional methods such as diplomatic 
negotiations, and the development of mechanisms specifically designed for resolving 
territorial disputes has been relatively slow.13  To sum up, international disputes are 
settled differently in different issue areas, and, accordingly, processes of international 
political change are managed differently in different issue areas. Therefore, ascertaining 
why the rising power or rising powers in a given international society are dissatisfied is 
vitally important for understanding the process of international political change in the 
context of power transition.  
The significance of this point has tended to be forgotten or neglected in the existing 
literature on power transition. On the contrary, efforts have been made in the opposite 
direction. Woosang Kim, for example, tried to provide an index of states’ dissatisfaction 
with the international order.14 The quantification of states’ dissatisfaction takes priority 
over detailed examination of the sources of their dissatisfaction in his theory of power 
transition. The problem with this way of theorising dissatisfaction is that it can obscure 
the fact that states’ attitudes towards the status quo are usually a mix of satisfaction and 
                                                   
13  That said, some advanced mechanisms for settling territorial disputes do exist in 
contemporary international society such as the United Nations Convention of the Law of 
the Sea, which provides the machinery for settling maritime disputes. Moreover, there has 
been a gradual development in the capacity of regional organisations to deal with 
territorial disputes. For instance, the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) 
and the EU were instrumental in settling territorial dispute among some of their member 
states. See P. Mweti Munya, ‘The Organization of African Unity and its Role in Regional 
Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation’, Boston College Third 
World Law Journal, 19/2, 1999, pp. 537–592; Michael O. Slobodchikoff, ‘How Effective 
are International Organizations at Resolving Territorial Disputes among Member States: 
A Look at the European Union’, Studies of Changing Societies: Comparative and 
Interdisciplinary Focus, 1/2, 2012, pp. 29–59.  
14 Woosang Kim, ‘Alliance Transitions and Great Power War’, American Journal of 
Political Science, 35/4, 1991, pp. 833–850.  
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dissatisfaction and that few states, if any, are willing to reject it in its entirety. Such an 
index can be misleading, for states are usually dissatisfied with certain aspects of the 
status quo, except in rare circumstances in which they are ‘revolutionary’ in the 
Kissingerian sense and seek to destroy the whole established social order.15  
 
2. What are the primary and secondary institutions governing international political 
change in a given international society?  
The next key question is: what are the primary and secondary institutions governing 
international political change in a given issue-area (or areas)? As discussed above, rising 
powers can be dissatisfied with the status quo for different reasons, and international 
disputes are dealt with and settled differently depending on the issue-area. Therefore, it 
is important, first of all, to identify issue-specific institutions governing political change 
in a given issue-area (or areas).  
Having said that, it is equally or even more important to identify the primary and 
secondary institutions governing international political change in all or nearly all issue-
areas. Such institutions may be called general, as opposed to issue-specific, institutions. 
In almost all human societies, be they domestic or international, there are institutions 
governing change that operate across the whole (or nearly whole) range of issue areas. 
Such general institutions set the normative parameters within which actors seek to bring 
about political change in a given society, and it is normally within such parameters that 
issue-specific institutions governing political change are developed. Moreover, general 
institutions provide guides as to how to bring about political change when issue-specific 
institutions become dysfunctional or are non-existent.  
The existence of some general institution for effecting political change is one of the 
basic conditions for the maintenance of social order in any society, be it domestic or 
                                                   
15 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of 
Peace, 1812–22, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964, p. 2.  
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international. Bull fully appreciated this point, arguing that, in any society, the following 
function must be fulfilled by some institution.  
 
(vii) The rules must be capable of adaptation to changing needs and 
circumstances—there must be ways of rescinding or modifying old rules and 
replacing them with new ones.16  
 
Any society has some sort of machinery for fulfilling this function, but the manner 
in which this function is fulfilled is different depending on the society. In modern 
domestic societies, this function is usually carried out by the government in the broader 
sense. As Bull remarks:  
 
(vii) The government may also adapt the rules to changing circumstances and 
demands by having its legislature repeal or amend old laws and enact new ones, 
and by having its administrators execute the law and its judges interpret it in such 
a way as to change its content.17  
 
In international society, however, the same function is carried out not by the world 
government, but by sovereign states ‘in the absence of a universal legislative authority’.18 
In some cases, states try to change the status quo through non-compliance. In other cases, 
they seek to change it through violent and forceful actions. 19  As Bull explains, 
international society ‘is notoriously lacking in mechanisms of peaceful change, 
notoriously dependent on war as the agent of just change’.20 This is one of the reasons 
why he counts war as one of the fundamental institutions of international society 
alongside the balance of power, international law, diplomacy and great power 
                                                   
16 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 4th edn, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 54.  
17 Ibid., p. 56.  
18 Ibid., p. 69.  
19 Ibid., p. 70.  
20 Ibid., p. 183.  
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management.  
That said, it is important to take note of the following three points. First of all, the 
role of the legislature in domestic societies should not be overemphasised. As Henry 
Maine demonstrated, important social changes had been brought about by the judicature 
in some domestic societies. 21  In modern domestic societies, the function of legal 
adaptation or adjustment is carried out not only by the legislature, but also by the judicial 
and executive branches of the government, as Bull points out in the passage quoted above. 
Although international society lacks the world legislature, there do exist international 
judicial institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, and, as Lauterpacht asserted, they can, in theory, play a role in political 
change. Moreover, administrative agreements concluded between governments might 
have some cumulative effect on the status quo of the international order.  
This brings us to the second point: although states have from time to time sought 
to change rules and arrangements by resorting to war, it is by no means the only institution 
governing political change in international society. Indeed, it can even be questioned if 
war can still be regarded as a primary institution for settling disputes and for effecting 
political change in contemporary international society in light of the emergence and 
entrenchment of the primary institutions of non-use of force and peaceful change, as we 
have seen in the preceding chapter. In addition, as discussed in the preceding chapter, 
such primary institutions as international law, diplomacy and great power management 
also play an important role in promoting peaceful change in contemporary international 
society, and there also exist derivative primary institutions such as mediation and 
conciliation. Furthermore, secondary institutions such as international judicial 
organisations and the UN organs also play a role in this regard. Most important in this 
respect is the role of the UN Security Council since, as explained in the preceding chapter, 
                                                   
21 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, 
and its Relation to Modern Ideas, London: J. Murray, 1861.  
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it is a secondary institution specifically designed for promoting the primary institution of 
peaceful change (as well as collective security) in contemporary international society. In 
short, the point is to discard the war/non-war dichotomy, to recognise the diversity or 
multifariousness of institutions governing international political change, and to examine 
the role of primary and secondary institutions that are operating in a given case.  
However, and this is the third point, the existence of the primary institution of 
peaceful change and other institutions supporting it does not necessarily lead to the 
elimination of power and violence from international society. As H.L. Nieburg argues, it 
is often the threat of violence and the fear caused by it that assist political changes in both 
domestic and international societies.22 As he remarks:  
 
The threat of violence, and the occasional outbreak of real violence (which gives 
the threat credibility), are essential elements in conflict resolution not only in 
international, but also in national communities. Individuals and groups, no less 
than nations, exploit the threat as an everyday matter. This fact induces flexibility 
and stability in democratic institutions and facilitates peaceful social change.23  
 
Elements of power and violence are always present in any society, whether it be domestic 
or international. In this point, Carr was on the right. What is important is not how to 
eliminate such elements, but how to manage and regulate them.  
 
3. To what extent and why do rising powers conduct themselves in accordance with the 
primary and secondary institutions governing international political change?  
When considering the process of political change in connection with international social 
structure, it is necessary to examine to what extent and why states follow the norms set 
by the issue-specific institutions governing change in a given issue-area and by the 
                                                   
22  See H.L. Nieburg, ‘The Threat of Violence and Social Change’, The American 
Political Science Review, 56/4, 1962, pp. 865–873.  
23 H.L. Nieburg, ‘Uses of Violence’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7/1, 1963, p. 43.  
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general institutions governing change in a given international society. Whether there exist 
institutions is one thing, how deeply they shape state behaviour is another. As the present 
study is concerned with international political change in the context of power transition, 
it is necessary to consider whether rising powers are observing or, at least, willing to 
observe the norms set by the issue-specific and general institutions governing change in 
a given international society. Rising powers’ attitudes towards the institutions governing 
change in international society is the third point that need to be examined when analysing 
power transition in connection with international social structure.  
The level of conformity to institutional norms among states other than rising 
powers also matters. While it may sound tautological, it is a well-known sociological and 
psychological fact that the power of a social norm is strong when it is actually followed 
by the majority of actors. Conversely, its power can be weak when it is neglected by a 
large number of actors. The same point has been made by a number of prominent IR 
scholars. For example, C.A.W. Manning points out that states follow norms since they 
have no choice but to act in front of what he calls ‘the reference group’, i.e. other members 
of the international society with whom they will have to co-exist and get along with for 
many years and decades to come.24 For another example, James G. March and Johan P. 
Olsen argue that states’ behaviour can be explained in terms of ‘the logic of 
appropriateness’ as well as in terms of ‘the logic of consequences’.25 While it is difficult 
to predict how states will seek political changes in a given situation from their past 
behaviour, there is no denying that the degree of conformity among states is an important 
factor determining state behaviour.  
In this connection, it is also important to understand why states conform to social 
                                                   
24 C.A.W. Manning, ‘The Legal Framework in a World of Change’, in Brian Porter (ed.), 
The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1972, p. 323.  
25 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders’, International Organization, 52/4, 1998, pp. 949–952.  
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norms. Following Buzan’s discussion about the mode of internalisation, it can be argued 
that there are three reasons why social norms are followed: coercion, calculation and 
belief.26 The power of a social norm is weak when states are forced to comply with it. Its 
power is moderate when states act in conformity with it for the reason that it is in their 
interest to do so. The power of a norm is strong when the conformity with it is based on 
the belief that doing so is legitimate and appropriate in a given situation. For example, 
the norms set by what I have called the trinity of international legal norms—the League 
Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the principle of non-recognition—were not respected by 
the rising powers during the interwar period partly because the values underpinning them 
were not internalised deeply enough, as discussed in chapter 3. In the next chapter, I shall 
examine whether and to what extent the norms and standards set by the UN are 
internalised by the rising powers of today.  
The three modes of internalisation are, however, nothing more or less than ideal 
types. In reality, the three logics can operate concurrently. Moreover, as I shall discuss 
shortly, states’ perception of the legitimacy and appropriateness of a social norm is related 
to, if not determined by, their perception as to whether acting in conformity with it would 
generate socially desirable outcomes.  
 
4. Are the existing institutions governing international political change effective?  
It is important to note that positive outcomes do not necessarily follow from states’ acting 
in conformity with the existing institutions governing international political change. The 
next focal point is whether and to what extent such institutions are effective in bringing 
about political change. Effectiveness is here defined as the ability of an institution to 
produce socially desirable outcomes at an acceptable cost. In this context, it refers to the 
ability of an institution to bring about reasonable political changes without seriously 
disrupting the international order. Note that the concept of effectiveness can be applied to 
                                                   
26 See Buzan, From International to World Society?, p. 103.  
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both primary and secondary institutions, and that the effectiveness of a primary institution 
can affect that of a secondary institution reflective and supportive of it, and vice versa.  
The effectiveness of an institution impacts upon its legitimacy. An institution, be it 
primary or secondary, which produces socially desirable outcomes is likely to be 
considered as legitimate by states, and such an institution is likely to be followed by them. 
In contrast, an institution which is ineffective may come to be considered as illegitimate. 
When an institution is considered as ineffective and illegitimate, it may lose its power to 
shape state behaviour, and states may well seek to replace it with some other institution 
that can be expected to produce desired outcomes more effectively. And again, the 
legitimacy of a primary institution can affect that of a secondary institution reflecting and 
supporting it, and vice versa.  
As discussed in chapter 3, war ceased to be regarded by many states as a legitimate 
institution for bringing about change in international society after the First World War. 
This was because it was widely held that war could no longer be resorted to without 
causing socially unacceptable consequences. In other words, the decline in its 
effectiveness in the sense defined here led to the decline of its legitimacy as an institution 
of international society. The decline in the effectiveness and legitimacy of war led to the 
emergence of non-use of force and, subsequently, to the creation of the trinity of the 
Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris and the principle of non-recognition. However, 
the League system based on this trinity proved ineffective in bringing about international 
political change. Article 19 of the Covenant came to be seen as symbolising the 
ineffectiveness of the League system. The League’s ineffectiveness gave rise to the sense 
of grievance on the part of revisionist countries against it and to revisionist efforts to re-
legitimate war as an institution for bringing about change. It remains to be seen whether 
the UN system will prove effective in managing international political change. As shown 
in the preceding chapter, the UN system as it exists is not without problems and in need 
of reform (more on this in the next chapter). This directly leads to the next key question.  
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5. How can international social structure be reformed so as to entrench peaceful change 
in international society in the context of power transition?  
International social structure is by no means immutable. International social structure 
remains the same as long as it is reproduced through states’ practices and actions. The 
transformation of international social structure may be caused by gradual changes in 
human understanding, consciousness, values and morality. Or, alternatively, it may be 
caused as a result of purposeful attempts. If international social structure is mutable, how 
can it be changed for the better? In other words, how should it be modified or reformed 
so as to promote and entrench peaceful change in a given international society in the 
context of power transition? This normative question needs to be addressed especially 
when the effectiveness of the existing institutions governing international political change 
is in doubt.  
The three thinkers discussed in chapter 4 provide three different normative 
positions on this question. Firstly, the Schmittian view suggests that the idea ‘peaceful 
change’ is just a liberal fantasy and that it is absurd to try to eliminate war from world 
politics. On this view, states must strive to bring about changes necessary for their own 
political existence by whatever means necessary, including the use of force. This was the 
course of action taken by revisionist countries in the 1930s, as exemplified by the German 
attempt to establish the Lebensraum or by the Japanese attempt to establish the Great East 
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This view is based on the assumption that war is an important, 
or even integral, part of international social structure. In ES terminology, it can be argued 
that the Schmittian view envisages the creation of a ‘Power political’ international 
society.27 In other words, those who take the Schmittian view would aspire to survive in 
a Hobbesian world ‘based largely on enmity and the possibility of war’.28 As discussed 
in the previous chapter, however, the development of the primary institution of non-use 
                                                   
27 Buzan, From International to World Society?, p. 159.  
28 Ibid., pp. 159–160.  
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of force and its twin derivative primary institutions, i.e. collective security and peaceful 
change, in the postwar international order has made this position socially unacceptable 
and illegitimate. This normative position stands little chance of social acceptance, at least 
for the time being.  
Secondly, the Lauterpachtian view stresses the importance of peaceful change in 
terms of the rule of law in international society, and would suggest that international social 
structure should be strengthened via the development of secondary institutions, both 
general and issue-specific, such as international organisations designed for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, regional organisations, international 
courts and tribunals, and other intergovernmental arrangements designed for dealing with 
specific issues. The effectiveness of a secondary institution can be improved by increasing 
its operational efficiency or by reforming its organisational and legal structure or both. 
On this view, secondary institutions can play an important role in reducing and ultimately 
eliminating the role of war and violence in international political change, thereby 
reinforcing the rule of law in international society. In ES terminology, those who hold the 
Lauterpachtian view can be seen as envisaging the creation of a ‘Cooperative’ or 
‘Convergence’ international society.29  
During the interwar period, there were many people who held views along these 
lines. Arthur Salter, for example, argued that the League system could manage 
international crises and prevent wars, if states were willing to live up to their commitment 
to the principle of collective security under the Covenant.30 Moreover, he suggested that 
peaceful change could be promoted, if the right to the benefit of mutual guarantee and 
collective security could be made conditional on the compliance with recommendations 
approved by the League Assembly and the Council.31  
                                                   
29 Ibid., p. 160.  
30 Arthur Salter, ‘Reform of the League’, Political Quarterly, 7/4, 1936, pp. 467, 478–
479.  
31 Ibid., pp. 475–476. This proposal paralleled the idea floated by Cecil in the drafting 
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Although many people shared the view that the League had to be resuscitated by 
strengthening the machinery for collective security and peaceful change, there were 
different views as to which of the two should take priority. Some argued that peaceful 
change should take precedence over collective security, arguing for the strengthening of 
Article 19 of the Covenant. For example, V. Shiva Ram remarked as follows:  
 
What is needed at the moment is developing the operation of Art. XIX and 
seeking territorial revision in Europe and the colonial world. Without settling 
these issues, no reform of the League is possible which can establish collective 
security.32  
 
However, others held the view that the establishment of an effective collective 
security system took precedence over peaceful change. For example, G.M. Gathorne-
Hardy remarked that ‘I believe that, without collective security, so-called “peaceful 
change” lets in the worst evils and iniquities of war by a side-door’.33 On this view, 
collective security is a precondition for peaceful change. According to Clyde Eagleton’s 
account written in 1937, this was, in fact, the view held by the majority of the member 
states of the League during the 1930s, although some countries such as Hungary and 
Australia maintained that the effective operation of Article 19 had to be the precondition 
for achieving collective security.34 This was reflective of the simple political fact that 
many countries which remained in the League were concerned about the maintenance of 
the status quo.  
From a theoretical point of view, however, this was a chicken-and-egg problem, 
                                                   
process of the Covenant, which was mentioned in chapter 3.  
32 V. Shiva Ram, ‘Reform of the Covenant of the League of Nations’, The Indian Journal 
of Political Science, 1/1, 1939, p. 93.  
33 G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, ‘The League at the Cross-Roads’, International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939), 15/4, 1936, p. 495.  
34 Clyde Eagleton, ‘Reform of the Covenant of the League of Nations’, The American 
Political Science Review, 31/3, 1937, p. 462.  
215 
 
and collective security and peaceful change were in no way opposed to one another. As 
Quincy Wright pointed out, collective security and peaceful change were mutually 
supportive, and the one could not operate effectively when the other remained 
ineffective.35 Moreover, despite the existence of the Schmittian position which rejected 
both collective security and peaceful change and the Carrian position which claimed that 
peaceful change could be promoted without, at the same time, promoting collective 
security, the idea that there existed a symbiotic and mutually reinforcing relationship 
between collective security and peaceful change was, as was discussed in chapter 3, 
shared by many scholars and practitioners in the interwar period, and the League was 
expected to play an important role in promoting and entrenching this institutional 
symbiosis in international society.  
As shown in the preceding chapter, the understanding of the symbiotic relationship 
between collective security and peaceful change and of their mutually constitutive 
relationship between secondary institutions reflecting and reinforcing them is vitally 
important for understanding the role of the UN and, especially, that of the Security 
Council in managing international political change. When faced with the effectiveness 
question in the contemporary context, those who hold the Lauterpachtian view would 
propose reforming the Security Council with a view to enhancing its capacity to bring 
about peaceful change as well as its capacity to implement collective security. This would 
entail amending the UN Charter, especially Chapter VI (and potentially Chapter VII as 
well), since the Council is designed to help states to practise peaceful change via exercise 
of its powers under Chapter VI of the Charter (more on this in the next chapter).  
Thirdly, the Carrian view suggests that peaceful change is both desirable and 
possible, and that the pragmatic way to facilitate peaceful change is not to set up and 
strengthen secondary institutions, but to pursue diplomatic negotiations. On this view, it 
                                                   
35 Quincy Wright, ‘Article 19 of the League Covenant and the Doctrine “Rebus Sic 
Stantibus”’, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual 
Meeting (1921–1969), 30, 1936, pp. 72–73.  
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is primary institutions such as diplomacy and great power management that are the key 
to peaceful change. Moreover, this view does not rule out the possibility of the presence 
or development of issue-specific primary institutions governing change in specific issue-
areas such as the customary law of the sea.36 The Carrian view can be seen as envisaging 
the creation and maintenance of a Coexistence international society.37  
It is well to note that developing primary institutions for political change is not the 
same as falling back on ad hoc or one-off reconciliation of differing state interests. What 
the Carrian view stresses is the importance of establishing ‘a regular system of “peaceful 
change”’ or ‘regular procedure of “peaceful change”’.38 The adjectives ‘pragmatic’ and 
‘ad hoc’ are not synonyms. In order to establish such a regular institution for political 
change, there needs to be expectations between states that disputes between them can and 
will be resolved in a certain way, and such expectations grow not out of a single agreement, 
but out of a continued cooperation. This is why Carr, who argued that the Munich 
agreement was ‘the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major 
international issue by a procedure of peaceful change’,39 remarked rather tentatively as 
follows:  
 
Other aspects of it [the Munich agreement] were, however, less reassuring. Herr 
Hitler himself seemed morbidly eager to emphasise the element of force and to 
minimise that of peaceful negotiation—a trait psychologically understandable as 
a product of the methods employed by the Allies at Versailles, but none the less 
inimical to the establishment of a procedure of peaceful change. … The 
agreement was violently attacked by a section of British opinion. Recriminations 
ensued on the German side; and very soon any prospect that the Munich 
                                                   
36 As discussed in chapter 1, the term ‘primary institution’ refers to some such thing as 
‘an established custom, law, or relationship in a society or community’. Barry Buzan, An 
Introduction to the English School of International Relations, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2014, p. 16.  
37 See Buzan, From International to World Society?, pp. 159–160, 191–192.  
38 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the 
Study of International Relations, London: Macmillan, 1939, p. 272, emphasis added.  
39 Ibid., p. 282.  
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settlement might inaugurate a happier period of international relations in which 
peaceful change by negotiation would become an effective factor seemed to have 
disappeared.40  
 
Another point to note is that the Carrian position, which stresses the role of primary 
institutions, and the Lauterpachtian position, which emphasises the role of secondary 
institutions, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The development of primary 
institutions in a given international society may give rise to the momentum towards the 
development of secondary institutions, and the established secondary institutions in turn 
serve to support those primary institutions. As shown in the preceding chapter, 
contemporary international social structure governing international political change 
combines institutions of both types. The difference between the two positions lies in the 
assessment of the degree of convergence of interests and values in a given international 
society. As will be pointed out shortly, the degree of convergence among states largely 
determines the shape of the social structure of a given international society and its 
potential for development.  
Some readers might intervene at this point, pointing out that one important policy 
choice is missing from the discussion: the policy of containment. Some might point to the 
lesson of Munich, arguing that rising powers must always be contained, not appeased. As 
important as it is, the lesson of Munich in itself does not provide a satisfactory answer to 
the problem of peaceful change. As David Chuter critically points out:  
 
… the Munich myth, especially in its cruder forms, is an argument for always 
fighting (or threatening to fight) rather than negotiating, and always preferring 
violent solutions to compromise. The very concept of negotiation can be 
dismissed as weakness, as was sometimes suggested in the Reagan years.41  
                                                   
40 Ibid., pp. 282–283.  
41 David Chuter, ‘Munich, or the Blood of Others’, in Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser 
(eds), Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations, Providence: Berghahn 
Books, 1998, p. 77.  
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The primary lesson of the myth is that the challenger must be contained and deterred so 
as to impede its attempt to change the status quo. The problem with this lesson is that it 
does not distinguish reasonable demands for change from unreasonable ones. Therefore, 
the policy of containment needs to be coupled or combined with other mechanisms or 
institutions for bringing about just change.  
The tripartite normative distinction formulated above is useful for considering how 
the existing international social structure can be made more effective in the context of 
power transition, and I shall apply this distinction as we discuss how to facilitate the 
process of Security Council reform in the following chapter.  
 
6. To what extent do the status quo powers and the rising powers in a given international 
society share common interests and values?  
The preceding question of how to reform the existing international social structure 
governing international political change needs to be addressed from both empirical and 
normative points of view. The last key question concerns the extent to which states, 
especially the status quo powers and the rising powers in a given international society, 
share common interests and values, which not only affects the manner in which the 
dispute or disputes at stake in the context of power transition are settled, but also impacts 
on the shape of international social structure governing change in international society 
and its potential for development in the face of power transition. To put it another way, 
the range and potential development of primary and secondary institutions governing 
international political change in a given international society facing power transition are 
affected, if not determined, by the degree of common interests and values amongst the 
challengers and the challenged. In addition, it is to be noted that, as was discussed earlier 
in the present chapter, states’ interests, values and identities are not shaped independently 
of the existing primary and secondary institutions.  
At the minimum, there needs to be what Bull calls ‘a sense of common interests in 
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the elementary goals of social life’ or what Carr calls ‘a certain measure of common 
feeling as to what is just and reasonable’ among states, especially among those with the 
power to shape and re-shape the international social structure, if an institutionalisation of 
the process of international political change is to happen.42 In very rare cases in which 
this basic condition is totally absent, such an institutionalisation is not to be expected. The 
process of institutionalisation would be facilitated when states, especially the status quo 
powers and the rising powers, are willing to cooperate with one another and to take 
coordinated actions in pursuit of common interests and values which are not limited to 
co-existence, as in cases in which states form what Mayall calls ‘an enterprise association’ 
with a view to realising a set of fundamental values such as human rights, democracy and 
free market. 43  Generally speaking, the development and maintenance of secondary 
institutions require a greater degree of common interests and values among states, and 
secondary institutions governing change in the context of power transition are likely to 
be robust and effective when they are underpinned by the cooperation among the status 
quo powers and the rising powers. The role of secondary institutions in managing 
international political change in the context of power transition can be significantly 
undermined in the absence of the cooperation on the part of the rising powers. However, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter, recent years have witnessed increasing efforts by 
rising powers to set up and make use of secondary institutions for the purpose of bringing 
about desired changes in the status quo.  
 
A brief commentary on the framework  
The analytical framework set forth above makes frequent use of such words as ‘function’ 
and ‘effectiveness’ which are often been used by functionalist theories in sociology, but 
the present framework needs to be dissociated from functionalism or structural 
                                                   
42 Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 64; Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 279.  
43 James Mayall, World Politics: Progress and its Limits, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, 
p. 21.  
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functionalism in sociology. Functionalism in sociology or what Bull calls ‘“structural-
functionalist” explanation’44 is based on ‘[t]he theory that all aspects of a society serve a 
function and are necessary for the survival of that society’.45 Functionalism in this sense 
is of a conservative nature, for the claim that everything that exists in a society is a 
necessary element for its survival and self-reproduction leads to the spurious legitimation 
of the existing social arrangements and institutions. As Bull explains, arguments of this 
sort are problematic and flawed since the survival of a society, and the maintenance of a 
social order, is just one of many different values and goals pursued by actors in that 
society.46 Similarly, peaceful change is not the only goal pursued by states, and, indeed, 
it is possible that some states in an international society may feel obliged to pursue their 
goals via means incompatible with peaceful change. The present framework allows for 
this possibility by taking note of the Schmittian position on peaceful change.  
 
Conclusion  
Based on the socio-structural conception of power transition as an institutionally 
governed process, the present chapter has developed a framework for power transition 
analysis that emphasises the role of international social structure. The framework enables 
us to explain the attitudes of rising powers towards the status quo and the process of 
international political change in the context of power transition with reference to both 
primary and secondary institutions in a given international society. Moreover, the present 
chapter has brought in the distinction between issue-specific and general institutions so 
as to increase its analytical leverage. Issue-specific institutions are institutions governing 
international political change in specific issue-areas. The presence of issue-specific 
institutions is reflective of the fact that there exist various kinds of issues in world politics 
                                                   
44 Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 72.  
45 Oxford Dictionaries, ‘functionalism’, available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/d 
efinition/functionalism (accessed 16 July 2017).  
46 Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 72.  
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and that disputes are settled differently depending on the issue-area. General institutions, 
on the other hand, govern the process of international political change in a given 
international society regardless of the issue-area.  
Note that the distinction between issue-specific and general institutions cuts across 
the distinction between primary and secondary institutions. Therefore, the two-
dimensional typology, as shown in figure 3, can be derived from the two distinctions. This 
typology allows us to map and locate the institutions governing international political 
change in a given international society. The focus on issue-specific institutions means that 
any analysis of power transition using the present framework must draw up, at least in 
one’s head, its own map when examining the process of international political change in 
a given actual case of power transition. As institutions change over time, there cannot be 
such a thing as the definitive map for understanding institutions governing international 
political change, and so the institutions displayed in figure 3 are samples only.  
The framework developed in the present chapter also sheds light on such issues as 
the influence and effectiveness of institutions governing change in international society, 
and brings up issues concerning reform of international social structure. As we explore 
ways to promote and entrench peaceful change in international society, it is important to 
take note not only of different normative views on peaceful change, but also of the 
existing conditions of world politics, especially the degree to which rising powers share 
General  
Diplomacy  
Great power management  
International law  
Peaceful change  
League of Nations  
UN and its Security Council  
International Court of Justice  
Issue-specific  
Customary law of the sea  
State practice governing 
dynastic succession and 
marriage  
WTO  
PKOs  
ITLOS  
 Primary  Secondary  
Figure 3: two-dimensional typology for mapping institutions governing change in international society  
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common interests and values with other members of international society. By highlighting 
these key points, the framework facilitates the socio-structural analysis of power 
transition.  
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Chapter 7  
The UN Security Council as Both Object and Agent of 
International Political Change  
 
 
 
Introduction  
Reform of the UN has been greatly debated for years, and, among others, reform of the 
Security Council has always been the focal point of UN reform, both within academia 
and beyond.1 Some of the rising powers in contemporary international society have long 
sought to reform the Council. This chapter analyses the process of Council reform and 
the behaviour of the rising powers active in this issue-area through the framework 
developed in the preceding chapter. The analysis not only explains their behaviour in 
connection with primary and secondary institutions in contemporary international society, 
but also shows that their identities and preferences have been shaped and constituted by 
those institutions. The chapter also addresses how the process of Council reform can be 
facilitated so as to bring about an international political change in this issue-area.  
Moreover, the chapter seeks to question the way in which the debate on Council 
reform has been framed and to reframe the debate on the basis of the conception of the 
Council as both object and agent of international political change. The Council can be 
viewed as an object of international political change since, as discussed below, some 
rising powers have called for reform of the secondary institution; the Council is seen as 
                                                   
1 Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett, ‘Reforming the United Nations’, Foreign Affairs, 
74/5, 1995, pp. 56–71; Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security 
Council Reform, London: Routledge, 2005; Peter Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.  
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something to be changed in response to power shifts. At the same time, however, it is an 
agent of international political change inasmuch as, as discussed in chapter 5, it is 
expected to play an important role in entrenching the practice of peaceful change in 
contemporary international society. It will be argued that the current debate on Council 
reform is problematic from the standpoint of this duality. For the current fixation on issues 
concerning the size and composition of the Council has led to the neglect of the role of 
the Council as an agent of international political change and, consequently, to the failure 
to address the issue of how it can be reformed so as to improve its capacity to maintain 
international peace and security via the promotion of the symbiotic relationship between 
the primary institutions of collective security and peaceful change. The focus on the 
duality of the Council will help reframe the debate, thereby enabling us to deliberate on 
ways to enhance the Council’s capacity in this respect.  
The first section provides an overview of the history of and debate on Council 
reform, focusing on the attitudes of the G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) 
towards Council reform. It focuses on their intentions as well as behaviour with regard to 
Council reform, and, as discussed in chapter 2, this requires attention on the social and 
historical contexts surrounding Council reform. The second section analyses the 
intentions and behaviour of these countries through the framework developed in the 
preceding chapter, demonstrating how they have been affected by international social 
structure. The third section criticises the current Council reform debate as excessively 
focused on the Council’s size and composition, calling for shifting the focus of the debate 
away from them to the Council’s role and effectiveness in promoting the institutional 
symbiosis between collective security and peaceful change in contemporary international 
society.  
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The history of and debate on UN Security Council reform  
Power transitions in contemporary international society: 1945–present  
The title of Paul Kennedy’s book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, nicely captures 
one of the truisms of international relations: that great powers come and go.2 During the 
interwar period, there were seven great powers: the United States, Britain, the Soviet 
Union, France, Italy, Germany and Japan. By the end of the Second World War, the 
number had decreased to two. The new term ‘superpower’ was coined to describe the 
primacy and predominance of the United States and the Soviet Union over other states in 
the postwar international society. It was this bipolarity that characterised world politics 
during the Cold War.  
However, there have been significant power transitions since the end of the Second 
World War, which cannot be captured by the concept ‘superpower’ alone. Germany and 
Japan have successfully recovered from their defeat in the Second World War by actively 
engaging in international trade.3 Their rise as regional and global economic engines led 
to changes in the balance of power within the Western capitalist camp. Although their 
economic growth became sluggish during the 1990s, they have not disappeared from the 
international stage and continue to stand as regional and potential global powers.  
In the past decade or so, the focus of attention has shifted to the rise of the BRIC. 
As is well known, the acronym was coined by Jim O’Neill in his 2001 Goldman Sachs 
report, in which he suggested that these countries be invited to take part in international 
economic decision-making processes which had been dominated by the G7.4 Picking up 
on the subject broached by the report, Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman 
explored long-term implications of the rise of the BRIC for the global economy in another 
                                                   
2 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.  
3 See Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the 
Modern World, New York: Basic Books, 1986.  
4 Jim O’Neill, ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’, Global Economics Paper No: 
66, Goldman Sachs, 30 November 2001, available at: http://www.goldmansachs.com/our 
-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf (accessed 21 July 2017).  
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Goldman Sachs report published two years later. In this report, it was predicted that these 
four emerging economies could surpass the G7 in terms of GDP by 2039.5 Later on, 
South Africa was incorporated in the grouping, and they have come to be called the 
BRICS.  
The emergence of these countries since the end of the Second World War has 
significantly altered the geopolitical realities of world politics, so much so that it would 
be absurd to consult geopolitical maps created in 1945 for the purpose of understanding 
the present situation of the world.  
 
The background to contemporary efforts to reform the Security Council  
Council reform is a political agenda that some of these rising powers in contemporary 
international society have sought to push to the front-burner. The so-called G4 countries 
(Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) have been especially active and assertive in pushing 
Council reform onto the agenda. These countries have often been elected as non-
permanent members of the Council. 6  This can be seen as an indication of public 
recognition of their power and influence in the post-war international society as well as 
of their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, which is one 
of the criteria for selecting non-permanent members, as provided in Article 23(1) of the 
UN Charter. Such intermittent and temporary access to seats in the Council has allowed 
these powers to make themselves heard in processes of international decision- and rule-
making. Ironically enough, however, this has brought home to them that there exists a 
large disparity between permanent and non-permanent members in terms of power and 
                                                   
5 Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, ‘Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050’, 
Global Economics Paper No: 99, Goldman Sachs, 1 October 2003, available at: http://w 
ww.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf (accessed 21 
July 2017).  
6 By way of example, Japan has been elected to a non-permanent seat eleven times since 
it joined the UN in 1956, and Brazil, an original member of the UN, has been elected ten 
times since 1946. See UN, Countries Elected Members of the Security Council, available 
at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp (accessed 4 April 2017).  
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influence, which can be corrected or eliminated only by reforming the Council and by 
becoming permanent members themselves. With this awareness in mind, the four 
countries have come together to form the G4 with a view to pressing forward with Council 
reform.  
While these countries have been most active in promoting Council reform, the need 
for Council reform has been widely recognised by the membership of the UN. The UN 
membership has nearly quadrupled since its inception in 1945, and, as of 2017, the UN 
boasts a membership of 193 countries. On grounds of this huge increase in membership, 
many member states have called for reforms designed to enhance the representativeness 
of the Council.  
In the history of the UN, the following three changes or adjustments have been 
made to the size and composition of the Council in response to changes in world politics. 
Firstly, a decision was reached in the General Assembly in 1963 to increase the Council 
membership from eleven to fifteen by adding four non-permanent seats, and the Charter 
was amended accordingly in 1965.7 At the same time, the non-permanent seats were 
reallocated on the basis of new regional groupings.8 The 1965 Council reform was a 
timely response to the rising tide of decolonisation and the resultant increase in the UN 
membership.9 The second change or adjustment concerns the so-called ‘representation 
question’ of China. As is well known, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1971 
that brought Communist China on board, while expelling Nationalist China from the 
                                                   
7  UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 1991(XVIII), UN Doc 
A/RES/1991(XVIII), 17 December 1963.  
8 The resolution stipulated that five non-permanent members be elected from ‘African 
and Asian States’, one from ‘Eastern European States’, two from ‘Latin American States’, 
and two from ‘Western European and other States’. This formula provided the basis of 
today’s UN regional groups. See UN, United Nations Regional Groups of Member States, 
9 May 2014, available at: http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml 
(accessed 5 April 2017).  
9 Yehuda Z. Blum, ‘Proposals for UN Security Council Reform’, The American Journal 
of International Law, 99/3, 2005, p. 636.  
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UN.10 The third change concerns Russia’s assumption of the permanent Council seat 
previously occupied by the Soviet Union which took place in the wake of the latter’s 
collapse in 1991. 11  These changes and adjustments are by no means insignificant. 
However, given the magnitude of the changes in world politics that have occurred since 
1945, one may well regard them as inadequate. Indeed, no progress has been made as far 
as the expansion of the permanent membership is concerned since 1945, leaving the G4 
countries discontented.  
Contemporary efforts towards and debates on Council reform, which are discussed 
below, are best understood in the context of power shifts in international society. In 
contrast to the focus on the expansion of non-permanent membership in the 1965 Council 
reform which was brought about in the context of decolonisation, one of the most hotly 
debated issues in contemporary debates on Council reform is whether to add permanent 
as well as non-permanent seats to the Council, and the Council reform process and the 
debates thereon have been led, among others, by the G4 countries which have risen to 
become major powers in contemporary international society. The current focus on the 
expansion of permanent membership is reflective of the extent of power shifts that have 
occurred since the inception of the UN as well as of the shared awareness that some 
reforms are necessary in order to accommodate the G4 countries’ demands for change 
with regard to the size and composition of the Council.  
 
The 1991 Gulf War and early efforts to reform the Security Council  
The 1991 Gulf War was a turning point in the history of the Security Council. The war 
vividly showed the Council’s ability and willingness to act decisively in processes of 
international dispute settlement, but it also highlighted the Council’s exclusiveness in 
                                                   
10  UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 2758(XXVI), UN Doc 
A/RES/2758(XXVI), 25 October 1971.  
11 David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of 
the Modern World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 166–167.  
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terms of decision-making.12 Edward Luck and Toby Gati explain the issue foregrounded 
by the Gulf War as follows:  
 
The more active and assertive the council becomes, the more the 150-plus 
member states not on the council will mutter about decisions it makes in their 
name but without their input.13  
 
Although Germany and Japan are regular attendees of the Council as non-
permanent members, neither of them was represented at the Council at the time of the 
Gulf Crisis. Therefore, neither of them could take meaningful part in the decision-making 
process at the Council in the run-up to the war despite their substantial financial 
contributions which largely underwrote the US-led operations against Iraq.14  
The need for Council reform was most strongly felt in Japan, which contributed as 
much as 13 billion US dollars for the implementation of the UN-authorised and US-led 
campaign in the Gulf region.15 The Gulf War left the country frustrated because it had 
been unable to access information regarding the discussions taking place inside the 
Security Council chamber.16 The war also left the country traumatised since its financial 
contributions, which were by no means insignificant in amount, were not well-received 
and actually went unappreciated by other governments. In Japan, this event is vividly 
remembered as the ‘Gulf Shock’.17 The main cause of the Japanese diplomatic failure 
was the lack of contributions in personnel and, since then, it has been hotly debated how 
                                                   
12  Jerzy Ciechanski, ‘Restructuring the UN Security Council’, International 
Peacekeeping, 1/4, 1994, p. 414.  
13 Edward C. Luck and Toby Trister Gati, ‘Whose Collective Security?’, The Washington 
Quarterly, 15/2, 1992, p. 45.  
14 Ibid.; Ciechanski, ‘Restructuring the UN Security Council’, p. 429.  
15 Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of 
Pride or Justice?, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 65–66.  
16 Ibid., p. 66.   
17 Kuniko Ashizawa, ‘Japan’s Approach towards Asian Regional Security: From “Hub-
and-Spoke” Bilateralism to “Multi-tiered”’, The Pacific Review, 16/3, 2003, p. 372.  
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the country should make personnel as well as financial contributions to the international 
community—the subject that still informs debates surrounding the amendment of the 
Japanese Constitution. This political agenda has increased awareness of the importance 
of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. For it would be viewed as 
politically insupportable to put the lives of members of Self-Defense Forces at risk in 
military and non-military activities in which the Japanese government has no say. It is no 
accident that Japan has increased its efforts to become a permanent member of the Council 
since the end of the Gulf War.  
However, the need for Council reform was felt also by small and middle powers 
which had misgivings about future Council interventionism. The fear on the part of third 
world countries of great-power management and intervention by means of manipulation 
of the Council was such that many of these countries expressed concern in the wake of 
the Gulf War over the future status of the principle of non-intervention as codified in 
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.18  
Meanwhile the permanent members of the Council were not willing to support 
Council reform in fear of opening a Pandora’s Box and were reluctant to even discuss the 
matter in depth. While the Gulf War prompted emerging and developing countries to call 
for Council reform, the same war was seen by the permanent members as providing a 
rationale for opposing it. The permanent five based their positions on the issue on what 
Dimitris Bourantonis calls the ‘“efficiency” argument’, the reasoning underlying which 
is simple: there is no need to revamp the Council if it is working properly and 
effectively.19 The reluctance on the part of the permanent five to broach and address this 
delicate subject manifested itself in their handling of the question concerning the status 
of the Soviet seat in the Council in the wake of its collapse at the end of 1991. When the 
collapse of the Soviet Union raised a question as to what to do with the Soviet seat, the 
                                                   
18 Ciechanski, ‘Restructuring the UN Security Council’, p. 415; Luck and Gati, ‘Whose 
Collective Security?’, pp. 45–46.  
19 Bourantonis, History and Politics, p. 36.  
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permanent five collaboratively saw to it that this question was settled before it sparked 
wider debates over the size and composition of the Council.20 At the initiative of British 
Prime Minister John Major, the first ever Security Council summit was convened in 
January 1992. The summit meeting was characterised by what Dimitris Bourantonis and 
Georgios Kostakos call the ‘dual agenda’.21 According to them, while the official item 
on the agenda for the meeting was The Responsibility of the Security Council in the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, the permanent five had an agenda of 
their own. The true motive for holding the meeting was to establish that Russia would 
legitimately succeed the Soviet Union as a permanent member, and to present this as a 
fait accompli to the world.22  
The permanent five could pull off this diplomatic manoeuvre rather easily and 
without serious obstruction partly because the General Assembly was in recess when the 
summit meeting took place.23 While other countries had little choice but to acquiesce in 
the permanent five’s decision, it is often pointed out that the period following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union was a window of opportunity for Council reform. As David Bosco 
remarks:  
 
… it is also clear that the moment was a missed opportunity to realign and 
perhaps expand the council. Just as the end of the Second World War had opened 
space for the council’s creation, the end of the Cold War might have allowed 
adjustment to reflect new realities and to refresh the council’s legitimacy with 
the rest of the world.24  
                                                   
20 Russia’s assumption of the permanent seat was also supported by the eleven Soviet 
Republics which gathered in Alma-Ata at the end of December 1991 to declare the 
creation of the CIS. See Yehuda Z. Blum, ‘Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union’s Seat at 
the United Nations’, European Journal of International Law, 3, 1992, pp. 355–356.  
21 Dimitris Bourantonis and Georgios Kostakos, ‘Diplomacy at the United Nations: The 
Dual Agenda of the 1992 Security Council Summit’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11/3, 
2000, pp. 212–226.  
22 Ibid. See also Bourantonis, History and Politics, pp. 41–45.  
23 Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, p. 167.  
24 Ibid.  
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While the summit meeting did not address the question of Council reform, it is 
noteworthy that the discussions at the meeting touched on the need to promote the 
symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change. In his opening 
address to the Council, Prime Minister Major stated that ‘we should today reaffirm our 
attachment to the principle of collective security’ and then went on to declare that ‘we 
should today consider anew the means by which collective security is upheld through the 
United Nations and consider how best to update and to develop them’, pointing out that 
such instruments as preventive action, peacemaking and peacekeeping are available for 
this purpose.25 As shown below, however, the debate on Council reform has failed to pick 
up on this issue and has instead focused its attention on the issue of Council’s size and 
composition.  
 
Increasing momentum towards Council reform  
Notwithstanding the permanent five’s attempts to put Council reform on the back-burner, 
the movement towards Council reform gained momentum from 1992 to 1993. General 
Assembly debate over ‘equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the 
Security Council’ has become a yearly event at the UN since 1979.26 However, the 
General Assembly debate on the question at its 47th session held on 23 November 1992 
was filled by a sense of expectation and urgency. For instance, the representative of India 
argued that most states were convinced that ‘the need for the revitalization and 
restructuring of the Security Council [had] become more urgent than ever before’.27 
Following the debate, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/62 requesting the 
Secretary-General to solicit opinions on Council reform from member states and to 
                                                   
25 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3046th Meeting, UN Doc 
S/PV.3046, 31 January 1992, p. 6.  
26  Bardo Fassbender, U.N. Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A 
Constitutional Perspective, Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 221.  
27 UN General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 69th Meeting of the 47th 
Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc A/47/PV.69, 23 November 1992, p. 12.  
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produce a report containing comments submitted by them.28 The report of the Secretary-
General was published in July 1993. 29  This document provides an overview of the 
attitudes of countries towards the question of Council reform, including those of the G4 
countries. On 3 December of that year, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 48/26 
‘establish[ing] an Open-ended Working Group [hereafter OEWG] to consider all aspects 
of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters 
related to the Security Council’.30 Putting aside the merits of the idea to set up a working 
group, this decision was both reflective and supportive of the increasing momentum 
towards Council reform at that time. It was during this period that countries demanding 
Council reform began to systematically formulate and air their own opinions regarding 
the question. Here, we will have a close look at the opinions expressed during this period 
and afterwards by the G4 countries.  
 
The attitudes of the G4 countries  
As discussed above, the G4 countries’ call for Council reform is best understood in the 
context of power transition. As Hosli and Dörfler remark:  
 
Several countries are ambitious to accede to the Council mainly because of their 
“power” in terms of population size, economic weight or their financial or 
military contributions to the work of the organization, such as Brazil, Germany, 
India and Japan.31 
 
                                                   
28  UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 47/62, UN Doc 
A/RES/47/62, 11 December 1992.  
29 UN General Assembly, Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the 
Membership of the Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/48/264, 
20 July 1993. A total of ten addenda and a corrigendum were later published.  
30  UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly Resolution 48/26, UN Doc 
A/RES/48/26, 3 December 1993.  
31 Madeleine O. Hosli and Thomas Dörfler, ‘The United Nations Security Council: The 
Challenge of Reform’, in Dries Lesage and Thijs Van de Graaf (eds), Rising Powers and 
Multilateral Institutions, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, p. 136.  
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However, power shifts are nothing more than a permissive condition which merely allows 
them to demand such changes. The G4 countries’ behaviour in general, and their attitudes 
to Council reform in particular, cannot be explained solely in terms of their increased 
power and influence in contemporary international society. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
rising powers in the 1930s used their growing military power and political clout not to 
move forward with reform of the League of Nations, but to challenge it. On this account, 
it cannot be claimed that the G4 countries have sought Council reform simply because of 
their growing power, wealth and influence vis-à-vis other countries. Therefore, both 
material and social factors must be sought to explain the behaviour of the G4 countries in 
the context of Council reform. Indeed, as we shall see below, it is their commitment to 
the purposes and principles of the UN that is the key to explaining their behaviour with 
regard to Council reform.  
 
(i) Brazil  
Reflecting its self-identification as a leader of developing countries, Brazil’s original 
stance on the question emphasised the ‘correlation’ between the representativeness of the 
Council, on the one hand, and its authority and effectiveness, on the other.32 At the same 
time, however, it hinted at its ambition of becoming a permanent member, arguing that 
there existed a substantial support in the international community for increasing 
permanent seats on the Council so as to ‘reflect better … the changed international 
situation’.33 In its written comment submitted to the Secretary-General, the Brazilian 
government proposed ‘the idea of entrusting the responsibility of permanent membership 
in the Council to perhaps two additional major industrialized States, as well as to one 
major country from each of the main regions of the developing world’.34 Although it did 
not nominate itself here as a candidate for permanent membership, it was clear that Brazil 
                                                   
32 UN General Assembly, A/47/PV.69, p. 18.  
33 Ibid., p. 21.  
34 UN General Assembly, A/48/264, p. 14.  
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considered itself as a legitimate candidate to represent the Latin American and Caribbean 
Group. Indeed, the fact that there are no permanent members from the Latin American 
and Caribbean group supports Brazil’s bid for permanent membership, although a number 
of rival countries in Latin America deny the claim that Brazil represents the interests of 
the region. 35  Brazil has come to publicly promote its candidacy for permanent 
membership since the creation of the G4. The current Brazilian government underlines 
the importance of reforming the Council so as to accommodate ‘today’s geopolitical 
realities’, and promotes itself as a natural candidate for permanent membership capable 
of ‘perform[ing] greater responsibilities in the field of international peace and security’.36  
 
(ii) Germany  
In the 1990s, Germany was often called a ‘reluctant power’ since the controversy over its 
Basic Law had prevented the country from taking on broader international 
responsibilities.37 Moreover, there are persistent domestic reservations about the use of 
force overseas, as with the case of Japan. 38  Despite these historical and social 
backgrounds, it has consistently expressed its willingness to assume greater responsibility 
in the international community and has promoted itself as a legitimate candidate for 
permanent membership. In 1992, the representative of Germany remarked in the General 
Assembly that ‘all reform efforts must take into account the new reality of the forces of 
international politics’, and, in its written comments submitted to the Secretary-General, it 
                                                   
35 Sabine Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership: The Illusion of 
Representativeness, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, p. 138. See also Oliver Stuenkel, 
‘Leading the Disenfranchised or Joining the Establishment? India, Brazil, and the UN 
Security Council’, Carta Internacional, 5/1, 2010, pp. 53–63.  
36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Brazil and UNSC Reform, available at: http:// 
csnu.itamaraty.gov.br/en/brazil-and-unsc-reform (accessed 31 July 2017).  
37 See Franz-Josef Meiers, ‘Germany: The Reluctant Power’, Survival, 37/3, 1995, pp. 
82–103. See also Jochen Thies, ‘Germany: Europe’s Reluctant Great Power’, The World 
Today, 51/10, 1995, pp. 186–190.  
38 Mark Imber, ‘The Reform of the UN Security Council’, International Relations, 20/3, 
2006, p. 332.  
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was declared that ‘[t]he Federal Government is … prepared to assume the responsibilities 
which permanent membership of the Security Council entails’.39  As Sabine Hassler 
points out, there has been a growing acceptance of the view that ‘[p]ermanent 
membership would not be possible without the Federal Army’s participation in measures 
authorized by the Council, including combat action’,40 but it is equally the case that 
greater participation and involvement in UN activities give rise to a demand for a bigger 
say within the UN. While Germany maintains the stance that its ultimate objective is to 
create a permanent seat for the EU, it has in practice sought permanent membership for 
itself seeing that Britain and France are unlikely to subscribe to such an idea.41  
 
(iii) India  
India has seen itself as a leader of developing countries, as has Brazil as we have seen 
earlier. It has consistently advocated a broader representation on the Council on the 
grounds of the alleged correlation between the Council’s representativeness, on the one 
hand, and its effectiveness and efficiency, on the other, while denying the validity of the 
claim that an increase in the number of seats on the Council would inevitably result in its 
inefficiency.42 The representative of India on the Council has recently stated as follows:  
 
The Security Council, which takes decisions on behalf of “we the peoples”, 
represents an increasingly small minority of the world’s population. If it is to 
make rules for “the peoples”, it needs to adequately reflect new realities.43  
 
                                                   
39 UN General Assembly, A/47/PV.69, p. 22; UN General Assembly, A/48/264, p. 44.  
40 Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership, p. 144.  
41  See Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Reform of the United Nations Security 
Council—Questions and Answers, 10 January 2017, available at: http://www.auswaertig 
es-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/VereinteNationen/05_Reformen/ReformSR 
-Fragen.html?nn=481864 (accessed 26 April 2017).  
42 UN Security Council, S/PV.3046, p. 97; UN General Assembly, A/47/PV.69, p. 16.  
43 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 7857th Meeting, UN Doc 
S/PV.7857, 10 January 2017, p. 71.  
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However, India holds that the Council must not only represents ‘the peoples’, but 
also reflect ‘the present and future dimensions of power’, and that it is a legitimate 
candidate for permanent membership on the Council in light of its growing economy, 
population and future potential as well as in view of its large-scale contributions to UN 
peacekeeping operations.44 Indeed, India is not just a supporter, but a pioneer of the 
present-day UN peacekeeping, 45  and this also strengthens its bid for permanent 
membership. This stance on the question has remained basically the same until today.46  
 
(iv) Japan  
Japan has long been an ardent supporter of UN reform not merely because it wants some 
reward for its financial contributions and wants to eliminate the former enemy clauses in 
the UN Charter,47 but mainly on grounds of its belief that, if the goals of the UN are to 
be achieved, the confidence of its member states needs to be sustained by revamping the 
UN to accommodate changes in world politics, including ‘shifts in global power 
relations’.48 Presumably, of all the written comments submitted to the Secretary-General, 
Japan’s comments make out the most systematic case for a reformed Council inclusive of 
countries with the capacity and willingness to assume global responsibilities.49  This 
should not be surprising given its willingness to play a greater role in the international 
community and its record as a major financial contributor to the UN.  
 
                                                   
44 UN General Assembly, A/48/264, pp. 47–48.  
45  Yeshi Choedon, ‘India’s Perspective on the UN Security Council Reform’, India 
Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 63/4, 2007, p. 19.  
46 See Permanent Mission of India to the UN, India and United Nations: UN Reforms, 
available at: https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1991 (accessed 25 April 2017).  
47  Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership, pp. 141–142. See also 
Rajaram Panda, ‘Japan, Germany and the UN Security Council’, India Quarterly, 48/4, 
1992, pp. 51–70.  
48 UN General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 7th Meeting of the 47th 
Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc A/47/PV.7, 30 September 1992, p. 67.  
49 UN General Assembly, A/48/264, p. 54, paras. 6–7.  
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Commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN  
It is pertinent to the present study to note that all the G4 countries seeking Council reform 
are united in their firm commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN. Their 
stances on the question of Council reform are premised on the shared assumption that the 
Security Council carries primary responsibility for the achievement of the purposes of the 
UN, primary among which is the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
their proposals and plans for Council reform are aimed at enhancing the Council’s ability 
to execute this responsibility. For example, in the 1992 Security Council summit meeting, 
the then Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa remarked as follows:  
 
First of all, I believe that, in securing a peaceful world order, the ideals and 
purposes of the United Nations Charter, which represent fundamental and 
universal values, will be of even greater relevance than ever before. It is 
incumbent on Member States to strive, constantly, to ensure that each of these 
values is respected in practice. At the same time, it is also necessary for the 
United Nations to evolve while adapting to a changing world. … In addition, 
since the Security Council is at the centre of the United Nations efforts to 
maintain international peace and security, it is important to consider thoroughly 
ways to adjust its functions, compositions and other aspects so as to make it more 
reflective of the realities of the new era. This is a process in which Japan is 
prepared to take an active part.50  
 
This oft-quoted remark is but one of many similar ones made by the G4 countries. 
To give another example, the Brazilian government clearly states that its national interest 
is inseparable from the workings and effectiveness of the UN.  
 
For Brazil, the protection of the Security Council’s credibility, to be achieved 
through a comprehensive reform, can be seen as a national goal. In addition to 
posing threats to the international stability, the weakening of the UNSC would 
benefit other arrangements in which the country would have scant influence and 
                                                   
50 UN Security Council, S/PV.3046, pp. 104–105.  
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would be detrimental for the achievements of the last 60 years in terms of 
consolidation of the international law through the UN. Therefore, aware of the 
post-Cold War world order, Brazil must engage actively in the discussions on 
peace and security, notably on the UNSC reform.51  
 
Likewise, Germany and India have also made clear their commitment to the causes 
promoted by the UN and its Security Council as well as their willingness to take on greater 
responsibilities for promoting those causes.52 Japan itself has kept a favourable attitude 
towards the UN. As Peter Nadin argues, ‘Japanese foreign policy is partial to the UN … 
[its] constitution is pacifist in nature, which accords with the spirit of the Preamble and 
Chapter VI of the charter’.53 What does all this mean for the behaviour of these emerging 
and potential global powers with regard to Council reform? This point needs to be 
elaborated in detail, and we shall return to this question later on.  
 
The debate on Security Council reform from the mid-1990s to the present  
On 20 March 1997, the Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail, who was then the President of 
the General Assembly and the Chair of the OEWG, set forth a reform plan which is 
generally known by the name of ‘Razali Reform Paper’. 54  The paper, which was 
presented in the form of a General Assembly draft resolution, proposed the addition of 
five permanent members without the right of veto and four non-permanent members to 
the Council. In spite of his initiative, the proposal and, indeed, the whole plan met with a 
setback in the face of resistance primarily from Italy and the Non-Aligned Movement, 
which did not concur with the idea of adding more permanent members to the Council.55  
                                                   
51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Brazil and UNSC Reform.  
52 See UN General Assembly, A/48/264, pp. 43–44; Permanent Mission of India to the 
UN, India and United Nations: UN Reform.  
53 Nadin, UN Security Council Reform, p. 55.  
54 Razali Ismail, Razali Reform Paper, 20 March 1997, available at: http://csnu.itamaraty. 
gov.br/images/documentos/15._Razali_Reform_Paper.pdf (accessed 27 April 2017).  
55 Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, pp. 202–206; Dimitris Bourantonis and Konstantinos 
Magliveras, ‘The Enlargement of the UN Security Council: Reflections from the Current 
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While the debate on Council reform continued after the failure of the Razali Reform 
Plan, this setback was followed by a short period of relative stagnation, during which 
much of the focus of the international community was on issues surrounding 9/11 and 
war on terror. However, the publication of two important documents gave fresh impetus 
to the debate. In November 2004, a report entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility was published by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
which had been appointed by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.56 The report 
proposed two models for consideration. Model A, on the one hand, provided for the 
addition of six permanent members without the right of veto and three non-permanent 
members. Model B, on the other, proposed the addition of eight four-year seats which 
were renewable and one two-year seat which was non-renewable.57 About half a year in 
advance of the 2005 World Summit to be held in September that year, Annan published 
his own report titled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All.58 In the report, he referred to the two models suggested by the High-level 
Panel and called on the UN member states to deliberate on them with the hope of forming 
a consensus about Council reform preparatory to the summit.59  
In response to Annan’s call for Council reform, the G4 countries, along with other 
like-minded countries, submitted a draft resolution on Council reform, in which it was 
proposed along the lines of the above-mentioned Model A that the Council be expanded 
by adding six permanent and four non-permanent seats.60 As for the issue as to whether 
                                                   
Debate’, Politics, 22/1, 2002, pp. 24–30.  
56 UN General Assembly, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of 
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc A/59/565, 2 December 
2004.  
57 Ibid., pp. 66–69.  
58  UN General Assembly, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/59/2005, 21 March 
2005.  
59 Ibid., pp. 41–43.  
60  UN General Assembly, Draft Resolution on Security Council Reform, UN Doc 
A/59/L.64, 6 July 2005.  
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new permanent members would have the right of veto, the draft resolution suggested that 
‘the new permanent members shall not exercise the right of veto’ and that the issue be 
reconsidered in fifteen years’ time.61 By shelving the issue for the time being, the G4 
countries attempted to assuage concerns that adding more permanent members would 
have adverse effects on the effectiveness of the Council. Following the submission of the 
draft resolution supported by the G4 and other countries, two counterproposals were 
submitted for consideration. On the basis of the common African Union position on UN 
reform, which is known as the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’, a group of African states introduced 
a draft resolution, in which it was proposed that new permanent members enjoy the right 
of veto on equal terms with the existing permanent five.62 The African proposal differs 
from one supported by the G4 countries in this regard, but both groups were united in 
their desire to add permanent as well as non-permanent seats. Another counterproposal 
came from what is widely known as the Uniting for Consensus (hereafter UfC) group, 
which is a group of states opposed to the idea of adding more permanent seats to the 
Council. The draft resolution submitted by the UfC proposed that the Council accept ten 
more non-permanent members with no additional permanent seats. 63  These draft 
resolutions were not put to a vote, and they only served to underscore the deep divisions 
existing between these groups of states. Indeed, it was difficult to reach any substantive 
agreement which would be satisfactory to all parties, and the World Summit Outcome 
Document did nothing more than reaffirm the member states’ support for ‘early reform’ 
of the Council and their commitment to continue negotiations towards this goal.64  
                                                   
61 Ibid., pp. 3–4, emphasis added.  
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Seeing as there existed a wide division of opinion among UN member states on the 
question, it was unlikely that the OEWG would ever be able to play the role of a deus ex 
machina, and its report published in September 2007 contained recommendations to the 
effect that, while the OEWG would continue its work as heretofore, the governments of 
the UN member states should begin intergovernmental negotiations at the General 
Assembly with the goal of moving forward with Council reform.65 The OEWG report 
published the following year yet again called for intergovernmental negotiations and 
specified ‘five key issues’ to be addressed, that is, ‘categories of membership, the question 
of the veto, regional representation, size of an enlarged Council and working methods of 
the Security Council, and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly’ 
(in the Council reform debate, these issues are sometimes referred to as five pillars), and 
the General Assembly gave its assent to the OEWG’s recommendations in its Decision 
62/577.66 Since then until today, UN member states have pursued intergovernmental 
negotiations (frequently abbreviated as IGN) at the General Assembly. Recent 
intergovernmental negotiations have led to identification of a couple of ‘elements of 
convergence’ among member states.67 However, this progress is far from a breakthrough, 
and the IGN show no sign of reaching a substantial agreement.  
In an attempt to press forward with Council reform, the G4 countries have recently 
put energy and effort in cooperation with like-minded countries. At the initiative of the 
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G4 countries, especially India, the Group of Friends on Security Council Reform was 
created in 2016, consisting of the G4, the Committee of Ten (C10), the L.69 group, Nordic 
and East European countries, Britain and France, and the G4 countries continue to call on 
other member states to join this newly formed group committed to the ‘principles of early 
reform, text-based negotiations and the expansion of the Security Council in both the 
permanent and non-permanent category of seats’.68  
 
Analysis of the process of Council reform  
In this section, I will analyse the process of Council reform through the framework 
developed in the previous chapter, with a view to demonstrating the ability of the 
framework to produce socio-structural accounts of rising powers’ behaviour as well as to 
furthering understanding of the process of international political change in this issue-area.  
 
1. What are rising powers’ attitudes towards the status quo of a given international society, 
and how are they affected by primary and secondary institutions?  
As was argued in the preceding chapter, it is vitally important to understand what exactly 
rising powers are dissatisfied with. As has been established in the previous section, the 
G4 countries are dissatisfied with the current state of the Security Council and are united 
in their commitment to its early reform. It is important to draw attention to the simple fact 
that these countries are primarily dissatisfied with the size and composition of the Council. 
They are not dissatisfied with the Council itself, nor are they dissatisfied with its roles 
and mandates. Indeed, as discussed above, the G4’s efforts to move the process of Council 
reform forward are underpinned by their commitment to the purposes and principles of 
the UN, and they have strongly supported the cause of international peace and security 
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by providing personnel and financial assistance. These countries feel impelled to work 
towards the betterment of the Council. This suggests that their identities and preferences 
are at least partly constituted by these secondary institutions as well as by the primary 
institutions underpinning them such as non-use of force, collective security and peaceful 
change.  
This contrasts markedly with the rising powers’ attitudes towards the League of 
Nations during the interwar period. The revisionist states at that time were not only 
dissatisfied with specific powers, mandates and functions of the League, but were 
radically opposed to the League itself. This contrast is reflective of the different levels of 
development of such primary institutions as non-use of force, collective security and 
peaceful change in the respective periods as well as the different degrees of internalisation 
of these institutions and the norms and values they represent. Furthermore, these 
differences account for the difference in the rising powers’ behaviour in the respective 
periods. It is to this point that we turn below.  
 
2. What are the primary and secondary institutions governing international political 
change in a given international society?  
As discussed in the previous chapter, international political change in contemporary 
international society is governed by the primary institutions of non-use of force and 
peaceful change. It is these general institutions that are governing the process of Council 
reform, providing general guides as to how states should pursue their goals with regard 
to Council reform. The modalities of the movement towards Council reform cannot be 
understood without reference to these general primary institutions.  
Within this normative framework, states, including the G4 countries, have thus far 
pursued Council reform with the help of the primary institution of diplomacy. In this 
regard, the movement towards Council reform follows the Carrian model that emphasises 
the role of diplomacy in international political change. However, the movement departs 
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from the Carrian model in that the former has not been governed by the primary institution 
of great power management. Indeed, the permanent five forming the great power club in 
contemporary international society have often been unwilling to discuss the question of 
Council reform, and the debate on Council reform has taken place mainly at the General 
Assembly, not at the Security Council.  
Although sustained efforts have been devoted to Council reform since the Cold War 
period, it is only in the last twenty years or so that the efforts have led to the generation 
of issue-specific institutions governing the process of Council reform. As seen above, the 
OEWG was established in 1993 in order to consider the question of Council reform from 
all perspectives. The OEWG can be regarded as an issue-specific secondary institution 
since it is an intergovernmental arrangement consciously designed to promote discussion 
in this issue-area. At the suggestion of the OEWG, the IGN commenced in 2009 with a 
view to forging a convergence of views and opinions of member states regarding the five 
pillars of Council reform. The IGN are structured negotiations designed to push forward 
with Council reform and, therefore, can be regarded as another issue-specific secondary 
institution governing the process of Council reform.69 These issue-specific secondary 
institutions reflect and support the primary institutions of non-use of force, peaceful 
change and diplomacy.  
Furthermore, the G4 countries’ behaviour in the process of Council reform has been 
governed by the primary institution of multilateralism, which is derived from the primary 
institution of diplomacy.70 This is particularly evident in their recent move to create a 
group of like-minded states, i.e. the Group of Friends. According to the German 
                                                   
69 It is to be noted that, in ES terminology, secondary institutions refer not only to 
intergovernmental organisations, but more generally to ‘intergovernmental arrangements’ 
including international conferences. Barry Buzan, An Introduction to the English School 
of International Relations, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014, p. 17.  
70 See Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and 
the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 
187.  
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representative at the General Assembly, the members of the Group share the triple 
principles of ‘early reform, text-based negotiations and expansion in both categories of 
seats’.71 Reflective of the primary institution of multilateralism, the Group serves to 
reinforce the above-mentioned institutional frameworks governing the process of Council 
reform, especially the IGN.  
 
3. To what extent and why do rising powers conduct themselves in accordance with the 
primary and secondary institutions governing international political change?  
As seen above, states have different opinions on Council reform, but there is a general 
agreement that Council reform should be pursued within the institutional frameworks just 
described. The G4 countries have not only acted within the institutional frameworks, but 
have also led their creation.  
The question here is why this has been the case. In other words, how can we explain 
the compliance pull of those primary and secondary institutions? March and Olsen’s logic 
of consequences and logic of appropriateness provide a helpful framework for 
considering this question.72 From the point of view of the logic of consequences, the 
following three hypothetical answers can be imagined. Firstly, it could be that the 
governments of the G4 countries, after much deliberation, have reached a conclusion that 
the two-track approach that combines consultations of the OEWG and the IGN is the most 
efficient way forward to bring about a Council reform. This answer is implausible 
considering that the approach has produced very few substantial achievements so far. 
Secondly, it could be the case that they, again after much deliberation, reached the view 
that the question of Council reform is not important enough to risk social and/or legal 
punishment by the international community by pursuing it in a more aggressive manner 
                                                   
71 UN General Assembly, Verbatim Record of the 42nd Plenary Meeting of the 71st 
Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc A/71/PV.42, 7 November 2016, p. 7.  
72 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Order’, International Organization, 52/4, 1998, pp. 943–969.  
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that could possibly contravene the norms set by the institutional frameworks governing 
the process of Council reform, including the threat or use of force. This answer is also 
implausible considering the importance that the G4 countries have attached to the 
question of Council reform. The third possible answer is that the G4 countries are 
grudgingly forced to bow to the modality of the current Council reform process for the 
simple reason that they are not powerful enough to make their point through forcible 
measures. Of the three hypothetical answers, this is the least plausible for the reason given 
below and, again, this claim contradicts the fact that it is the G4 countries that have led 
the ongoing Council reform process. This is not to suggest that the behaviour of the G4 
countries is not based on, or being affected by, the logic of consequences. Clearly, their 
behaviour is based on political calculation to a certain extent. However, political 
calculation is not the only determinant of the G4 countries’ policy choices. If we are to 
fully understand the behaviour of these powers, it is necessary to consider how it is 
governed by the logic of appropriateness as well.  
One thing that the G4 countries have in common is, as we have seen earlier, their 
firm commitment to the UN and its purposes and principles. To give another example, in 
the G4 joint press statement on 21 September 2016, ‘[t]he Ministers re-iterated their 
resolve to continue contributing to the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the 
UN Charter’. 73  One might think that their professed commitment is perfunctory or 
tactical at best. However, it is an undeniable fact that these countries have provided 
continual support to the UN in various forms, such as personnel and financial support. 
This is something that cannot be done on a continuous basis were it not for domestic 
public support for the raison d’être of the UN.  
Given the G4 countries’ commitment to the UN and its purposes and principles, 
one can use a simple syllogistic reasoning to extrapolate why these countries have not 
                                                   
73  G4, G4 Joint Press Statement on United Nations Security Council Reform, 21 
September 2016, available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp/page3e_000585.html 
(accessed 10 May 2017).  
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resorted to forcible measures and have instead complied with the norms set by the primary 
and secondary institutions governing this issue-area.  
 
Proposition 1:  the G4 countries are committed to the fundamental principles of the UN;  
Proposition 2:  peaceful settlement of disputes is one of these principles;  
Proposition 3:  therefore, the G4 countries are committed to the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes.  
 
The G4 countries consider Council reform as a means of enhancing the UN’s capacity to 
achieve its purposes and principles, and this is why they pursue Council reform in 
conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. To pursue Council 
reform otherwise would be totally self-contradictory and self-defeating.  
In short, their commitment to the UN is a significant determinant of the G4 
countries’ behaviour with regard to Council reform. From the perspective of ES theory, 
the attitudes of the G4 countries towards Council reform can be interpreted as a sign of 
the development of a Cooperative international society, in which war is no longer 
recognised as a legitimate primary institution governing international political change.74  
 
4. Are the existing institutions governing international political change effective?  
The Council reform process has been progressing at a snail’s pace, and there is a wide 
recognition of the need to break this diplomatic logjam. While the current reform process 
has provided states with opportunities to air different views on the question, it has not 
been effective in producing tangible outcomes, and it is far from clear whether the 
continuation of the ongoing reform process will bear any fruit in the future. In short, the 
existing institutional frameworks governing the process of Council reform are far from 
effective in the sense defined in the preceding chapter.  
                                                   
74 Buzan, From International to World Society?, pp. 193–194.  
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Given the commitment on the part of the G4 countries to the purposes and 
principles of the UN, it is unlikely that the ineffectiveness of the existing institutional 
frameworks will immediately lead them to abandon the ongoing process of Council 
reform. In the long term, however, the diplomatic deadlock may lead them to harbour 
doubts about the legitimacy of some of the primary and secondary institutions governing 
the Council reform process, and this could potentially result in withdrawal of their support 
for the UN in the form of reduction in financial and personnel contributions. This would 
be detrimental not only to the UN, but also to the maintenance of international peace and 
security.  
 
5. How can international social structure be reformed so as to entrench peaceful change 
in international society in the context of power transition?  
How can the prospect of peaceful change be improved in the issue-area of Council 
reform? As already discussed, the threat or use of force is a self-defeating way of bringing 
about Council reform. Besides, such a course of action is not peaceful, nor is it effective. 
Therefore, the Schmittian normative position which, as discussed in the preceding chapter, 
emphasises the role of force in international political change cannot offer any workable 
solutions to the question of Council reform. Given the efforts made so far to improve the 
prospect of peaceful change in this issue-area, it is important to explore, first of all, ways 
to improve the effectiveness of the existing institutional frameworks. Since the Council 
reform process is governed by the issue-specific secondary institutions of the OEWG and 
IGN, as well as by the general primary institutions of non-use of force, peaceful change 
and diplomacy, ways must be found, first of all, to improve the effectiveness of these 
issue-specific secondary institutions, especially the IGN. This means pursuing the course 
of action proposed by the Lauterpachtian position on peaceful change that focuses on the 
role of secondary institutions in international political change.  
One possible way to improve the effectiveness of the IGN is to set a deadline for 
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concluding negotiations and to take a vote after the set negotiation period. However, this 
idea is unlikely to gain much support considering that the General Assembly has decided 
that the IGN process should seek ‘a solution that can garner the widest possible political 
acceptance by Member States’.75 Besides, it would be unwise to set a time limit for such 
an important political decision.  
Another, more realistic, way to improve the effectiveness of the IGN is to advance 
the Council reform process by means of text-based negotiations. In General Assembly 
Decision 69/560 adopted without vote on 14 September 2015, it was decided that the IGN 
be pursued on the basis of the documents circulated by Sam Kutesa, the then President of 
the General Assembly.76 The decision was hailed as a landmark development in the 
history of Council reform.77  However, substantial negotiations based on the Kutesa 
documents are yet to begin, and a large number of states have called for the early 
commencement of, to borrow a German representative’s phrase, ‘real, text-based 
negotiations’.78 Text-based negotiations are the most practical and realistic way available 
at this moment to induce convergence of views with regard to the five pillars of Council 
reform, and this approach currently enjoys broad support from UN member states.  
Invigoration of secondary institutions may have the effect of revitalising primary 
institutions, such as are emphasised by Carr, by inducing states, including great powers, 
to engage in open or behind-the-scenes negotiations and to make compromises outside 
the secondary institutional frameworks mentioned above, and such processes may in turn 
feed into the process of Council reform. As will be discussed below, whether such a 
development would facilitate the process of Council reform depends on the extent to 
                                                   
75 UN General Assembly, Decision 62/557, p. 107.  
76 UN General Assembly, Decision 69/560, UN Doc A/69/49 (Vol. III), 14 September 
2015, p. 265; Sam Kutesa, Letter from the President of the General Assembly dated 31 
July 2015, available at: http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/11/Secu 
rity-Council-reform-IGN-31-July-2015.pdf (accessed 12 May 2017).  
77 See UN General Assembly, Verbatim Record of the 104th Meeting of the 69th Session 
of the General Assembly, UN Doc A/69/PV.104, 14 September 2015.  
78 UN General Assembly, Record of the 42nd Plenary Meeting of the 71st Session, p. 7.  
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which states involved in the process of Council reform share common interests and values.  
 
6. To what extent do the status quo powers and the rising powers in a given international 
society share common interests and values?  
The success of the IGN and text-based negotiations depends on the potential as well as 
existing degree of common interests and values among states in contemporary 
international society. In the IGN process, no state is in a position to force views on other 
states, although there are differences in their negotiating power and influence. Moreover, 
as provided by Article 108 of the Charter, amendments to the Charter require the assent 
of at least two thirds of member states including the permanent five, which can, 
individually or collectively, veto any amendments to the Charter. This necessitates that 
states overcome political differences and strive in good faith to reduce gaps in their 
opinions through the IGN process. Intergovernmental text-based negotiations would not 
only serve as a test of the existing degree of common interests and values among states, 
but also provide opportunities for exploring and furthering common interests and values. 
Finding common ground among the status quo powers and the rising powers pursuing 
Council reform through the IGN process is not a sufficient condition for the success of 
Council reform, but, nevertheless, is an important step towards its realisation.  
I have thus far examined the process of Council reform through the analytical 
framework developed in the preceding chapter, and have explained the behaviour of the 
G4 countries in terms of the preferences and goals they have, the primary and secondary 
institutions governing the Council reform process, the binding power and influence of 
those institutions on the behaviour of those countries, and the effectiveness of those 
institutions in bringing about international political change. I have also discussed how the 
Council reform process can be moved forward, taking into account the present and 
potential conditions of contemporary international society.  
This line of analysis has been made possible by virtue of the socio-structural 
252 
 
conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process and the analytical 
framework based on it. This is something that cannot be done by analysing the process of 
Council reform through traditional theories of power transition that try to explain the 
behaviour of rising powers in terms of changes in international material structure and the 
rising powers’ evaluative attitudes towards the status quo as a whole. Such a theory cannot 
capture complex processes of international political change, which cannot be understood 
in terms of the war/non-war dichotomy. It is only by adopting the socio-structural 
perspective and the framework underpinned by it that the complexity surrounding 
international political change in the context of power transition can be accurately analysed.  
 
Reframing the debate on Council reform  
Fixation with the issue of size and composition and the duality of the Security Council  
As we have seen in the present chapter, many countries, including the G4 countries, have 
pursued Council reform so as to adapt it to changing realities of world politics. In this 
sense, the Council can be seen an object of international political change. When 
addressing the question of Council reform, however, the Council cannot be seen merely 
as an object of change. Council reform is not just about giving a bigger say to rising 
powers or recognising them as great powers; the goal of Council reform, shared by the 
G4 countries, is to enhance the effectiveness of the Council in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and this cannot be achieved without the enhancement of 
its ability to promote the symbiotic relationship between the primary institutions of 
collective security and peaceful change. As discussed in chapter 5, the Council performs 
this function by acting as an agent of change via exercise of its powers under Chapters VI 
and VII of the UN Charter. In view of this, the Council cannot be viewed merely as an 
object of change; it is also an agent of change. Any discussion on Council reform should 
take this duality into account, and, therefore, the debate on Council reform should be 
addressing issues concerning the ways in which the Council exercises its agency and how 
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this can be done more effectively, including in the context of power transition. However, 
the current debate on Council reform has been fixated on issues concerning the Council’s 
size and composition, and issues concerning the Council’s agency with regard to 
promoting peaceful change have been neglected.  
Much of the current debate on Council reform has been fixated on the issues 
relating to its size and composition. This has been so because of the underlying 
assumption or dogma that the effectiveness of the Council in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is a function of its size and composition. This shared 
assumption is evident in justificatory statements, comments and proposals made by states. 
The G4 countries focus on the issues concerning the Council’s size and composition on 
the grounds that an expanded Council with new permanent as well as non-permanent 
members is a sine qua non for the maintenance of international peace and security in 
contemporary international society. This logic is evident in the following statement:  
 
The G-4 leaders stressed that a more representative, legitimate and effective 
Security Council is needed more than ever to address the global conflicts and 
crises, which had spiraled in recent years. They shared the view that this can be 
achieved by reflecting the realities of the international community in the 21st 
century, where more Member States have the capacity and willingness to take on 
major responsibilities with regard to maintenance of international peace and 
security. … The leaders emphasized that the G-4 countries are legitimate 
candidates for permanent membership in an expanded and reformed Council and 
supported each other’s candidature.79  
 
As seen above, some countries have opposed any increase in the permanent 
membership on grounds of fairness and sovereign equality and, therefore, have refused 
to accept the G4’s proposals. However, these countries share the same assumption that 
                                                   
79  G4, Joint Press Statement on United Nations Security Council Reform, 26th 
September 2015, available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000101241.pdf 
(accessed 16 May 2017), emphasis added.  
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the effectiveness of the Council is dependent on its size and composition. For example, 
the Italian diplomat Marcello Spatafora, addressing the General Assembly, commended a 
proposal submitted by the UfC group as a promising plan that could improve the 
Council’s effectiveness since it was grounded in the principles of fairness and equality.80 
It is important to note here that, in the UfC proposal, such notions as fairness and equality 
are understood primarily in terms of the size and composition of the Council.  
Furthermore, many of those who are against any expansion of the Council are 
concerned that an expansion of the Council would seriously undermine its effectiveness, 
and, in this regard, their views are similarly based on the assumption that the effectiveness 
of the Council and its size and composition are connected. The following text from Russet 
et al. nicely summarises such sceptics’ reasoning:  
 
The concern for maintaining an effective Security Council remains central. A 
council hobbled by new veto-wielding or veto-threatening states might not act 
quickly or decisively in a crisis, or perhaps could not act at all. Much the same 
effect could be produced if there were a substantial enlargement of even the 
nonpermanent membership, or a serious increase in the majority threshold.81  
 
In short, the assumption that the effectiveness of the Council in the maintenance of 
international peace and security is a function of its size and composition is shared widely 
across the political spectrum.  
Why has this been the case? Here, I would venture to argue that this is attributable 
to a commonly accepted myth about the failure of the League of Nations. It is often taught 
and widely believed that the League failed to deal with the international crises during the 
1930s for, among others, the following two reasons. Firstly, it is often claimed that the 
                                                   
80  UN Press Release, ‘Uniting for Consensus’ Group of States Introduces Text on 
Security Council Reform to General Assembly, UN Doc GA/10371, 26 July 2005, 
available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/ga10371.doc.htm (accessed 31 July 2017).  
81 Bruce Russett, Barry O’Neill and James Sutterlin, ‘Breaking the Security Council 
Restructuring Logjam’, Global Governance, 2/1, 1996, p. 73.  
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League’s failure is due to the absence of certain major powers, including the United States. 
Secondly, it has been pointed out that the League could not make effective decisions in 
face of the revisionist challenges due to its unanimity rule. If these are believed to be the 
main causes of the League’s failure, and if the UN is understood by analogy with the 
League, it is understandable why the focus of Council reform has been put on the issues 
concerning its size and composition, including the issue of the right of veto. As we have 
seen in chapter 3, however, it was widely discussed during the 1930s that the 
ineffectiveness of the League was primarily due to its inability to effectively promote the 
symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change. Indeed, it was 
issues concerning the promotion of this institutional symbiosis and the role the League 
played in this regard that were most debated among scholars and practitioners in the 1930s. 
The excessive focus on the issues concerning the Council’s size and composition that has 
haunted the current debate on Council reform may be reflective of the failure to appreciate 
this important lesson of history. Since we have discussed in great detail the significance 
of the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change for 
secondary institutions designed for the maintenance of international peace and security 
such as the League and the UN, we are in a good position to consider what it is that is 
truly important for the effectiveness of the Security Council in managing international 
political change, including in the context of power transition.  
To sum it up, the current debate on Council reform is problematic because it has 
failed to address issues concerning the institutional symbiosis between collective security 
and peaceful change, its significance for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and the role that the Council plays in promoting and entrenching the institutional 
symbiosis in contemporary international society. The Security Council is not merely an 
object of international political change, but also an agent of international political change. 
Any reform that fails to recognise the duality of the Council and confines itself to 
tinkering with its size and composition would not bring about a real improvement in its 
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capacity to maintain international peace and security. Such a reform might improve the 
Council’s capacity with regard to collective security. However, collective security is just 
one of the two basic pillars of the maintenance of international peace and security, and it 
cannot be sustained unless it is accompanied by some machinery for peaceful change.  
 
Key issues to be addressed in future debate on Council reform  
This brings us back to the discussion of the Council’s powers under Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter, which we have already touched on in chapter 5. Chapter VI of the Charter 
stipulates the Council’s powers with regard to peaceful settlement of disputes, and it is 
primarily this part of the Charter that provides for peaceful change. As was discussed in 
Chapter 5, the Council has frequently responded to conflicts and crises only after violence 
has set in. Therefore, the Council’s powers under Chapter VI need to be reviewed, and 
strengthened as necessary, so that the Council can respond to conflicts more proactively 
and effectively. At least, the following three interrelated issues need to be addressed in 
future debate on Council reform.  
Firstly, future debate on Council reform needs to address how it is that the Council’s 
capacity to induce states to pursue a peaceful settlement can be improved. As provided 
for in Article 33(1), states party to a dispute ‘likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security’ are under obligation to pursue a peaceful settlement by 
‘means of their own choice’.82 However, it is often extremely difficult for states party to 
a dispute that is genuinely likely to cause major disruption to the international order to 
agree on the means by which the dispute is going to be settled. Failure to agree on the 
mode of dispute settlement may well lead to a political stalemate which, in turn, could 
result in an armed confrontation. In order to forestall such a development, Article 36(1) 
of the Charter stipulates that the Council may ‘recommend appropriate procedures or 
                                                   
82 UN, Charter of the United Nations, Art. 33(1), 26 June 1945, available at: http://www. 
un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html (accessed 26 July 2017).  
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methods of adjustment’.83 However, recommendations of the Council are, by definition, 
legally non-binding. Moreover, there is a traditional interpretation of the Charter that 
stresses the non-enforceability of Council recommendations. According to Goodrich et 
al., ‘the Dumbarton Oaks text was revised to eliminate the provision expressly permitting 
the Security Council to determine that a failure to settle a dispute under Chapter VI was 
a threat to international peace and security’.84 This means that some of the drafters of the 
Charter held that Council recommendations made under Article 36(1) could not be 
enforced by any of the enforcement measures provided for in Chapter VII. This 
interpretation of the relationship between Chapters VI and VII needs to be critically 
reviewed if the Council is to be able not only to respond to, but also to proactively prevent 
the occurrence of, armed conflicts. In view of this, there is room for discussion on what 
the Council can legitimately do to induce parties to a dispute to pursue a peaceful 
settlement.  
The second issue to be addressed in future debate on Council reform, which is 
closely connected to the first one, is whether the Council is entitled to make 
recommendations containing terms of settlement on its own initiative. According to the 
traditional interpretation of Article 37 of the Charter, the Council can recommend terms 
of settlement only after a dispute has been referred to the Council by one or more states 
party to a dispute. This means that the Council is prohibited from proactively engaging in 
dispute settlement by making recommendations containing terms of settlement on its own 
initiative, and that the Council cannot recommend terms of settlement when all of the 
parties concerned are unwilling to refer the matter to the Council. Despite this traditional 
interpretation, some states have opined that the Council can, on its own judgement, make 
                                                   
83 Ibid., Art. 36(1).  
84 Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Isak Hambro and Anne Patricia Simons, Charter of the 
United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd edn, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1969, p. 292.  
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substantial recommendations under Article 37.85 This leaves room for discussion as to 
whether the Council can legitimately make substantial recommendations before a dispute 
has been referred to it.  
Thirdly, future debate on Council reform should address whether the Council may 
legitimately determine terms of settlement and enforce them by means of measures 
provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. Although some of the drafters of the Charter 
held the view that the Council may not take enforcement measures against those 
disregarding its substantive recommendations, Kelsen and others have argued that the 
Council is permitted to do precisely this, as discussed in chapter 5. The answer to this 
question significantly affects the capacity of the Council to manage the process of 
international political change, including in the context of power transition, and on this 
account this legal ambiguity needs to be addressed in future debate on Council reform.  
Future Council reform should explore ways to enhance the Council’s ability to 
bring about peaceful change in contemporary international society, and to this end 
discussion on these interrelated key issues concerning the Council’s powers under 
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter should be made an important part of the agenda of the 
IGN by adding the item entitled ‘the Council’s powers under Chapters VI and VII of the 
UN Charter’ as a sixth pillar to the existing five pillars of Council reform. This move 
would enable future IGN to address how to improve the Council’s capacity as an agent of 
international political change.  
 
Conclusion  
On the basis of the analytical framework presented in the preceding chapter, the present 
chapter has examined the process of UN Security Council reform and the behaviour of 
the G4 countries. The analysis has explained the behaviour of the G4 countries in relation 
                                                   
85 Ibid., p. 285; Thomas Giegerich, ‘Article 37’, in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, 
Georg Nolte and Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 
3rd edn, vol. I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 1154.  
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to the primary and secondary institutions governing political change in this issue-area 
such as non-use of force, peaceful change, diplomacy, multilateralism, the OEWG and 
the IGN. Moreover, the chapter has highlighted the G4 countries’ commitment to the 
purposes and principles of the UN, thereby demonstrating the regulative and constitutive 
effects that the UN and its Security Council as well as the primary institutions 
underpinning these secondary institutions have had on the behaviour, preferences and 
identities of the G4 countries. These findings have been made possible by the use and 
application of the analytical framework that combines elements of ES theory and the 
theoretical insights obtained from the interwar debate on peaceful change, and this is 
something that cannot be achieved by the state-centric, materialist theories of power 
transition which neglect the role of international social structure in power transition and, 
especially, the role of the primary institution of international law and that of secondary 
institutions such as the League of Nations, the UN and other international political and 
judicial organisations.  
The present chapter also considered how the process of Council reform can be 
moved forward, and proposed institutionalising text-based negotiations as a possible and 
realistic way forward to bringing about a Council reform. Improving the effectiveness of 
institutions governing the process of Council reform is not only important for the success 
of Council reform, but also for the long-term effectiveness of the primary and secondary 
institutions governing change in contemporary international society.  
Given the role of the Council in promoting the institutional symbiosis between 
collective security and peaceful change, which is central to the maintenance of 
international peace and security including the management of changes induced by power 
transition, it is also important to consider what kind of Council reform is necessary for 
this purpose. The Council is not only an object of international political change, but also 
an agent of international political change. The excessive focus on the issues concerning 
the Council’s size and composition has had the counterproductive effect of shifting the 
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focus of debate away from the role of the Council as an agent responsible for promoting 
the symbiotic relationship between collective security and peaceful change. With this in 
mind, the present chapter has proposed that the item entitled ‘the Council’s powers under 
Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter’ be added as a sixth pillar to the existing five 
pillars of Council reform and, by doing so, it should be made an important part of the IGN 
process. It is only by addressing this issue that the long-term effectiveness of the Council 
in managing the process of international political change, including in the context of 
power transition, can be enhanced.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
 
By exploring the interface between power transition, peaceful change and reform of the 
UN Security Council, the present study has explored the relationship between power 
transition and international social structure with a view to gaining a better understanding 
of the behaviour of rising powers and international political change in the context of 
power transition. The first section of the conclusion provides an answer to each of the 
secondary research questions set out in chapter 1, and the second section goes on to 
provide an answer to the primary research question. This will be followed by a discussion 
about the significance of the present study for power transition studies. The fourth section 
discusses how the present study can contribute to further research in power transition 
studies and what needs to be done in future research in order to further deepen the 
understanding of power transition.  
 
Power transition, peaceful change and UN Security Council reform  
The present study started with doubts about the explanatory power of the existing major 
theories of power transition and their ontological assumptions. Chapter 1 offered an 
overview of the existing literature on power transition through an examination of the 
major theories of power transition propounded by A.F.K. Organski, Robert Gilpin and 
others, revealing their reliance on the ontological assumptions that have led to the 
conception of rising powers as rational actors acting on the basis of cost-benefit 
calculations and in response to changes in international material structure. As a result of 
these assumptions, much of the extant literature has failed to look at how such factors as 
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state practice, international norms and law, and international organisations (which I have 
referred to collectively as ‘international social structure’) affect the behaviour of rising 
powers and hence the process of international political change. In chapter 1, it was argued 
that such a socio-structural perspective was necessary if we were to fully comprehend the 
behaviour of rising powers in world politics. The present study turned to ES theory, 
especially Barry Buzan’s reformulation of it, for just such a theoretical perspective.  
However, it was also pointed out in chapter 1 that ES theory itself needed some 
reworking to perform analysis of the behaviour of rising powers and the process of 
international political change in the context of power transition since it had not developed 
its own distinctive framework necessary for such an analysis. It was then argued that the 
interwar debate on peaceful change would provide hitherto neglected insights into the 
relationship between international political change and international social structure on 
the basis of which to generate a socio-structural conception of power transition and to 
rework ES theory. Thus the first secondary research question was: what are the key 
insights from the interwar debate on ‘peaceful change’ and how do they, with the help of 
ES theory, reform the conception of power transition and the way we analyse the 
behaviour of rising powers?  
This question was addressed in chapters 2 to 6. Chapter 2 addressed the 
methodology and methods underlying this study and reflected on how power transition 
could be analysed, drawing on the ES’s discussions on methodological pluralism. It was 
argued that power transition needed to be looked at not only from the positivist and 
interpretivist perspectives, but also from the perspective of critical theory so as to keep 
normative issues concerning power transition within reach of this inquiry. Drawing on 
the literature on hermeneutics, the latter part of the chapter addressed how the interwar 
debate on peaceful change should be interpreted, arguing that it needed to be read and 
interpreted in context and in such a way as to modify any preconceptions we might have 
about power transition.  
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Chapters 3 and 4 turned to the interwar debate on peaceful change for key lessons 
and insights for power transition analysis. Chapter 3 took a close look at the debate and 
its historical background, and shed light on the following insights. Firstly, the debate 
illustrated the need to view war as a social practice and therefore as amenable to social 
change and control. It was pointed out that this conception of war accords with the ES’s 
conception of it as a primary institution of international society. Secondly, it was shown 
that the key to eliminating war as an institution of international society is to establish and 
entrench the symbiotic relationship between the primary institutions of collective security 
and peaceful change in international society. Thirdly, the debate showed that the 
entrenchment of this institutional symbiosis requires the support of secondary institutions 
designed for the maintenance of international peace and security such as the League of 
Nations. These insights together provide the basis on which to develop a socio-structural 
conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process. Chapter 4 expanded 
further on the debate by focusing on three different normative views on peaceful change 
and on the expected role of international social structure in international political change. 
The existence of divergent views on this point upholds the claim made in chapter 2 that 
power transition studies cannot just be about the analytical, but must also concern the 
normative.  
On the basis of the discussions in chapters 3 and 4, chapters 5 and 6 set out to 
address the first secondary research question by presenting a socio-structural conception 
of power transition as an institutionally governed process and by developing a framework 
for analysing actual cases of power transition. Chapter 5 started by formulating the socio-
structural conception by recapitulating the insights gained from the interwar debate and 
by comparing the approach underlying the debate with that adopted by much of the 
existing literature on power transition. It then went on to establish that the socio-structural 
conception, based on the insights drawn from the interwar debate, is of enduring 
importance for attempts to understand power transition in contemporary international 
264 
 
society by showing that the postwar international society has been characterised by the 
development of international law governing the use of force, the institutionalisation of 
peaceful change, and the development of the machinery for managing international 
political change, especially the UN and its Security Council.  
Chapter 6 set out an analytical framework on the basis of the socio-structural 
conception of power transition, combining elements of ES theory and the insights gained 
from the interwar debate. The framework was presented in the form of six key questions 
to be addressed in the socio-structural analysis of power transition. The framework drew 
attention to the importance of identifying the sources of rising powers’ dissatisfaction, 
brought the distinctions between the issue-specific/general and primary/secondary 
institutions into power transition analysis, and brought up issues concerning the influence, 
effectiveness and reform of institutions governing change in international society. The 
analytical framework enables production of sociologically and historically rich accounts 
of international political change in the context of power transition.  
Chapter 7 addressed the second and third secondary research questions through 
exploring the duality of the Council with regard to power transition. The second 
secondary research question was: how does the reformed conception of power transition 
enhance the understanding of the behaviour of the rising powers pursuing UN Security 
Council reform? Council reform is certainly one of the most hotly debated topics in 
connection with power transition today, and in this respect the Council can be seen as an 
object of international political change. At the same time, however, the Council is an 
important political actor affecting the process of international political change, and 
therefore it must also be regarded as an agent of international political change. It follows 
that any outcome of Council reform would have significant repercussions on its ability to 
manage international political change, including in the context of power transition. 
Therefore, the third secondary research question was: given the duality of the Security 
Council with regard to power transition, how should the Council be reformed so as to 
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enhance its capacity to manage change in international society, including changes in the 
international status quo in the context of power transition?  
The first two sections of chapter 7 addressed the second secondary research 
question. The first section provided an overview of the history of and debate on Council 
reform, focusing on the goals pursued by the rising and potential global powers active in 
this issue-area, i.e. the G4 countries, and revealing their attitudes towards the issue. The 
second section analysed the process of Council reform and the behaviour of the rising 
powers pursuing this goal through the framework developed in chapter 6, showing that 
the process and their behaviour are governed not only by the general primary institutions 
of diplomacy, non-use of force and peaceful change, but also by issue-specific secondary 
institutions such as the OEWG and the IGN. The analysis demonstrated that the behaviour 
of the G4 countries, especially their compliance with the norms laid down by these 
primary and secondary institutions, can only be explained with reference to their 
commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN and its constitutive as well as 
regulative effects on those countries. In short, it showed how the process of Council 
reform and the behaviour of the rising powers active in this issue-area are shaped by 
international social structure, i.e. institutions of international society. It was also pointed 
out that the institutions governing the process of Council reform are not effective enough 
to bring about a reform of the Council, suggesting that text-based negotiations can serve 
to move forward the Council reform process by providing opportunities for the opinions 
held by the relevant actors to converge.  
The third section then went on to address the third secondary research question by 
reframing the debate on Council reform. It pointed out that the ongoing debate on Council 
reform has been fixated on the issue of size and composition and, therefore, has 
predominantly treated the Council as an object of international political change. In view 
of this, it was asserted that another dimension of the Council as the agent of international 
political change must feature in future debate on Council reform and that Council reform 
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should be carried out in such a way as to improve its capacity to promote and entrench 
the primary institution of peaceful change in contemporary international society. To this 
end it was suggested that the item entitled ‘the Council’s powers under Chapters VI and 
VII of the UN Charter’ be added as the sixth pillar to the existing five pillars of Council 
reform. It is only by doing so that the duality of the Council with regard to power 
transition would be duly addressed in the debate on Council reform.  
To sum up, the interface explored in this study can be summarised as follows. 
Power transition in world politics is not so much a physical phenomenon as a social 
phenomenon since international political change triggered by power transition can only 
be understood with reference to international social structure or, in ES terminology, 
institutions of international society. The interwar debate on peaceful change bolsters this 
conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process and provides both 
theoretical and empirical insights into the relationship between international political 
change and international social structure. One thing that the interwar debate underscores, 
and the analytical framework developed in this study theorises, is the role of secondary 
institutions such as the UN Security Council as agents of international political change. 
This means that it is not enough just to analyse Council reform, which is an important 
issue foregrounded by contemporary power transitions, in connection with the primary 
and secondary institutions governing change in contemporary international society, but 
also necessary to consider how the outcome of Council reform would feed back into the 
Council’s ability as a secondary institution responsible for the management of 
international political change, including in the context of power transition. The three 
themes are not separate but thus interconnected, so much so that it is impossible to arrive 
at a better understanding of power transition and its relationship with contemporary 
international social structure without exploring the interface between them.  
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Rising powers and international social structure  
On the basis of the findings and arguments of the present study, we can now provide 
conclusions to our primary research question, which is: how do primary and secondary 
institutions of international society affect the behaviour of rising powers and hence the 
process of international political change in the context of power transition? The 
conclusions can be stated as follows:  
 
 primary institutions, such as international law and peaceful change, impact on the 
behaviour of rising powers by providing a general socio-structural context in which 
power transition occurs, and by constituting their identities and interests;  
 secondary institutions provide rising powers with a more specific, structured, open, 
multilateral and possibly fair way of negotiating and bringing about political changes 
in the international status quo;  
 some secondary institutions, such as the UN and its Security Council, also act as 
agents of international political change, influencing the behaviour of rising powers 
in varying degrees depending upon their effectiveness, and constituting rising powers’ 
identities and interests;  
 the behaviour of rising powers and the process of international political change in the 
context of power transition are affected not only by the general socio-structural 
context of a given international society, but also by the type, character and 
effectiveness of the primary and secondary institutions governing change in a given 
issue-area or areas at stake.  
 
These conclusions stress the importance of secondary as well as primary 
institutions in the context of power transition in contemporary international society. The 
growing importance of the role of secondary institutions governing international political 
change is reflective of the development of the primary institution of international law and 
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the entrenchment of the primary institution of peaceful change in contemporary 
international society.  
These conclusions do not imply that the behaviour of rising powers is always 
influenced by secondary institutions governing change in international society. Some 
rising powers are reluctant to make use of secondary institutions in the process of dispute 
settlement, as in the case of Russia’s ambiguous attitudes towards the idea of 
peacekeeping in Ukraine and in the case of China’s refusal to settle maritime disputes by 
international judicial means. However, in other issue-areas and contexts, rising powers 
have shown their willing to make active use of secondary institutions in their attempt to 
effect changes in the international status quo, as in the case the G4’s attitudes towards UN 
Security Council reform and, as will be discussed shortly, in the case of BRICS’s attempts 
to reform the international economic governance structure. These phenomena can be 
interpreted as a sign of the existence of contested understandings of the international 
social structure or, alternatively, as a sign of the transition from a Coexistence 
international society to a Cooperative or even Convergence international society, to 
borrow Buzan’s typology of international societies.1  
 
Significance of the present study  
The present study and its findings contribute to the literature on power transition in the 
following ways. Firstly, the present study sets out and supports the socio-structural 
conception of power transition as an institutionally governed process, and presents a 
distinctive way of theorising power transition that radically differs and departs from the 
materialistic, mechanistic, and state-centric conception of power transition prevalent in 
the existing literature on power transition. The present study shows that international 
social structure, as defined in terms of both primary and secondary institutions, have both 
                                                   
1 See Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and 
the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 
159–160, 190–195.  
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regulative and constitutive effects on states including rising powers. In particular, the 
present study demonstrates the significance of the primary institution of international law 
and of secondary institutions designed to maintain international peace and security for 
international political change, including changes in the context of power transition. As 
regards the role of international law, the present study illustrates the institutionalisation 
and codification of the primary institution of peaceful change in contemporary 
international law, and highlights the development of methods, techniques and 
organisations that help states practise peaceful change. As regards the role of secondary 
institutions, the present study reveals the Security Council’s role as an agent of 
international political change, and unravels the mechanism by which it exercises its 
agency via focus on its powers under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. By 
underlining these key points that have been almost totally neglected by much of the 
existing literature on power transition, the socio-structural conception of power transition 
advances a distinctive way of looking at power transition that emphasises the role of 
international social structure.  
Secondly, the present study sets forth an analytical framework for examining cases 
of power transition with reference to international social structure, thereby enabling study 
of power transition from the socio-structural perspective. While the present study has 
examined the case of Security Council reform through this framework, it can be used for 
producing historically and sociologically thick accounts of other cases of, or issues related 
to, power transition and also for conducting comparative analyses of various sorts, as will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
Thirdly, based on the ES’s methodological pluralism, the present study sheds light 
on the inescapable normativity of power transition studies, and the analytical framework 
it sets forth is framed in such a way as to enable the theorist to address both analytical 
and normative issues concerning power transition. The three normative positions on the 
role of primary and secondary institutions governing international political change as 
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formulated in chapter 4 provide a useful framework for normative deliberations in power 
transition studies.  
 
Future research agendas  
In this section, I shall indicate directions in which this study can be furthered in future 
power transition studies.  
 
The case of global economic governance reform  
The analytical framework that the present study set out in chapter 6 can be used for the 
purpose of analysing other specific cases of power transition. For example, it can be used 
as a framework for analysing processes of reform of global economic governance and for 
understanding the behaviour of the rising powers active in this issue-area in connection 
with international social structure. The following is the sketch of what a socio-structural 
account of global economic governance reform would look like.  
The global economic order in the wake of the Second World War was marked by 
the combination of two primary institutions: hegemony and the market.2 Against the 
backdrop of American hegemony, three secondary institutions, namely the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), were created in order to give an institutional expression to the market as a 
primary institution of international society. The Bretton Woods system was based on the 
preponderance of American power and its leadership. In view of this, some scholars of 
international political economy (IPE) claimed that the stability and effectiveness of the 
global economic order crucially depended on the maintenance of American hegemony 
and leadership.3 However, American hegemony underpinning the Bretton Woods system 
                                                   
2 As discussed in chapter 1, Ian Clark has argued for conceptualising hegemony as an 
institution of international society. See Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
3 See, for example, Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, 
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was taken over by multilateralism as Germany and Japan achieved rapid economic 
development through international trade. The relative decline of American power created 
the need to adjust and coordinate the economic policies of the hegemon and those of the 
rising powers so as to maintain and stabilise the global economic order. A series of 
multilateral agreements was reached amongst the United States and the emerging 
economic powers during the 1970s and 1980s, starting with the Smithsonian Agreement 
of 1971. In 1985, the Plaza Agreement was reached by the United States, Britain, France, 
Germany and Japan, i.e. the countries comprising the G5, with a view to adjusting foreign 
exchange rates, and, two years later, these countries and Canada and Italy, i.e. the 
countries comprising the G7, assented to the Louvre Agreement with the goal of 
promoting exchange market stability. Strictly speaking, these are not cases of rising 
powers’ challenging the status quo and the hegemon since it was the United States that 
desired changes in the existing global economic order, from which such countries as 
Germany and Japan had been benefiting greatly. However, as a result of these multilateral 
negotiations, multilateralism as a primary institution for managing the workings of the 
market and for bringing about changes in the field of global economic governance has 
become entrenched in state practice.  
The primary institution of multilateralism, derived as it is from the primary 
institution of diplomacy, continues to operate in the field of global economic governance 
reform. Policy coordination among the G7 and the BRICS has taken the form of the G20, 
which can be seen as a secondary institution reflective of multilateralism. The G20 was 
originally created in response to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 in 
recognition of the limitations of the effectiveness of the G7 framework and of the 
necessity to incorporate emerging economies into decision-making processes in order to 
deal with the contemporary global economic and financial issues.4 Other interconnected 
                                                   
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.  
4 Mark Beeson and Stephen Bell, ‘The G-20 and International Economic Governance: 
Hegemony, Collectivism, or Both?’, Global Governance, 15/1, 2009, pp.74–76.  
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factors also gave impetus to the creation of the G20. For example, the allegation that the 
IMF mishandled the situation during the Asian financial crisis produced a sense of 
discontent amongst developing countries towards the existing global economic 
governance dominated by the G7, and this generated demands for a more representative 
and legitimate global economic order. The G20 was hailed as an avenue for bringing about 
such a change. Moreover, the creation of the G20 almost coincided with the recognition 
of the economic importance of the BRICS. These rising powers were in support of the 
G20 since they were exploring opportunities to engage with international economic rule- 
and decision-making processes, and the G20 appeared as providing just what they wanted. 
The political significance of the G20 was enhanced as a result of the global financial crisis 
of 2007–2008, which, to borrow Ayse Kaya’s phrase, led to the ‘revival of 
multilateralism’.5 The crisis was commonly viewed as making manifest the limitations 
of the Western- and G7-led global economic order. For instance, Wen Jiabao, former 
Premier of China, remarked in January 2009 that the financial crisis had ‘fully exposed 
the deficiencies in the existing international financial system and its governance structure’ 
and that ‘a new world economic order that is just, equitable, sound and stable’ must be 
established. 6  The G20 has been hosting summit meetings in addition to ministerial 
meetings since the crisis of 2008. These developments illustrate the growing importance 
of the primary institution of multilateralism in the field of contemporary global economic 
governance.  
However, it can be questioned whether the G20, which is a secondary institution 
governing reform of global economic governance, is effective enough to deliver on what 
is expected of it by the BRICS. One of the goals pursued by the leaders of the BRICS and 
                                                   
5  Ayse Kaya, ‘Revival of Multilateralism and the Challenges Ahead’, in Global 
Governance Audit, Global Economy & Development Working Paper 49, Brookings, 
January 2012, pp. 19–20.  
6 Quoted in Will Shield, ‘The Middle Way: China and Global Economic Governance’, 
Survival, 55/6, 2013, p. 147.  
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other developing countries represented at the G20 summit meetings was to promote 
infrastructure investment in developing countries, which had declined since the global 
financial crisis. At the 2010 summit meeting held in Seoul, it was declared that the leaders 
of the G20 countries were committed to increasing and promoting infrastructure 
investment in developing countries, but the G20 has overall failed to deliver on the 
commitment and to bring about demanded changes partly because of the lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of the G7 and the World Bank.7 By 2012, it had become clear that 
the G20 was not very effective in terms of the implementation of agreed policies. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of the G20 was questioned since its membership was not based 
on any objective criteria. Based on the recognition of the G20’s ineffectiveness and of the 
lack of its legitimacy, Jakob Vestergaard and Robert H. Wade propose to establish what 
they call ‘the Global Economic Council’ which would oversee the activities of the IMF 
and the World Band and make important decisions on global economic issues.8 The 
essence of the idea is to set up a secondary institution which is stronger than the G20 in 
order to bring about changes in the field of global economic governance.  
However, instead of striving to reform the existing global economic governance 
structures such as the G20 and the Bretton Woods institutions, the BRICS have begun to 
try a different route; they began to establish secondary institutions of their own design 
that would better serve their purposes. At the 6th BRICS summit in 2014, the BRICS 
leaders agreed to establish the New Development Bank, a secondary institution focused 
on infrastructure investment and sustainable development, and the agreement came into 
force in 2015.9 As Gregory Chin explains:  
                                                   
7 Gregory T. Chin, ‘The BRICS-led Development Bank: Purpose and Politics beyond the 
G20’, Global Policy, 5/3, 2014, pp. 368–370.  
8  Jakob Vestergaard and Robert H. Wade, ‘Establishing a New Global Economic 
Council: Governance Reform at the G20, the IMF and the World Bank’, Global Policy, 
3/3, 2012, pp. 257–269.  
9 New Development Bank, ‘Essence: History’, available at: http://www.ndb.int/about-
us/essence/history/ (accessed 21 July 2017). On the New Development Bank more 
generally, see Andrew F. Cooper, The BRICS: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford 
274 
 
Given the obstruction of the infrastructure investment agenda encountered in the 
G20 process, it should not be surprising that the BRICS governments turned to 
creating an alternative institutional option to try to mobilize finance for 
infrastructure in the developing world.10  
 
Along with the Bank, the BRICS leaders have also established the BRICS Contingency 
Reserve Arrangement (CRA), the operation of which can compete with that of the IMF 
in the future.11 In addition to playing a leading role in the establishment of these BRICS-
led economic structures, China has also led the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), which, as its name suggests, is focused on promoting 
infrastructure investment in Asia.12  
These sub-multilateral institutions are not only motivated by economic 
considerations, but also by a sense of political frustration arising from the snail pace of 
reform of the IMF and the World Bank. It is widely believed that the BRICS’s primary 
motivation for establishing these institutions is to provide a set of economic and financial 
arrangements that can act as a counterbalance to the Bretton Woods institutions (and to 
the Asian Development Bank in the case of the AIIB) largely dominated by the G7 and 
other western countries. This might be understood as a manifestation of the shift from 
multilateralism to what Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane call ‘contested 
multilateralism’, which is a concept invented to capture a situation where states utilise 
existing or new multilateral institutions in order to challenge or put a limit on the activities 
and operations of other existing multilateral institutions. 13  In this connection, two 
                                                   
University Press, 2016, pp. 65–81.  
10 Chin, ‘The BRICS-led Development Bank’, p. 370.  
11 On the relationship between the IMF and the CRA, see Nicolette Cattaneo, Mayamiko 
Biziwick and David Fryer, ‘The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and its Position 
in the Emerging Global Financial Architecture’, SAIIA Policy Insights, 10, 2015, pp. 1–
7.  
12 See Xiao Ren, ‘China as an Institution-Builder: The Case of the AIIB’, The Pacific 
Review, 29/3, 2016, pp. 435–442.  
13 See Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Contested Multilateralism’, Review of 
International Organizations, 9/4, 2014, pp. 385–412.  
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potential research questions arise; namely (1) Would the potential or ongoing transition 
from multilateralism to ‘contested multilateralism’ give rise to competing conceptions as 
to how disputes in this issue-area should be managed? (2) Would the development of 
‘contested multilateralism’ extend to other issue-areas, e.g. global security and human 
rights? Contested multilateralism may potentially have the negative effect of producing 
different, even competing understandings as to the role of primary and secondary 
institutions in managing change in international society. If this process extends to other 
issue-areas such as global security and human rights, then this could lead to the 
fragmentation of contemporary international society. The analytical framework 
developed in the present study can help address these key questions facing contemporary 
international society.  
 
Comparative research on power transition  
The framework not only enables the socio-structural analysis of specific instances of 
power transition, but also enables comparative research of various kinds. For example, 
the following three kinds of comparative analysis can be conducted using the framework: 
(1) comparative analysis of how the ways in which international political change in the 
context of power transition is managed in one international society differ from those in 
another international society, and historical analysis of diachronic change in international 
social structure governing the process of international political change; (2) comparative 
analysis between rising powers in a given international society in terms of their goals, the 
means employed to achieve the goals, and their conformity with the norms laid down by 
the institutions of the given international society; and (3) comparative analysis across 
issue-areas aimed at showing how international political change is managed differently 
in different issue-areas. These are but few of possible ways to utilise the framework in 
future research. The framework can be used for such purposes since, although it is based 
on the insights drawn from the interwar debate and is particularly useful for the purpose 
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of analysing power transition in contemporary international society, the framework itself 
is of general applicability and can be used for analysing cases of power transition in the 
past, present and future without difficulty.  
One can also combine the framework with the regional/global distinction so as to 
conduct a comparison across different regions or a comparison between the institutions 
governing international political change at the global level and those at the regional level. 
This would enable further analysis of the role of regional secondary institutions, such as 
the EU, ASEAN and CSTO, in bringing about international political change in regional 
international societies in the context of power transition.  
 
Peaceful change and the role of the UN Security Council  
On the basis of this study, it is possible to undertake an inquiry into what is the best 
possible combination of institutions of international society from the standpoint of 
peaceful change. The effective management of international political change requires 
much more than resort to makeshift measures. If power transition occurs in the context 
provided by international social structure, efforts must be made to rearrange the structure 
so as to render the process of change more peaceful. As shown in the present study, the 
international social structure governing international political change is comprised of a 
series of primary and secondary institutions, and this raises the question as to what is the 
best combination of institutions in terms of the peaceful management of international 
political change, including in the context of power transition. When addressing this 
question, it is important that the findings of comparative and historical analyses 
conducted along the lines suggested above be consulted, although it is always necessary 
to take context into account. Moreover, the three normative positions on peaceful change 
discussed in chapter 4 provide different views on this point.  
In this connection, it is not only possible but even necessary to discuss further what 
the UN Security Council can do to help states to practise the primary institution of 
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peaceful change in contemporary international society, especially in the context of power 
transition, and how it should be reformed so as to enhance its ability in this regard. In 
chapter 7, I have set forth ways to improve the Council’s capacity with regard to peaceful 
change, but these proposals need to be scrutinised and considered in greater detail in 
future research on power transition.  
 
The interaction between agency and structure  
While it has been argued that institutions of international society are neither immutable 
nor unchangeable, the dynamics of institutional change were not examined in depth in the 
present study. The discussions in chapter 3 regarding the emergence of the primary 
institution of non-use of force and other relevant institutions provide hints about how 
institutions in international society come and go. Moreover, the idea of the effectiveness 
of institutions introduced as part of the framework can be referred to when theorising 
international institutional change. However, these points need to be addressed in a more 
systematic manner if we are to fully understand the institutional dynamics in international 
society.  
In this connection, it is well to note that this study has not paid enough attention to 
the agency of states. As far as this study is concerned, this is defensible since the purpose 
of this study is to show how international social structure affects the behaviour of rising 
powers and the process of international political change—a question which has been 
neglected in the existing literature on power transition. However, once the importance of 
international social structure has been established and its role in international political 
change clarified, it is necessary to step back and see the whole, and this means examining 
the interaction between agent and structure and how this interaction produces institutional 
changes.  
This is an old and classic issue in sociology, but it is an issue that is still being hotly 
debated in the discipline, and students of world politics can learn much from the ongoing 
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debates on the issue.14 For ES theorists in particular, this means going back to their 
original starting point for the ES project, which was clearly set out by C.A.W. Manning 
in his The Nature of International Society.15 As Manning showed in this enigmatic but 
seminal book, sociological perspectives can help theorise some of the most important 
aspects of world politics. Pushing future research on power transition in such a 
sociological direction would enable us to better theorise both how international social 
structure affects rising powers and vice versa. Moreover, power transition studies can also 
contribute to the ongoing sociological debates by providing theoretical and empirical 
insights gained from world politics.  
The world is never static, and power transition will continue to be a key issue in 
world politics. By furthering research along the lines suggested above, we will be able to 
gain a better understanding of this perennial issue of world politics.  
 
 
                                                   
14 Recent works on this topic include, for example, Elizabeth Shove, Mika Pantzar and 
Mat Watson, The Dynamics of Social Practice: Everyday Life and How it Changes, 
London: Sage, 2012; James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds), Explaining Institutional 
Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, New York: Cambridge University Press 2010.  
15 C.A.W. Manning, The Nature of International Society, London: London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1962.  
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